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ABSTRACT
CEO succession is an important event in the life of an organization. It is
unavoidable. Around 80% of succession events are relay successions, where a CEO
successor is identified a few years before the actual succession event takes place. The
success of relay succession compared to horse race and outside successions has been
credited to the learning an heir apparent acquires during the transition period. However,
to my knowledge, none of the CEO succession research examines the learning process of
heirs apparent. Studies exploring leaders’ or executives’ learning have not investigated
whether their learning is any different due to their designation as heirs apparent or future
CEOs.
This study attempts to fill this gap through empirical qualitative research by
examining the change in executives’ learning and sensemaking processes after their
designation as heirs apparent. While executives have learned throughout their career, their
designation as heirs apparent has a direct impact on their identity, social context, and
interactions with their environment, the main properties used in the proposed theoretical
framework. Using a combination of learning and sensemaking perspectives, this study
builds premises proposing that the designation of executives as heirs apparent affects their
learning processes by (1) eliciting a new identity for them, (2) triggering a potential for a
future identity, (3) changing their social context, and (4) influencing their enacted
environment.
The research question guiding this study is: “how does the designation of
executives as heirs apparent affect their learning and prepare them to become CEOs?”.
To empirically validate my model and answer this thesis research question, I use a
ii

phenomenological approach. Qualitative data were collected through interviews with 22
CEOs who were promoted from within their organizations, outgoing and ex-CEOs, board
members, and consultants, as well as secondary data.
My findings provide a rich basis for analysis and some indications to support the
proposed model regarding the impact of designation on executives’ learning during the
transition period. This study suggests designation elicits a new identity for the executives
and induces changes in their environment affecting how they interpret cues from the
environment and adjust their behaviours and cognition accordingly. It also suggests
executives, after designation, undergo a deep thinking process to establish the standards
for their future identity as CEOs.
This thesis contributes to CEO succession literature in three ways. Firstly, the
research describes the conjectured learning process executives experience after
designation. Secondly, the thesis demonstrates the impact of the three types of enactment;
namely act, interact, and double interact; on the learning outcomes. Thirdly, the findings
also provide a basis to re-examine many of the prevailing descriptions, definitions, and
assumptions in the existing literature with respect to relay succession and heirs apparent.
This research helps generate important insights that may improve the CEO succession
process in organizations.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
First listed reason to sell
The remarkable success of Berkshire Hathaway is nearly wholly attributable to
Warren Buffett and Charles Munger. Though Buffett has put in place a succession
plan and has chosen a successor, the names of the to-be CEO remain under a veil.
However, there remains an air of uncertainty regarding the performance of the
company under a new CEO. In our view, it is unlikely that any new management of
this conglomerate will be able to continue Buffett and Munger’s long-term market
out-performance. (“Berkshire Hathaway”, Zacks Equity Research, August 22, 2013,
available through Lexis Nexis)
First listed reason to buy
Prior to market open on 3 April TD announced its succession plan for President and
CEO Ed Clark, a process that will play out in steps over the next 19 months and will
culminate with current U.S. banking chief Bharat Masrani assuming the top spot at
TD to begin November 2014. We believe that no bank we cover has been as closely
linked with the strategic vision of its leader as has been the case with TD and CEO
Clark, and as such the news of the elongated transfer provides answers to the
important questions of “who?” and “when?” that have been an ongoing point of
discussion for TD investors in the past few years. (“TD Bank Financial Group”,
Macquarie Equities Research, April 4, 2013, available through Thompson One)
1.1. Motivation for the Study
CEO succession is an inevitable event every organization has to face
(Giambatista, Rowe, & Riaz, 2005; Grusky, 1960; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). A change in
any senior managerial position affects a firm’s political, financial, and social climate, as
well as its morale (Friedman & Saul, 1991). Thus, the turnover in the firm’s CEO position
is believed to have a significant impact on the firm’s performance (Alexander, Fennell, &
Halpern, 1993; Helmich & Brown, 1972). The above statements regarding Berkshire
Hathaway and TD Bank show the impact of CEO succession planning on analysts’
valuation of companies. Both reports use succession as the primary reason for their
recommendation to shareholders on whether to buy or sell the stock under consideration,
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which explains why CEO succession is one of the critical responsibilities of boards of
directors – second only to the financial performance of organizations (Biggs, 2004).
Given its importance, many researchers have studied the event of CEO
succession. Most studies have investigated the succession event itself or the passing of the
CEO title, emphasizing the impact of the characteristics of the incoming CEO or the
different types of succession on post-CEO-succession organizational performance
(Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). However, the recent examples
provided below from The Wall Street Journal and The Globe and Mail indicate the
process of transferring the CEO title often starts with the identification of an heir apparent
long before the actual succession event.
Helping assess that strategy is the company’s new president and chief operating
officer Keith Creel, a long-time protegé of Mr. Harrison from their days together at
Illinois Central Railroad and then at Canadian National Railways Co. Mr. Harrison
described Mr. Creel as his clear heir apparent (Dixon, 2013).
… Bank of Nova Scotia became the first of the major banks to strongly signal its next
CEO. Brian Porter, a 31-year veteran of Canada’s third-largest bank, was named
president of the bank on Wednesday, assuming that role from current chief executive
officer Rick Waugh. Though Scotiabank executives did not elaborate on their reasons
for the move, it is widely seen as setting the stage for Mr. Waugh’s eventual
departure after nearly 10 years at the helm (Robertson, 2012).
The transition has already taken place at Toyota Motor Corp., where Akio Toyoda,
56 years old, a great-grandson of the company’s founder, was elevated to CEO in
2009. It is expected to happen soon at Ford Motor Co., where Mark Fields, 51, was
recently named chief operating officer, making him the heir-apparent to CEO Alan
Mulally, who is 67 (Ramsey, 2012).
While Vancil (1987) was among the first researchers to emphasize the importance
of studying CEO succession, Cannella and Shen (2001) were among the first researchers
to highlight the importance of acquiring a deeper understanding of heir apparent or relay
succession. Relay succession refers to the process where a successor, usually referred to
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as the heir apparent, is identified a significant period of time before the actual succession
event (Rowe, 1996; Vancil, 1987). Relay succession is the most common and least
disruptive form of succession in major corporations (Rowe, 1996; Vancil, 1987). It
constitutes more than 80% of total CEO changes in publicly traded companies (Carey,
Phelan, & Useem, 2009). Understanding the characteristics of effective relay succession
is hence a critical factor in understanding CEO succession more generally. In a landmark
study on CEO succession, Vancil (1987) suggested heirs apparent learn about the CEO
role during their transition tenure. In a similar, more recent study, Zhang and Rajagopalan
(2004) conjectured that heirs apparent outperform other types of successors because they
have the time to learn before becoming CEOs. These authors used the overlap time
between the incoming and outgoing CEOs as a proxy for learning, but they did not
provide any evidence about the actual learnings or learning processes of the heirs
apparent during the transition period. In the corporate world, human resource executives
focus on naming the replacement or heirs apparent to the outgoing executives. They
assume the incoming executives’ learning and development will happen naturally and
their interference is unnecessary (Hall, 1986). While most studies and management
practice infer that learning happens, the most recent literature review on CEO succession
by Giambatista et al. (2005) calls for more understanding between learning and CEO
succession.
In summary, CEO succession affects the valuation of companies (Graffin,
Carpenter, & Boivie, 2011; Shen & Cannella, 2003). Heir apparent or relay succession
constitutes the majority (around 80%) of succession practices in large organizations. The
majority of the research conducted on heirs apparent attributes the success of relay
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succession to the learning heirs apparent acquire during the transition period (Vancil,
1987; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004), but little evidence has been provided to support this
argument. Consistent with Hall’s (1986) predictions, heir apparent research assumes
learning happens during the transition period. The most recent literature review study on
CEO succession has invited researchers to examine how the learning happens during
transition periods (Giambatista et al., 2005). However, to my knowledge, how the
designation of executives as heirs apparent affects their learning has not yet been studied.
In this dissertation, I explore the impact of the designation of executives as heirs
apparent on their learning during the transition period to becoming CEO. I focus on the
impact of designation on triggering a change in identity and in the social environment for
the executive affecting their learning. This is important because research has shown the
learning process is influenced by who the learners are (Jarvis, 2006) and by context
(Weick, 1995). Additionally, I elaborate on the learning process designate CEOs
experience and the impact of their enactment style with the incumbent CEOs on their
learning outcomes during the transition period. I also present some of the barriers and
enablers affecting their learning process. The main research question for this study is
hence: “how does the designation of executives as heirs apparent affect their learning
and prepare them to become CEOs?”.
The key concepts used in this dissertation are:
Designation: refers to the event when the executives themselves realized they were
appointed to be the next CEO.
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Heirs apparent: refers to any officer who was a senior manager at the organization before
assuming the CEO role. This terminology has been replaced with CEO-Ds after the
fieldwork for reasons explained later.
Learning: describes a long-term change in the individual’s behaviour, cognition, and
identity.
Identity: though individuals have multiple identities, the executives’ identity used in this
dissertation refers to the meanings and behaviours executives attach to their professional
role as future CEO.
Social context: represents the perceived or actual influence of relevant actors in the
executives’ professional environment.
Enactment: denotes the interaction, mainly between the designated CEOs and incumbent
CEOs. It includes three different forms of interaction: Act, interact, and double interact.
1.2. Theoretical Lenses
While many things may occur during a relay succession process, this thesis
focuses on understanding the learning heirs apparent undergo during their transition
period. This is a focal point because the aforementioned learning is a common
explanation for the relative advantage of relay successions in terms of post-succession
organizational performance. Many studies have been conducted on how managers and
leaders learn. The thesis studies how the designation as an heir apparent affects
executives’ learning and CEO preparation. The aforementioned focus

enhances our

knowledge of relay succession processes in particular and CEO succession in general
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(Cannella & Shen, 2001; Giambatista et al., 2005). It also assists boards of directors as
well as incumbent and incoming CEOs to improve CEO succession practices.
The thesis’ research question is “how the designation of executives as heirs
apparent affects their learning and prepares them to become CEOs”. This question aims
to understand how the designation as heirs apparent affects, if at all, the behaviour,
cognition, and identity of the designated executives during the transition period. To
address this question, I develop premises which support a model describing the impact of
the designation as future CEO on the executives’ identity and social context. I also
illustrate the influence of different executives’ enactment styles of their environment;
namely act, interact, and double interact; on the change in their behaviour, cognition, and
identity. I propose that the designation itself is important because it triggers a new
identity for the executives, that of future CEOs, and produces a corresponding effect on
their behaviour and mindset in order to affirm the new identity.
In addition to triggering an immediate identity, the heir apparent one, I expect the
designation will result in executives undergoing a learning process and questioning their
existing and perceived standards of the new role to create a new set of standards for their
future identity, the CEO identity. The incumbent CEOs represent the most well-known
exemplification to the designate CEOs of how CEOs act. I therefore propose that the
styles and standards of the incumbent CEOs constitute the starting point for the
designated CEOs’ new standards.
The designation creates a new social environment for the executives. I propose the
expectations of employees, board members, and stakeholders regarding the designated
executives, change immediately upon designation as the future leaders of the
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organization. Executives may feel the need to align their behaviours and their mindset to
meet the new expectations of their social environment.
Finally, I suggest not all designate CEOs experience the same level of learning
during the transition period as conjectured in prevailing research on the heirs apparent
succession process. I propose different types of enactment result in different learning
outcomes. Since the incumbent CEO is an important potential person for the designate
CEO to learn from during the transition period, I build my arguments distinguishing
among three types of interaction – act, interact, and double interact (defined later in
chapter 3) (Weick, 1995, 2012); between the designate and the incumbent CEOs. I
propose double interact is the form of interaction that leads to the creation of shared
mental models between the CEOs, incumbent and designate, while act is the least likely
to reduce ambiguity and create a shared mental model. Interact leads to learning outcomes
in between the two extreme enactment forms.
I use sensemaking to explain meaning making from a social and action-oriented
perspective. This research starts at the individual level, the designate CEOs, and
transcends to the group level, the designate CEOs and members of their social context,
especially the incumbent CEO, the board of directors, and other relevant stakeholders.
Sensemaking helps to span these two levels to understanding the learning process of
designate CEOs during the transition period. However, it falls short in its ability to
explain how designate CEOs change or acquire new professional identities. To overcome
this gap, I use learning theories to explain how the designate CEOs create identity
standards for their future role. The combination of learning and sensemaking provides the
opportunity to explore the research question of this study (“how the designation of

8
executives as heirs apparent affects their learning”). Combining learning and
sensemaking also allows for the consideration of both the individual and social levels
surrounding my area of interest.
1.3. Research Design
The prior research on heirs apparent and relay succession is limited despite the
importance of this phenomenon for organizations (Cannella & Shen, 2001), and is
primarily quantitative (Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Previous studies
in this field rely heavily on large samples and archival data to understand the impact,
mainly on organization performance, of measurable variables related to incoming and
outgoing CEOs (c.f. Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). These quantitative
studies describe simplified relationships between variables (c.f. Antonacopoulou, 2001)
that result in the process of “learning” being accepted as “obvious”.
To understand the learning process of heirs apparent during the transition period, I
conducted a phenomenological study and in doing so, I answered a call for more
qualitative research by Giambatista et al. (2005) for the validation of quantitative studies’
interpretations of CEO succession. In this research, I attempted to explore the inference
regarding the learning of heirs apparent during the transition period (cf. Zhang &
Rajagopalan, 2004). A phenomenological study is most appropriate for research exploring
a specific experience of individuals, in this case, the learning of designate CEOs during
the transition period.
This methodology enabled me to capture the relationships between designation
and change in identity and social context reported by the respondents. The methodology
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furthermore aided me in gaining an understanding of the learning process and outcomes
under three different types of enactments. I used semi-structured structured interviews
with 22 CEOs to understand their experience during the transition period. I also
conducted interviews with outgoing CEOs, ex-CEOs, chairs of boards of directors, and
board members to establish a more comprehensive understanding of the CEO succession
event. I interviewed a consultant who specializes in helping organizations through CEO
succession and a journalist who reports on CEO successions in organizations in order to
have an external, independent view on the phenomenon. Given the public nature of my
participants and their organizations, I found a wealth of public information on their
succession event, which I used to validate some of the interviews. However, I used the
secondary information with extreme caution because of the tendency of organizations to
report a favourable image and change the representation of any possible
misunderstandings inside the organization. While these articles were helpful to me to
understand some of the complexities of the succession events, I was not in a position to
use any of this information directly in my research because of the risk of disclosing my
participants’ identities.
I analyzed data from the semi-structured interviews using NVivo to identify
shared elements in the experiences of the participants related to identity, social context,
and forms of enactment. I performed several transformations in the participants’
transcribed interviews in order to reach a thorough understanding of their experiences. I
used this data to produce a structure representing the shared elements in the experience of
all of the participants with respect to each of the premises constructed in the theoretical
model.
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Undoubtedly, my beliefs and experiences shaped this research (Creswell, 2013;
Giorgi, 2009). To inform the readers about my biases, I have included a reflexivity
statement to help readers interpret my findings while identifying my beliefs.
1.4. Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized in seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the
area of interest, the research questions, and a brief description of the theoretical model
and methodology used. Chapter 2 presents a review of the relevant literatures on CEO
succession – with an emphasis on relay succession, learning, and sensemaking in order to
prepare the necessary background for the proposed theoretical model. Chapter 3 describes
the theoretical model and the supporting premises that explain the impact of heir apparent
designation on executives’ identity and social context and the resulting change in
behaviour and cognition. It also includes premises regarding how the different types of
enactment between the incumbent and incoming CEOs impact the incoming CEOs’
learning during the transition period. Chapter 4 explains the methodology used in this
study, including the rationale for the use of a phenomenological approach, the data
collection methods and the coding and analytical procedures. Chapter 5 presents the
analysis and interpretation of my findings and their support or lack thereof to the premises
and model. Chapter 6 offers a discussion of my findings given the special context of the
research. Chapter 7 provides a summary of the academic contributions and practitioner
implications of the findings, the limitations of this study, as well as the directions for
future research.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
CEO succession events are unavoidable and disruptive for organizations. Rowe
(1996) argued relay successions are the least disruptive, horse races are more disruptive,
and CEO dismissals are the most disruptive. When an incumbent CEO is associated with
the good performance of an organization, the high expectations of this CEO may lead
stakeholders, especially shareholders, to believe the heir apparent may not achieve the
same level of performance. Thus, the disruption may occur because the stakeholders
question the capabilities of the incoming CEO.
Will the incoming CEO develop the necessary skills and knowledge to sustain the
good performance of the organization? Relay succession researchers assume heirs
apparent learn from outgoing CEOs but fail to explain how. To answer this question, I
used two complementary lenses: sensemaking and learning. Sensemaking explains the
impact of identity and social context on the executives’ learning. Sensemaking also
includes the social process through which executives interact with others to enact their
environment and update their capabilities. Learning explains how humans grow and build
a new set of standards for their changed professional identity. In this chapter, I review the
relevant literature on CEO succession, namely relay succession, learning, and
sensemaking and proceed to integrate these theories, as represented in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: From the Heir Apparent to the CEO: The Theoretical Context

Heir Apparent

Sensemaking

Learning

2.1. CEO Succession
What a firm becomes can be significantly influenced by how and to whom
this [CEO’s] power and authority are passed … This makes CEO
succession a defining event for virtually every organization (Kesner &
Sebora, 1994, p. 352. Brackets are added.).

2.1.1. A General Overview
Strategy and organization scholars’ interest in CEO succession research grew
mainly because of the importance of the event to organizations. Succession is
unavoidable, and even a smooth succession

results in insecurity in organizations

(Grusky, 1960). When the turnover in any managerial position affects a firm’s political,
financial, social climates, as well as its morale (Friedman & Saul, 1991), then the
turnover in the firm’s CEO position is believed to have a major impact on the firm’s
performance (Alexander et al., 1993; Helmich & Brown, 1972). Even in poorly
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performing companies, changing the CEO may result in distancing the only individual,
i.e. the incumbent CEO, who understands the problem(s) and who may be the only one
able to suggest appropriate remedies (Morrow Jr., 2002; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004).
In addition to its importance to strategy and organization scholars, CEO
succession is also important for managers and boards of directors. CEO succession
constitutes a major concern for boards of directors, second only to corporate performance
(Biggs, 2004). It is also important for other stakeholders and continues to be a hot topic in
the popular media (Giambatista et al., 2005). Nominations of best and worst CEOs remain
a perennial favourite for news media at the beginning of every year. Analysts identify
companies lacking clear succession plans, speculate about who will succeed the current
CEOs, and try to predict companies’ post-succession performance. Berkshire Hathaway is
currently one of the companies under scrutiny for its unclear succession plans to the
outside world.
There have been two comprehensive reviews of prior research on leader
succession to date. The first review, by Kesner and Sebora (1994), was conducted on
leader succession research completed prior to the end of 1994. The second study, by
Giambatista et al. (2005), covered the period from 1994 to 2004. Most of the research
conducted on leader succession research is quantitative and addresses the antecedents
and consequences of succession (Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994), with
less emphasis on what happens during the transition period (Giambatista et al., 2005).
A question often addressed in the CEO succession literature is the origin of the
incoming CEO (Giambatista et al., 2005). Who are the better performers, insiders or
outsiders? Findings are equivocal. A few researchers argue that insiders outperform
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outsiders most of the time (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004, 2006). Others find the results to
be contextually based, where insiders outperform outsiders in well-performing
organizations and outsiders outperform insiders in poorly performing organizations
(Citrin & Ogden, 2010). Parker, Peters, and Turetsky (2002) found that companies in
distress with externally recruited CEOs double their risk of going bankrupt as compared
to companies where CEOs are internally promoted.
There are mainly two processes for insider CEO successions: a relay succession
and a horse race succession (Vancil, 1987). The relay process occurs when an
organization grooms one successor mostly known as the heir apparent for the CEO
position. Horse race succession occurs when several executives are considered as possible
candidates for the CEO position. Some companies may use a combination of these
processes whereby they use the horse race to appoint the heir apparent who later becomes
the CEO. General Electric employed this strategy during the transition between Reginald
Jones and Jack Welch in 1981 and between Jack Welch and Jeffrey Immelt in 2001.
Though both processes result in an insider at the top of the organization, they are different
in terms of their benefits and risks and in the degree of instability or turbulence that they
cause in the organization. A horse race usually leads to the exit of important talent from
the organization. Candidates who lose the race often feel compelled to leave and are
likely to find attractive jobs elsewhere (Lehmberg, Rowe, White, & Phillips, 2009).
Relay succession is considered the least disruptive form of all succession
processes (Vancil, 1987), both internally and externally. Internally, employees’ morale
and confidence are maintained by the smooth transition of leadership (Zajac, 1990).
Externally, companies with heirs apparent suffer fewer negative market reactions
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(Davidson III, Nemec, & Worrell, 2001) and more positive shareholders reactions (Behn,
Riley, & Yang, 2005; Shen & Cannella, 2003) to their CEO succession events than
companies who select CEOs following a public horse race or hire outside CEOs.
This research focuses on understanding the heir apparent transition period for the
following two reasons. First, despite the mixed findings on the consequences of CEO
succession, relay succession is still the most common form of succession (Finkelstein &
Hambrick, 1996) representing more than 75% of all succession procedures (Allgood &
Farrell, 2003; Carey et al., 2009; Moriarty, 2009; Rowe, 1996; Zhang & Rajagopalan,
2004). Second, relay succession is assumed to be the least disruptive form of succession
for post-succession organizational performance (Helfat & Bailey, 2005; Vancil, 1987).
2.1.2. Heir Apparent Defined
Relay succession involves identifying a CEO successor, whom Vancil (1987)
referred to as the heir apparent, a few years before the actual succession event takes place.
Vancil (1987) did not limit the title of heir apparent to the COO or president. Later
studies, however, used the role of COO and/or president as a proxy to identify the heirs
apparent in organizations. This occurred because the studies were based on archival
datasets. Cannella and Shen (2001), among the first researchers to explore the position of
heirs apparent (Giambatista et al., 2005), defined an heir apparent as “any officer who
was the only person in a firm holding the title of president or of COO or both and who
was at least five years younger than the incumbent CEO” (p. 259). Many researchers,
interested in the concept of heirs apparent, adopted Cannella and Shen’s definition of an
heir apparent (Behn et al., 2005; Cannella & Shen, 2001; Shen & Cannella, 2003). Others
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modified it to exclude the condition related to the age difference between the CEO and
heir apparent (Boyer & Ortiz-Molina, 2008; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004, 2006).
Drawing on Vancil’s (1987) description of an heir apparent and Cannella and
Shen’s (2001) definition and later related adjustments, this study adopts the following
definition of an heir apparent: any manager in the company who was a senior executive,
including being the COO and/or president, before assuming the CEO role. This definition
is appropriate for this work because reliance on archival data is minimal. I conducted
extensive checking on each executive chosen before data was collected. I was able to
identify inside successors whether they were appointed COO and/or president or whether
they had a different title before becoming the CEO.
2.1.3. Learning of Heirs Apparent
In a relay succession, the heir apparent is selected a few years before the actual
succession event takes place (Vancil, 1987). This key feature of the relay succession
process has led many researchers to conjecture that heirs apparent have the time to learn
from incumbent CEOs. For example, using the upper echelons literature on executives’
cognitive orientation, Bigley and Wiersema (2002) argued that the longer the tenure of an
executive as the heir apparent, the more likely the incoming CEO will learn from the
outgoing CEO, not only in terms of job-related skills but also the outgoing CEO’s
strategic orientation. Using a learning lens, Zhang and Rajagopalan (2006) assumed heirs
apparent have enough time to learn the necessary job skills and outperform other types of
successors once they become the sitting CEOs. Shen and Cannella (2003) assumed heirs
apparent, given the status of incoming CEOs and the time, use the transition period to
build relationships with key stakeholders of companies and enhance investors’ post-
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succession expectations. Harris and Helfat (1997) built on the key feature of relay
succession to justify their argument that internal CEOs have more company-specific skills
and knowledge than external CEOs. The following anecdotal stories told by retired CEOs,
incumbent CEOs, and heirs apparent also provide insight into the dynamic between
outgoing and incoming CEOs and support the assumptions made by CEO succession
researchers:
I saw practically everything he did. I learned how to make decisions, for Kirk was
excellent at making them fast and making most of them right. When you have his kind
of experience and feel for a business, you can make very rapid decisions, particularly
where you can forecast the result (Watson & Petre, 2000, p. 132). Retired Thomas
Watson Jr. recalls his experience during the transition period from being an heir
apparent to becoming IBM’s CEO.
I learned [from Jobs] that focus is key. You can only do so many things well, and you
should cast aside everything else. I think he taught all of us that life is fragile, and
we’re not guaranteed anything tomorrow, so give it all you’ve got.… It was a gift. It
was an art… I saw it daily (Tweney, 2012). Tim Cook during his first year as Apple’s
CEO.
There’s a lot I can learn from Jack. I think the transition is going to be natural. Both
of us are always guided by doing what’s best for the company (CNNfn, 2000). Jeff
Immelt when he was declared GE’s heir apparent and Welch’s successor.
However, while learning is assumed to be an essential component of the
development of heirs apparent, little is known both theoretically and empirically about
this phenomenon. Aside from a few anecdotal stories, previous research (cf. Bigley &
Wiersema, 2002; Harris & Helfat, 1997; Shen & Cannella, 2003; Zhang & Rajagopalan,
2004) only conjectures that given the time overlap between incoming and outgoing
CEOs, heirs apparent learn from incumbent CEOs. For example, Harris and Helfat (1997)
and Shen and Cannella (2003) did not include any variables measuring learning. Bigley
and Wiersema (2002) and Zhang and Rajagopalan (2004) argued for the learning of heirs

18
apparent based on their speculation that the tenure overlap allows the incoming CEOs to
learn from the outgoing CEOs. They thus measured learning as the length of executives’
tenure as heirs apparent. These studies account neither for the negative potential impact of
learning nor for the possibility that incumbent CEOs may be unwilling to train heirs
apparent and pass the baton.
Along with the advantages attached to learning from predecessors come the
disadvantages. Some researchers believe the ability of heirs apparent to induce strategic
change after they become CEOs is limited because they are trained by the previous CEOs
(Bigley & Wiersema, 2002). Many CEOs are suspected of selecting successors who are
similar to them and will carry on their vision for the company (Devries, 1988; Zajac &
Westphal, 1996). The cognitive independence of some heirs apparent is hence believed to
be compromised by the intense influence of and socialization by their predecessors
(Charan, 2005; Fondas & Wiersema, 1997). To show the limited ability of heirs apparent
to induce strategic change, Bigley and Wiersema (2002) used the literature on managerial
cognitive orientation. They argued the longer the executives have been designated as
heirs apparent, the more likely they acquire the same cognitive orientation as the
incumbent CEOs, and the less likely they are to induce strategic change. To achieve this,
they used heir apparent tenure (independent variable) as the proxy for the similarity
between the incoming and outgoing CEOs’ strategic orientation, and strategic refocusing
(dependent variable) as their measure of strategic change. They measured strategic
refocusing as the percentage variation in the organization’s level of diversification for the
three years following the succession event. However, their study did not control for the
past strategic orientation of each company and hence their conclusion was based solely on
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the ability of an heir apparent to induce strategic refocusing over and above the status quo
of the organization. They also did not account for the quality of interaction between the
heir apparent and the CEO; they simply assumed the interaction between the two
executives led to similarities in their cognitive maps. Nevertheless, while heirs apparent
have the opportunity to “learn the ropes” from outgoing CEOs, it is assumed they may
run the risk of being restricted to learning the outgoing CEO’s mindsets (Bigley &
Wiersema, 2002).
Other streams of executive turnover research show CEOs are not always eager to
educate heirs apparent and give up their positions even when they are performing poorly
(Boeker, 1992; Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988; Sonnenfeld, 1988). Some
CEOs do not like to pass the baton for fear of losing their source of power and realizing
they are dispensable (Devries, 1988; Goh, 2002) and/or mortal (Levinson, 1974;
Sonnenfeld, 1988). Steve Jobs, for example, was disappointed when Apple’s share price
increased under the management of Tim Cook during his medical leave: “He (Steve Jobs)
was coming to grips with the thought that he might not be indispensable to the company.
Apple stock had fared well while he was away, going from $82 when he announced his
leave in January 2009 to $140 when he returned at the end of May” (Isaacson, 2011, p.
272). Whether the incumbent CEO chooses the heir apparent or not, it is believed some
incumbent CEOs will want to hold onto the power and prestige of the position for as long
as they can. Empirically, Cannella and Shen (2001) showed the more powerful the CEO
is, the less likely the heir apparent will get the CEO position. Immelt, for example, was
supposed to become the CEO of GE at the end of 2000 (CNNfn, 2000), yet Jack Welch
held onto the position until the end of 2001. However, Cannella and Shen (2001)
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measured only the CEO power and ignored the CEO’s refusal to give up power. If the
CEOs were willing to give up power, they are more likely to help the heir apparent during
the transition period to assume the CEO role.
2.1.4. Summary
CEO succession events can be disruptive to organizations (Helfat & Bailey,
2005). There is a general agreement in the existing literature and practice-based research
on leader succession that grooming an heir apparent contributes to a smoother CEO
transition (Vancil, 1987) and positive post-succession performance (Zhang &
Rajagopalan, 2004). Most researchers who study heirs apparent argue the main reason
behind the preference for relay succession is the opportunity presented to the heir
apparent to learn the skills required from the incumbent CEO. This thesis will explore the
heir apparent learning process. Specifically, it will examine the impact of the designation
of executives as heirs apparent on their learning processes and highlight the enabling and
restricting conditions affecting the learning in an attempt to enhance the succession
process. This thesis answers Giambatista et al.’s (2005) call to explore the link between
learning and CEO succession.
2.2. Learning
Learning helps individuals acquire new behaviours, skills, and ideas. Learning to
learn helps individuals to continue to develop and grow (Jarvis, 2006; Ormrod, 2012).
Inherent in these statements is the following assumption: learning has a positive outcome.
However, individuals may also learn undesirable behaviours or beliefs (Jarvis, 2006)
leading to negative outcomes or miseducation (Dewey, 1938). This research aims at
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understanding the learning process necessary for the development of human beings,
which is worth studying both for theoretical enrichment and practical value. The direct
scope of this research is not to qualify the outcome of learning as negative or positive,
some reference will be made if and when feasible. The purpose of this research is to shed
some light on the learning process in order to help companies and their boards develop a
learning environment to reach their intended outcome.
Human beings do not live in a vacuum. They construct their own personal
philosophies or mental models based on their interactions with the world. These mental
models represent individuals’ own perceptions of how the world operates (Craik, 1943)
and guide their thought processes, decisions, and behaviours (Feynman, Leighton, &
Hutchings, 1985), and hence represent their accumulated learning. New learning may
occur when an individual experiences disjuncture (Jarvis, 2006) or dissonance caused by
the occurrence of unexpected events or the non-occurrence of expected ones (Mandler,
1984). These unforeseen situations challenge the ability of an individual’s existing mental
models to explain what happened. While disjuncture or dissonance is necessary for new
learning, its mere occurrence is an insufficient condition to lead to new learning. The
following sections show that even in the presence of dissonance, the learner plays an
important role in whether new learning occurs.
2.2.1. Learning Defined
Behaviourism is one of the first perspectives applied to learning. Behaviourists
focus mainly on observable behaviours (i.e. objectively measured) to infer learning. They
investigate the relationship between an external stimulus and the resulting behaviour.
Two main examples of behavioural theories are classical conditioning and instrumental
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conditioning (Ormrod, 2012). Pavlov (1927, 2010) was the pioneer of the classical
conditioning impact on learning. This perspective explains the relationship between
external stimuli and behaviours or responses. The instrumental conditioning perspective
examines the effects of reinforcement in increasing or suppressing behaviour, known
respectively as operant conditioning or punishment. Rather than looking at the stimuli–
behaviour relationship, this perspective looks at the frequency of repeating or avoiding
certain behaviours as a result of whether the behaviour is followed by reinforcement
(Skinner, 1938) or punishment (Ormrod, 2012). Pure behavioural theorists assume
repetitive stimuli or repetitive consequences will lead to the expected behaviour and
ignore the cognitive models, maps, and abilities of the learners.
Cognitive theorists believe understanding learning cannot be reduced to the
analysis of the exhibited behaviour. They argue the information resulting from the
learner’s interaction with the environment is an unobservable process and may or may not
lead to observable behaviours. Purposive behaviourism or latent learning suggests a new
perspective for the study of learning. Unlike instrumental conditioning, this perspective
suggests reinforcement affects performance or the end result and not learning (Tolman &
Honzik, 1930). While the behaviourists believe learning happens when it can be observed
through new behaviours, Tolman and Honzik (1930) demonstrated learning may occur
without the individual’s behaviour necessarily reflecting the

new behaviour.

Reinforcement triggers the change in behaviour not the learning. The latent learning
perspective links the occurrence of new behaviour, or the previously used variable to
measure learning, to reinforcement not to learning. Hence, rather than relying solely on
observable behaviour as a measure of learning, cognitive theorists explore unobservable
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internal processes such as memory, attention, and cognitive schemas or mental models
(Jarvis, 2010; Mazur, 1993, 1998; Ormrod, 2012).
Behaviourists argue that in order to identify if learning happened we need to see it
in behaviour. Cognitive theorists contend learning may occur without behaviour
necessarily reflecting the learning. Inkpen and Crossan (1995) combine these approaches
and assert integrated learning occurs when changes in both behaviour and cognition take
place. Figure 2.2 below illustrates the relationship between cognition and behaviour.
When

neither

cognition

nor

behavioural

changes

occur

due

to

an

experience/stimulus, then no learning occurs. When both change, then integrated learning,
which is a form of sustained learning, occurs. When change occurs only in one area (for
example, cognition) without respective change in the second area (for example,
behaviour) then change is expected to be temporary and cannot lead to sustained learning;
the ultimate result is no learning. An example of this is blocked learning. The authors
argue temporary change in one or the other may lead to sustained learning only if it is
followed by the respective change in the other element, such as in the case of anticipatory
change and experimental learning.
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Figure 2.2: The Relationship between Cognition and Behaviour
Behavioural Change
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Source: Inkpen, A. C., and Crossan, M. M. 1995. Believing is seeing: Joint ventures and organization
learning. Journal of Management Studies, 32(5): p. 599

The earliest research in the field links learning to behaviour while later studies
link it to cognition, and the most recent views connect learning to a change in both
behaviour and cognition (Inkpen & Crossan, 1995; Ormrod, 2012). However, these
definitions apply to all living organisms, not only human beings (cf. Tolman & Honzik,
1930). The most recent developments in the learning perspective emphasize the human
learner in order to provide a richer understanding of the learning process (Jarvis, 2006,
2010). By acknowledging the impact on and change in individual cognitive assets,
cognitive theorists highlight the importance of the learner in the learning process. Within
this perspective, the individual’s internal processes largely shape the learning (Burke &
Stets, 2009). Researchers in the field believe human learners bring to the learning
situation their own experiences, meaning systems, and self.

The ‘self’ referenced

includes self-confidence, self-esteem, and self-perception (Jarvis, 2010).
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Building on the role individuals’ mental models play in understanding the world
around them, Mezirow (1997) developed transformational learning theory, which
explains how human beings learn to think like adults (Mezirow, 2012). The main focus of
Mezirow’s transformation theory is how individuals learn using their own purposes,
values, emotions, and beliefs. Mezirow differentiated between four ways of learning,
ranging from the expansion of current understanding to the total transformation of frames
of reference (Sherlock & Nathan, 2008). Mezirow explained how the change in
individuals’ social status may lead the individuals to evolve a new set of standards and
upgrade their frame of reference. Bandura (2001) explained how the social environment
influences the human learning and hence helps in the development of their new set of
standards. He argued human beings may imitate the observed and retained behaviour of
other beings in their social context if they believe these individuals and/or their
behaviours are important to their well-being.
My research emphasizes the criticality of the individual learner in the learning
process and develops premises accounting for the changes which might influence the
identity and internal processes of the heir apparent. The research builds on these concepts
in order to provide an explanation for the learning executives receive upon their
designation as heir apparent. The thesis contributes to the literature by providing a
perspective to explain how designated heirs apparent build the standards for their future
CEO identity. Building on cognitive, behavioural, and adult learning theories, this
dissertation adopts a customized definition to reflect human learning and acknowledges
the importance of the learner’s mental models in linking the antecedents, process, and
outcomes of learning as follows:
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Learning is a continuous process where the learner experiences equivocality or
disharmony in a situation, which he/she then processes in his/her own mind (i.e.
existing mental models) or body (i.e. reproduces physically), resulting in a longterm change in the mental models, behaviour, or identity of the learner.
There are several important elements in this definition. At the beginning and end
of the process there is the learner who is learning. In the context of this research the
learner is the designate CEO. The learning process is a recurring one with the heir
apparent at the end of one experience becomes the starting point to the next one. This
definition assumes that learning is triggered only when the existing mental models of the
heir apparent experiences disharmony or equivocality. Learning happens when the heir
apparent tries to resolve the disharmony or equivocality and updates his/her existing
mental models, behaviour, or identity accordingly. Thus, if the heir apparent merely
confirms existing knowledge, learning is not assumed to have taken place.
2.2.2. Summary
The learning theoretical perspective provides us with a general framework to
explain the learning heirs apparent experience during the transition period, which is
assumed in CEO succession literature but unexplored. The adult learning perspective aids
in accounting for the unique mental models of heirs apparent while explaining their
learning processes and how they learn to act given the circumstances. Adult learning
theories provide a framework which explains how heirs apparent build a set of standards
for their future CEO identity. This perspective lacks an ability to explain how the
designation of heir apparent affects the learning processes of executives within
organizations. The designation of heir apparent is an action which may change the way
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the executive learns in action (Argyris & Schön, 1992). To explore this aspect of the heir
apparent learning process, the thesis examines sensemaking next.
2.3. Sensemaking
Sensemaking predominately describes how people construct meaning of their
social world and the resulting consequences. The main focus of sensemaking is to provide
an explanation for the behaviour of actors, practitioners, and individuals as they
experience equivocality in their world (Smerek, 2011). Karl Weick coined the term
“sensemaking” (Schwandt, 2005). Weick (1979, 1995) used sensemaking to understand
how people think and act in social contexts. Sensemaking helps explain how executives
make meaning of their designation as heirs apparent and the impact of this designation on
their ongoing flow of experience. Weick (2008) described sensemaking as the process
through which human beings deal with equivocality, look for meaning, accept plausible
explanations, and “move on”.
Sensemaking is the ability to build a plausible story to aid the individual in
reducing equivocality from the environment. Sensemaking helps one rationalize one’s
actions in order to create meaning from an experience within the specific social context.
The new meaning will then form a new environment and one’s new experiences will then
be explained within the understandings of the new environment. This explains Weick’s
inference that individuals enact their own environment, which in turn affects their actions.
The environment of heirs apparent, however, is not merely their “creation”. While heirs
apparent contribute to the creation of their environment, they interact with others, thus
their environment is a product of co-creation. Co-enactment results from the interaction
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between heirs apparent and those of the other top management team members, including
CEOs and boards of directors.
To some extent, heirs apparent are expected to conform to current CEOs’
corporate visions (Saporito & Winum, 2012). The incumbent CEOs’ and boards of
directors’ cognitive maps represent companies’ governing dominant logic (Bettis &
Prahalad, 1995) which heirs apparent are expected to preserve. The ability of heirs
apparent to learn is dependent on the way they enact their environments. Some heirs
apparent might interpret constraints as being their creation and might act to overcome
them. Other heirs apparent might interpret them as objects present in their environment to
which they need to react (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). The different ways heirs
apparent enact their environment are a fundamental component of this research and are
presented more fully in the next chapter.
2.3.1. Sensemaking Defined
Weick (2008) defined sensemaking as “the ongoing retrospective development of
plausible images that rationalize what people are doing” to reduce equivocality.
Sensemaking explains how individuals learn every day in a social context. According to
Weick (2012), learning is a social, collective phenomenon between people - not a
detached phenomenon inside of a single mind. Sensemaking aims to explain how people
learn new behaviours and beliefs to reduce the equivocality resulting from disharmonies
they face. The process of sensemaking starts with an enactment, followed by the selection
of explanations, and finishes with the retention of the most plausible explanation for the
situation. To help us better understand sensemaking, Weick (1995) described seven
properties affecting how individuals select cues to understand an event and change their
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understanding of the situation to fit a specific context. Below is a brief description of
these properties.
Individual identity. Identity refers to “parts of a self composed of the meanings
that persons attach to the multiple roles they typically play” (Stryker & Burke, 2000, p.
284). How individuals think and act is highly connected to who they are (Burke & Stets,
2009). Identities influence the cues we select from the environment in order to interpret
our surroundings. Our interpretation of our environment accordingly influences the
sensemaking process (Weick, 1995). Actual and perceived threats or enablers to one’s
sense of current and desired self provide a framework to understand one’s sensemaking
process.
Social context. Social context means the implied or even imagined physical and
psychological influence of others on a person. An individual’s meaning-making process is
highly influenced by the social context in which it occurs. Although sensemaking is done
by the individual, ignoring the impact of the social context creates blind spots in
understanding the sensemaking process (Blumer, 1969). Face-to-face interactions with
other members of the social context improve the efficiency and effectiveness of action
and reduce the likelihood of contaminating the sensemaking process (Weick, 1993).
Retrospect. Retrospect means reflecting on past events. Our ability to make sense
of the present is limited by our past experiences (Mezirow, 1991, 1997). Sensemaking of
current events depends on the strength of our memory in terms of time period, quality,
and quantity (Weick, 2012; Weick et al., 2005).
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Salient cues. Individuals notice select information from the environment, called a
‘cue’ (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). The cue becomes an input and influences the meaning
one retains about a certain event in a specific situation (Weick, 1993, 1995).
Ongoing events. Individuals experience a continuous flow of events (Mintzberg,
1973; Weick, 1995). Making sense of any event does not start or end with the specific
event. Individuals evolve their mindsets and thought processes continuously. Some
interpretations become out-of-date based on new forms of evidence and lead to newly
constructed interpretations and worlds.
Plausibility. Plausibility refers to a solution being socially acceptable within a
certain context. Rather than looking for accuracy, individuals often search for an
acceptable answer to an ambiguous situation and move on. Building on Simon’s (1991)
concept of bounded rationality, Kahneman (2003, p. 699) stated: “People are not
accustomed to thinking hard and are often content to trust a plausible judgment that
quickly comes to mind”.
Enactment. Within the sensemaking perspective, environments are invented rather
than discovered. One criticism of Weick’s conceptualization of enacted environments is
they are geared toward idealism, where the outside environment is created by what
individuals think and do rather than by external factors. (Taylor & Van Every, 2000).
Accordingly, in his recent work on sensemaking, Weick re-articulated enactment as the
created environment within the conditions set by externalities (Weick, 2012; Weick et al.,
2005).
These seven elements affect the way people create meaning from their
environment which accordingly affects how and what they learn. Figure 2.3 below
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presents the relationship between enactment, selection, and retention, as well as the
impact of the seven properties on this sequence. Similar to learning, the process of
sensemaking is triggered by a disharmony in the social context and on-going events.
While attempting to restore order caused by the disharmony, people pick up cues shaped
by their retrospective, accumulated past experience. Through selection, involved
individuals reduce the number of plausible explanations, and usually retain the
explanations best aligning with their identity standards. The retained explanations (1)
become the input material for new enactment into the world, (2) are added to the
individuals’ accumulated experience, and (3) shape the selection of new plausible
explanations. This feedback route into enactment is filtered through the identity of the
individuals.

Figure 2.3: The Seven Properties of Sensemaking
Social Context
On-Going
Events

Disharmony

Enactment

Retrospect
Salient Cues

Identity
Plausibility

Selection

Retention

Identity

Source: Adapted from Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M. & Obstfeld, D. 2005. Organizing and the process of
sensemaking. Organization Science, 16(4): p. 414.
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The aim of this research is understanding “how the designation of executives as
heirs apparent affects their learning during the transition period”. The purpose is not
simply to describe how heirs apparent learn; it is to describe how the designation as heirs
apparent affects executives’ learning. In a way, the designation itself creates a
disharmony in the heirs’ apparent world. To restore harmony in their world, I argue, in
the next chapter, heirs apparent need to enact in a way preparing them to meet the
challenges of this designation. I argue that the designation has a direct impact on their
immediate and future identity and changes the major player in their social context. I also
argue, while the designation impacts identity and social context, and hence is necessary
for learning, it is not sufficient. The way the heirs apparent enact their environment is
what affects their learning outcome during the transition period.
Table 2.1 below highlights the properties expected to change upon the designation
of an executive as the heir apparent and the corresponding reason. Designation will have
an immediate impact on the identity and social context of the heirs apparent. This impact
will affect the heirs’ apparent selection of salient cues and criteria for plausibility, as well
as their ability to update their information base continuously. Heirs apparent will make
sense of their situations retrospectively, using their accumulated experience; however, the
designation itself is not assumed to impact this property. A detailed description of the
impact of the change in these properties on the learning process and outcomes for the heir
apparent is presented in the next chapter.
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Table 2.1: The impact of the heir apparent designation on sensemaking properties
Property

Expected
Impact of
Designation

Identity

Change

Social
Context

Change

Enactment

Change

Salient
Cues

Indirect Change

Plausibility

Indirect Change

Ongoing
Events

Indirect Change

Retrospect

No Change

Reason
The designation by itself creates two new identities for
the executive: (1) an immediate one (the heir apparent
identity) and (2) an expected one as the future CEO of
the organization.
The designation of an executive as heir apparent draws
the attention of new stakeholders such as the media,
shareholders, and the board of directors, hence creating
a different social context for the executive.
The change in social context introduces new players to
an executive’s environment once he/she is designated
as heir apparent. This change affects how an heir
apparent enacts their environment and hence their
sensemaking and learning process.
The designation as heir apparent may lead an executive
to notice cues that are (1) more in line with the
standards of the new identity and expected one and (2)
based on co-enacting with different social members in
the newly created environment.
Adopting a new identity and co-enacting with new
members in the newly created environment may change
the executive’s assessment of what constitutes a
plausible explanation. Selection criteria that were
plausible from an “operationally oriented” perspective
may not be so from a “strategically oriented”
perspective.
The new identity and new environment for coenactment may render a few previous interpretations
outdated and may provide new interpretations in line
with the new social context.
While the retrospect property may affect an executive’s
meaning making during the transition period, the
designation as heir apparent is not expected to
significantly change the essence of this property.

2.3.2. Summary
The sensemaking perspective provides a lens allowing us to understand how
executives make sense of their environment in order to reduce equivocality. It explains
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how the seven properties affect people’s thoughts and actions. This perspective helps us
understand how the heir apparent designation affects executives’ learning process. It also
examines how the designation impacts six of seven properties, directly and indirectly, that
executives use to make meaning of their new experience. The next chapter explains these
mechanisms.
2.4. Integrating CEO Succession, Learning, and Sensemaking
Existing research identifies relay succession as the most common form of
succession in large public organizations (Rowe, 1996; Vancil, 1987). Research on relay
succession suggests heir apparent learning is key during the transition period (Vancil,
1987; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004), yet this area remains unstudied. Research on learning
explains the process between stimuli from the environment and the learner’s response –
mainly change in behaviour or cognition. Adult learning theories help explain how
learners evolve new standards in their frame of references and/or adopt new standards
based on changes in their social status. Hence they help explain how individuals change
or evolve their identities. While these theories help illuminate some aspects of the
learning of heirs apparent, they are insufficient to explain the whole process. They ignore
the impact of important social factors on the learning process. Learning theories explain
action as an outcome of a learning experience but do not use action as an input by itself in
the learning process. Sensemaking explains the thought process of the heirs apparent
within the specific social context or during transition and the impact of their identity on
the thought process. However, sensemaking is limited in explaining the change or
evolution in the identity of the heir apparent. My research attempts to integrate learning
and sensemaking perspectives in order to offer an explanation of the impact of the
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designation of heirs apparent on executives’ learning processes. Specifically, my research
examines changes in executives’ learning processes with respect to changes in behaviour,
cognition, and identity. I explain my theoretical framework in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The previous chapter presented seven properties which may influence how people
formulate their initial sense of a situation and the potential for developing that sense
(Weick, 1995) and guiding the learning process in any situation. While these properties
apply to all sensemaking activities during the transition period, the following theoretical
framework explains how the designation of executives as heirs apparent directly changes
their (1) identity, (2) social context, and (3) co-enactment. The expected change in these
three properties upon the executives’ designation renders them the major building blocks
of the theoretical framework. The change in these properties affects the executives’
retention – selection – enactment process. It affects the cues they pick up on, their
interpretations (on-going events), and selection criteria (plausibility), and impacts their
sensemaking and learning process during the transition period. The change in these
properties affects how heirs apparent make meaning of a situation, process an event with
their existing mental models, and affect the outcome of their learning, i.e. a long-term
change in the cognition, behaviour and being, or identity of heirs apparent. While the
designation has a potential to directly affect identity, social context, and enactment, the
change in these properties is expected to impact (1) cues, (2) plausibility, and (3) ongoing events features as I explain in the next sections.
3.1. Identity
“Sensemaking unfolds from some standpoint, some frame of reference, some
identity” (Weick, 2012, p.57). The learners start with who they are – their own identities
as individuals and/or members in organizations (Gioia, Patvardhan, Hamilton, & Corley,
2013). Human beings see, understand, and interpret a situation they are experiencing
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according to who they believe themselves to be at the time (Mezirow, 1991, 1997). An
identity is part of the mental model of an individual (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Weick,
1979). Mental models represent individuals’ perceptions of how the world operates
(Craik, 1943) and their place within it, guiding their thought processes, decisions, and
behaviours (Feynman et al., 1985).
Each individual has multiple identities such as a gender identity, family-related
identity (e.g. father, mother, son), and professional/role identity such as COO, heir
apparent, or CEO. My research focuses on the impact of the heir apparent designation on
executives’ professional or role identity. Therefore, unless otherwise specified,
executives’ identity in this research refers exclusively to role identity. Through
experience, individuals build standards for each identity or a set of meanings which
defines what it is like to have a certain identity (Burke & Stets, 2009). Burke (2006) and
Burke and Stets (2009) found that human beings’ identity standards changed when there
was a major change in their social status such as marriage or parenthood. These
researchers also inferred that a significant promotion, such as becoming a store manager,
might also trigger the change of identity standards for the concerned individual/employee.
Identity standards reflect executives’ understanding of the different components of the
role they are occupying, such as their understanding of the degree of power, decisionmaking ability, or autonomy within a certain role. These standards may change as their
role changes.
Individuals continuously attempt to verify/validate their identities. They behave in
a manner allowing them to establish harmony between the perceived stimuli or cues from
the environment and their identity standards. Individuals use sensemaking to align
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perceived input from the environment with established identity standards (Burke & Stets,
2009; Gioia et al., 2013). The designation of heir apparent presents the potential for the
executive to develop a new identity – one of a future CEO (Bennett & Miles, 2006a).
The designation also alters how the designated heir apparent interprets novel situations as
well as situations which he/she has dealt with based upon his/her previous identity. The
announcement of the designation provides the executive with a sense of affirmed identity
vis-à-vis others and requires the executive to build new standards or a set of meanings
aligning with the new identity. As much as our identity lies within us and in who we think
we are, it also lies in the hands of others and who they think we are and how they relate to
us. The public perception component of identities can strengthen or weaken our identity
(Weick et al., 2005). Ralph Ellison, a renowned US writer, said, “By and large, the critics
and readers gave me an affirmed sense of my identity as a writer. You might know this
within yourself, but to have it affirmed by others is of utmost importance” (Chester &
Howard, 1955).
When someone is given power, he/she acts more powerful (Overbeck, Tiedens, &
Brion, 2006). Social support involves expressing confidence in a person’s ability to
handle specific situations (Cohen & Wills, 1985; Taylor, Sherman, Kim, Jarcho, Takagi,
& Dunagan, 2004). McDonald and Westphal (2011) found CEOs with greater social
support are more likely to engage in significant leadership behaviours and with increased
frequency, thus increasing their effectiveness as corporate executives. Designating an
executive as the heir apparent is an expression of confidence by the board of directors and
the incumbent CEO in the ability of the designated executive to run the company in the
future. The executive may consider the designation a form of social support. The new
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identity will require the creation of a new set of meanings to include in the identity
standards or mental models of the heir apparent (Burke, 2006). Following the designation
as heir apparent, the executive identity verification process necessitates the alignment of
the executive’s behaviour and thought processes with the new set of identity standards
related to the prospective role of CEO. For example, the executive may believe the heir
apparent status provides more autonomy and power in affecting decision making
regarding the organization’s strategic vision than their previous role. The executive may
also believe the degree of power will increase once he/she is promoted to the role of
CEO. Hence, my following premise:
P1: The designation of an executive as an heir apparent (1) evolves a new identity
along with a new set of identity standards for this executive, (2) affects the way
he/she interprets the cues in a situation, and (3) shapes his/her cognitive schemas
and behaviour so they align with the new identity standards.
Sensemaking helps us describe the impact of a new identity – the heir apparent –
on the change in behaviour or cognition of the heir apparent to deal with equivocality. It
fails, however, to explain how the heir apparent builds the new set of identity standards
which constitute the future identity, or the CEO identity. This limitation of sensemaking
(Gioia & Mehra, 1996) can be overcome by introducing a learning mechanism. Schwandt
(2005) suggested managers need to combine learning and sensemaking to advance their
professional career. The identity standards for the newly assigned role of heir apparent
consider both the expectations of the members of the social context tied to the position as
well as the meanings of the role the individual internalizes (Burke, 2006). Burke and Stets
(2009) argue individuals mainly use social learning (Bandura, 1977) and direct
socialization to build standards for a newly triggered identity.
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Along with the designation as an heir apparent comes the prospect for a new role:
CEO. Individuals usually learn from others, whom they think are similar to them in some
meaningful ways (Braaksma, Rijlaarsdam, & van den Bergh, 2002; Zimmerman, 2004).
They also model behaviours they believe have pertinent value to their situation (Bandura,
2001; Burke & Stets, 2009; Rosenthal & Bandura, 1978). I propose the incumbent CEO
as the point of reference available to the heirs apparent to build standards for the future
identity. In order to understand the standards of the new identity, I expect the heir
apparent to closely emulate/imitate the behaviour and thought processes of the incumbent
CEO.
Prior literature highlights major differences between the CEO and other executive
positions. These differences include, but are not limited to, the external focus of the
CEO’s job, overarching strategic matters, operational concerns of the firm, and the more
internal focus of other executives’ jobs (Bennett & Miles, 2006a; Ciampa, 2005;
Hambrick & Cannella, 2004; Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2013; Vancil, 1987). If the
heir apparent is incapable of evolving the previous identity into the new one, then little
new learning will occur without corresponding change in cognition, behaviour, or identity
taking place (Jarvis, 2006). The heir apparent will likely continue to apply the operational
identity standards (e.g. those of the COO) to the expected CEO identity. Other
stakeholders will have different expectations from the heir apparent based on their
expectations of what the CEO’s behaviour should look like (Ciampa, 2005).
Transformational learning involves a change in the frames of reference of the human
being creating a different set of identity standards and ultimately a changed being
(Hargrove, 2008). However, to achieve this level of learning, an heir apparent may need
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to reach more than a change in behaviour or cognition. This may lead him/her to
challenge their assumptions of the experience, question the foundations of their mental
models, and change their internal perspectives (Mezirow, 1991) or identity standards.
They also need to align these standards with existing ones which are fundamental to the
other identities of the heir apparent. The existing standards include ethical and moral
behaviour standards (Burke, 2006). If heirs apparent fail to align their new identity
standards with existing ethical or moral behaviour standards, they may face confusion and
be forced to deal with equivocality (Weick, 1995). For example, if the heirs apparent
observe the incumbent CEOs being autocratic in decision-making processes, it is likely
the heirs apparent will fail as CEOs if they emulate the autocratic behaviours when they
themselves believe in participative decision making. Therefore, I proceed on the
following premise:
P2: The designation of an executive as heir apparent activates a potential identity
and leads the heir apparent to reflect on the assumptions on which his/her mental
models are built vs. those of the representative of the future identity or the incumbent
CEO. The heir apparent hence builds his/her own role identity standards, rather than
simply adjusting current behaviour or cognition to resolve equivocality.
3.2. Social Context
The presence of other people – whether actual, implicit, or presumed – affects the
meaning individuals make of a certain situation (Weick, 1995). The designation of
executives as heirs apparent changes their social context and position within the
established social context. These changes may be accompanied by a physical relocation
which often brings the heir apparent into closer and/or more frequent contact with the
incumbent CEO. An example of this situation is illustrated below with respect to the
appointment of TD Canada Trust bank’s heir apparent.
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Masrani will move back to Canada to become TD’s chief operating officer starting
July 1 and then become CEO when Clark retires (Friend & Paddon, 2013).
Before executives are designated as heirs apparent the CEO monitors their
performance (Bennett & Miles, 2006b; Ciampa, 2005; Citrin, 2005; Citrin & Ogden,
2010). However, once executives are designated as heirs apparent, their performance
becomes the centre of attention of the shareholders, board of directors, the media, other
executives at the organization, and may extend to other stakeholders of the organization
(Bennett & Miles, 2006a; Ciampa, 2005). The presence of these people, whether physical,
implied, or perceived, influences the thought process of the heir apparent (Allport, 1985).
Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010) suggested “for a learning experience to be
successful and complete it needs to have commitment, capacity, and positive
expectations” (p. 553). One can argue commitment and capacity may primarily reside at
the individual level of the heir apparent; however, positive expectations of members of
the new social context need to be satisfied. Heirs apparent will attempt to align their
behaviours and cognition in a manner which will gain the endorsement of the newly
created social context. If heirs apparent do not think or act according to the expectations
of the new players in the social context, they may risk losing the CEO position (Hall,
1986). The change in the social context affects the cues which an heir apparent selects.
Which cues are selected therefore affects what the heir apparent believes he/she needs to
change in his/her cognition, behaviour, and identity standards in order to meet the
expectations set by the new social context. Hence, I proceed on the following premise:
P3: The designation of an executive as an heir apparent changes his/her social
context, and leads the heir apparent to heed and behave in ways that meet the
endorsement or perceived expectations of the members of the newly created social
context.
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3.3. Co-Enactment
Weick (2012) argued human beings make sense of and shape their world through
enacting. Specifically, we shape our world through meanings we attribute to situations
which help us build our mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1989). The meaning an individual
attributes to any situation is partly constructed by the actions the individual takes in a
specific situation (Weick et al., 2005). Actions do not need to be only responses to stimuli
(i.e. S–R) or observable, measurable behaviours (Blumer, 1969). Actions may also
include inquiring about a certain event or even making statements to see reactions and
then adjusting one’s cognition and behaviour in a way which lends itself to the anticipated
reaction (Weick, 1995). In other words, how and what an heir apparent learns depends on
how the heir apparent enacts his/her environment.
If actions help construct meaning, then understanding individuals’ actions helps us
understand the resulting change in their behaviours, cognitions, and/or identities, which
constitute their learning processes. Weick (2012) argued it is difficult to observe the
actions of a single person in a social setting. Rather, what we are more likely to observe
are the actions resulting from the interdependence between the individual and his/her
social environment. Therefore, to understand the impact of the heir apparent designation
on an executive’s learning, we need to consider the nature of interactions between heirs
apparent and their environments rather than their actions alone. In describing this process,
I aim to understand how the learning process itself affects the antecedents (stimuli) and
outcomes (responses) of learning. In this way I am combining the learning process,
which is rarely discussed in previous literature, with two sets of variables extensively
discussed in the extant learning literature. My research aims to answer a call by Inkpen
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and Crossan (1995) to enhance our understanding of the learning process alongside the
outcomes.
According to Weick (1979), in a social environment such as an organization, there
are acts, interacts, and double interacts. An act represents any form of behaviour by
“Individual A”. An interact represents the reaction of “Individual B” to the act of
“Individual A”. A double interact represents the response of “Individual A” to the
reaction of “Individual B” to the act of “Individual A”. The following are examples
illustrating the three types of enactment in an heir apparent context. Acts refer to
situations where the heirs apparent observed the incumbent CEOs undertaking a certain
behaviour which they did not understand. Given the circumstances under which the
behaviour took place, the heirs apparent believed they knew the reason behind the
behaviour and adjusted, or not, their cognition and/or behaviour accordingly. Under
interact form of enactment, having observed the behaviour, the heirs apparent would ask
the incumbent CEOs about their thought processes which led to the behaviour. This
interact brings the heirs apparent closer to the mental models of the incumbent CEOs, but
the resulting learning remains the heirs apparent own understanding of the reasoning
provided by the incumbent CEOs. If the heirs apparent challenged the reasoning provided
by the incumbent CEOs and discussed their own understanding of the situation in a
conversational form with other parties, the enactment type would be classified as double
interact. The result of a double interact would more likely be the creation of shared
mental models between the two parties. Therefore, among the different types of
interaction, double interacts are the most likely to reduce ambiguity or equivocality and
create a collective understanding in a specific situation (Weick, 1995, 2012; Weick &
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Roberts, 1993). The nature of interaction individuals undertake affects how and what they
learn from a situation because it explains how they change their behaviours, mental
models, and identity standards.
The designation as heir apparent creates a new social environment for coenactment for the executive. If, for example, we take the interaction between the heir
apparent and the incumbent CEO, we can see how the actions taken by the heir apparent
affect the learning outcome from this co-enactment. The co-enactment between the heir
apparent and the incumbent CEO is considered to be important for three reasons. First,
prior research has assumed the heir apparency period provides an heir apparent with time
to work with and therefore learn from the incumbent CEO (Vancil, 1987; Zhang &
Rajagopalan, 2004). Second, research on the second-in-command position emphasizes the
importance of the quality of the relationship between the CEO and the heir apparent as a
condition for a successful transition (Bennett & Miles, 2006a). Third, human beings learn
from others who present a functional value related to their situations (Bandura, 2001;
Rosenthal & Bandura, 1978). Since the incumbent CEO is the “observable”
representative of the future identity of the heir apparent, the nature of the co-enactment
between the two becomes important.
The heir apparent is not an official title. The heir apparent designation is a
promise to promote the designated executive to the position of CEO assuming no
unforeseen events. The agency of heirs apparent – in other words, the way heirs apparent
enact their environment during the transition period – transforms the learning process, its
antecedents, and outcomes. Below I explain how the different acts, interacts, and double
interacts undertaken by the heir apparent result in different learning outcomes. These

46
possible actions range from mere observation (acts) to conversation (interacts) and coenactment (double interacts) with the incumbent CEO.
During the transition period, heirs apparent may resolve equivocality in their
environment by accepting the current conditions. Argyris and Schön (1992) described this
process as single-loop learning or Model I. This model occurs when heirs apparent
resolve equivocality by changing their behaviour or act in accordance with their, or the
CEO’s, understanding or theory about situations. Learning through Model I may be the
result of two external factors. The first is perceived pressure from the environment, i.e.
“this is how we do things around here”. The second is consciously adopted (or discarded)
behaviour imitating the incumbent CEO because either the board of directors is rewarding
(or punishing) the behaviour or other staff members appreciate (or reject) the behaviour
(Bandura, 1977).
Observational learning researchers suggest individuals learn other actors’ skills
and are capable of inferring their thought processes by observing them at work (Nicolle,
Symmonds, & Dolan, 2011; Torriero, Oliveri, Koch, Caltagirone, & Petrosini, 2007).
Hence, an heir’s apparent observations of the incumbent CEO at work and/or imitation of
an observed behaviour may allow the heir apparent to infer the CEO’s mental models.
The heir apparent may then adjust his/her cognitive schemas and future behaviours
accordingly.
When heirs apparent resolve equivocality by observing and/or emulating CEOs’
behaviours, they make judgments about CEOs’ mental processes (Gallese, Keysers, &
Rizzolatti, 2004). Heirs apparent thus resolve equivocality using their own mental
models, and infer what they perceive to be the mental processes of the outgoing CEOs.
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The resultant learning may or may not accurately represent the outgoing CEOs’ mental
models. Heirs apparent may decide to use double-loop learning to resolve equivocality by
questioning their existing theories or mental models or interacting and testing their
theories-in-use (Argyris & Schön, 1992). To accomplish this, heirs apparent may resort to
conversations as a useful mechanism to bring divergent viewpoints closer amongst
executives (Isaacs, 1999). Heirs apparent may seek the opportunity to create physical,
temporal, and emotional space for conversation (Baker, Jensen, & Kolb, 2002), and
secure outgoing CEOs’ commitment to this space. In doing so, heirs apparent enhance the
learning experience they receive from observing outgoing CEOs and close the gap
between the inferred and actual mental models of CEOs.
The two different actions described above (i.e. act and interact) enact different
environments leading to different learning outcomes. By simply acting, heirs apparent
infer CEOs’ mental models. By interacting, heirs apparent better understand CEOs’
mental models and test their own theories-in-use with CEOs. However, if the heir
apparent is reluctant about questioning what is being enacted or reluctant about double
interacting, the collective sense made of the situation will be less robust and the learning
of all involved decreases. For enhanced learning, all actors involved need to discuss their
understanding of the situation. If building integrated mental models with the CEO is the
desired outcome, then observation and conversation alone, while necessary, are
insufficient (Jeong & Chi, 2007). Acting is directed by one’s own mental models built
from accumulated knowledge through experience (Johnson-Laird, 1989). Double
interacting presents the opportunity for the heirs apparent to learn and to create shared
mental models with the outgoing CEO.
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To create shared mental models, the heir apparent needs to co-enact or engage in
double interaction with the outgoing CEO (Weick, 1995). When an heir apparent and a
CEO engage in making sense of their joint experiences, they benefit from agreement in
three areas. These areas are: (1) the concepts representing their common experience, (2)
how these concepts are related, and (3) how these concepts affect them and how they can
affect the concepts (Weick, 2001, p. 313). Conversation or interacting is mainly about
thinking and leads to a shared understanding of previous experiences. The process of
double interacting, on the other hand, is broader than thinking and talking. It includes
action and leads to the creation of a new collective understanding of the joint experience:
its requirements, drivers, limitations, resultant outcome, and proposed actions (Weick,
1995).
Without double interaction, executives will act based on their understanding of the
situation and this may result in incoherent action plans. An example of an incoherent
action plan is the case of the firefighters in the Mann Gulch disaster (Weick, 1993), where
each firefighter acted based on his/her understanding of the situation and enacted different
environments accordingly, which led to the death of many firefighters. By engaging in
double interact, heirs apparent and outgoing CEOs are more likely to create shared mental
models (Mathieu, Goodwin, Heffner, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000; Weick et al., 2005)
which guide future actions. Engaging with the CEO through the process of enactment
(analyzing raw data from a certain experience), selection (reducing equivocality between
different alternatives), and retention (storing the agreed-upon enacted environment)
allows the heir apparent to understand the mental representations of the CEO. It further
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allows the heir apparent to create “CEO-compatible mental models” that are different
from the existing mental models of the heir apparent and outgoing CEO.
In summary, different actions lead to different enacted environments and different
learning outcomes for the heir apparent. I proceed on the following premise and related
sub-premises:
P4: The designation of executives as heirs apparent creates a new environment for
enactment; however, it is the subsequent actions taken by the heirs apparent, and the
incumbent CEOs, that affect their learning outcomes.
P4a: Heirs apparent who double interact with incumbent CEOs are more likely to
have the opportunity to induce change in their mental models, behaviours, and
identity standards to prepare for the CEO position.
P4b: Heirs apparent who are limited to act and/or interact with the incumbent
CEOs are more likely to miss the opportunities to induce change in their mental
models, behaviours, and identity standards to prepare for the CEO position.
Some researchers argue heirs apparent are influenced by their predecessors, feel
committed socially and psychologically to the ongoing visions and strategies set by
incumbent CEOs, and find it difficult to change the prevailing courses of action postsuccession (Fondas & Wiersema, 1997; Shen & Cannella, 2002). These researchers
therefore hypothesize that CEOs selected following a relay succession are less likely to
induce strategic change compared to their counterparts selected following a horse race or
outside succession process. The work in this thesis focuses on heir apparent succession,
and hence I do not compare the ability of heirs apparent to induce strategic change to that
of other types of successors. I build on the concept of enacted environment, to challenge
the premises these researchers used to argue heirs apparent are less likely to induce
strategic change than outside CEOs or CEOs selected following a horse race.
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To achieve this objective, I propose differences in the level of commitment heirs
apparent have to the ongoing visions and strategies set by incumbent CEOs and the
impact of this on their ability to undertake plausible action after assuming the CEO
position. I develop two competing premises describing the link between the types of
enactment during the transition period, the commitment of the heir apparent to the
ongoing vision of the organization, and their ability to take plausible action upon
assuming the role of CEO.
Galinsky and his colleagues (2008) showed individuals who are primed for power
are more likely to produce creative ideas and express attitudes which do not conform to
the opinions of others. Higher positions provide executives with more power, yet
Battilana (2011) found higher positions alone are not enough to trigger change. In her
study, Battilana (2011) found management executives with lower status, e.g. non-doctors
as opposed to doctors, are less likely to take actions diverging from the existing
organizational status quo than management executives with higher status, e.g. doctors.
Consequently, while the designation of executives as heirs apparent primes them for
power, it does not necessarily equip them with the tools needed, behaviourally and
cognitively, to take action that changes the existing status quo. Amongst heirs apparent,
those who double interact with incumbents are more likely to have the opportunity to
create the mental models, behaviours, and identity standards necessary to prepare them
for the CEO position than those who merely act/interact with incumbent CEOs. Hence,
heirs apparent who double interact with the incumbent CEO will have both the power and
the mental models and will therefore be more likely to take sense-ible action diverging
from the status quo than heirs apparent who solely act/interact.
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The double interact with incumbent CEOs is expected to equip the heirs apparent
with mental models needed to take action to change the course of the current status quo,
but does not guarantee they will take those actions. Hurst, Rush, and White (1989)
referred to this dilemma as the tension of renewal, or the ability of management teams to
respect the core of the organization while continuously updating it. They argued a
necessary component to achieve organizational renewal is the availability of teams
equipped with “prospecting and preserving abilities” (p. 97). They defined management
teams prospecting and preserving abilities based on the classification by Miles and Snow
(2003) of the strategic orientation of companies. Hurst et al. (1989) described prospecting
abilities as the willingness to introduce radical innovations and experiment with ideas
outside the existing scope of the business. They described preserving abilities as the
tendency to protect the on-going strategy of the organization and even avoiding
incremental changes.
Similarly, I argue heirs apparent who engage in double interact with incumbent
CEOs have more potential than other heirs apparent to build “prospecting and preserving
abilities”. Outside CEOs may be good at detecting the opportunities and threats facing
organizations, thus may possess more prospecting abilities. However, they may not be as
aware of the organization’s internal strengths and weaknesses, hence may lack preserving
abilities. Heirs apparent who act/interact with the incumbent CEO may not have had the
chance to build neither prospecting nor preserving abilities and hence may prefer to
protect the status quo. Heirs apparent who double interact with the incumbent CEO are
more likely to have the opportunity to create the evolved mental models, behaviours, and
identity standards necessary to prepare for the CEO position. They are more capable of
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detecting opportunities and threats while still being aware of the organization’s strengths
and weaknesses. These CEOs build the confidence to experiment with new ideas while
being mindful of the importance to protect the core strategy of the organization. Bishop et
al. (2004) described people with experiential openness and curiosity orientation while
being mindful of their surroundings as having complex cognitive representations. The
ability of heirs apparent to differentiate, see new opportunities, and integrate, using the
organization’s strengths, helps them build cognitive complexity (van Seggelen-Damen,
2013).
Engaging in double interacts with incumbent CEOs facilitates the social
construction of mental models required for the job (Weick, 1993). Incumbent CEOs serve
as a reliable source of ideas and open up other perspectives for heirs apparent. Double
interact therefore leads to the nurturing of effective heirs apparent equipped with distinct
mental models which are different from their prior mental models and CEOs’ mental
models. The heirs apparent with double interact exposure are more likely to be ready to
craft new solutions rather than rely on responses prescribed for past scenarios (Dorner,
1996).
While I am not comparing the ability of heirs apparent to induce strategic change
to other types of successors, I posit there is a difference within the heir apparent group.
Those who act/interact with incumbent CEOs may miss the opportunity to build either
preserving or prospecting abilities and therefore have trepidations, emotional and
psychological, towards changing the ongoing strategy of the organization. Those who
double interact with incumbent CEOs have the potential to build preserving and
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prospecting abilities, preserving their strengths and prospecting their opportunities. I
proceed with the following premise.
P5a: Heirs apparent who double interact, unlike heirs apparent who act/interact, with
incumbent CEOs, have more opportunity to build mental models with both
preserving and prospecting abilities enabling them to take plausible action upon
assuming the CEO position.
On the other hand, it is equally plausible to argue heirs apparent who are limited
to act/interact with the incumbent CEOs are more likely to take action which might
change the status quo upon assuming the CEO title than heirs apparent who double
interact with incumbent CEOs. I have argued earlier that CEOs who are limited to
act/interact with the incumbent CEOs may have lacked the opportunity to build shared
mental models with these incumbent CEOs. Given their new identity as future CEOs,
these heirs apparent will interpret strategy discussions differently and will construct their
own ideas and opinions about the strategic direction of the organization. Without the
opportunity to double interact with incumbent CEOs, heirs apparent miss the chance to
understand the incumbent CEOs’ reasons for adopting the current strategies. While these
heirs apparent might have been involved in the operating side of the ongoing strategy of
the organization, they were not necessarily actively involved in the corresponding
strategic decisions. Their emotional or psychological commitment to the ongoing strategy
of their organization might be limited as they may not have had the opportunity to discuss
the context behind the strategy.
The involvement of heirs apparent who act/interact with incumbent CEOs may be
limited to the operations side of the strategy. They may have low emotional or
psychological commitment to the ongoing strategy of the organization. Therefore, heirs
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apparent who act/interact with incumbent CEOs might build more prospecting abilities.
They may be more willing to take actions to change the current status quo of the
organization than heirs apparent who double interact with incumbent CEOs.
Consequently I proceed with the following competing premise:
P5b: Heirs apparent who act/interact, unlike heirs apparent who double interact, with
incumbent CEOs, feel less committed to the ongoing strategy of the organization and
are more likely to build prospecting abilities and to take action to change the status
quo of the organization upon assuming the CEO position.
The two above competing premises argue for equally plausible outcomes. In both
premises, I am arguing against the existing implicit assumption in CEO succession
literature regarding the cognitive capture between heirs apparent and incumbent CEOs.
Cognitive capture refers to the immersion of heirs apparent in the world of CEOs leading
heirs apparent to see the world through the CEOs’ eyes and think like them (Hayes,
2012). In P5a, I argue heirs apparent who double interact with incumbent CEOs have the
opportunity to build prospecting and preserving abilities leading to cognitive complexity.
They are expected to induce change leading to organizational renewal upon assuming the
CEO role. In P5b, I argue heirs apparent who act/interact with incumbent CEOs do not
experience any sort of cognitive capture from the incumbent CEOs, they build
prospecting abilities. They are expected to take innovative action and induce radical
strategic change. The outcome in both cases may be good for the organization. I will
leave the answer to whether heirs apparent and boards should prefer double interacting to
acting/interacting for the results from the fieldwork.
Figure 3.1 represents the theoretical framework described in this chapter. This
figure shows the direct impact of designation on the heirs’ apparent identity, social
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context and enactment, which then affects the learning outcomes of the executives at the
time of designation. It also reflects the indirect impact of designation on salient cues,
ongoing events, and plausibility, which then impact the executives’ learning outcomes at
the time of designation. The impact of designation on sensemaking properties, whether
direct or indirect, does not affect the executives’ learning just at the time of designation.
Rather the executives’ learning outcomes will continuously be updated through the
transition, reflected in the period ad1-n, and until the executives assume the CEO role.
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Figure 3.1: The Impact of the Heir Apparent Designation on the Executive’s
Learning Process
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH METHODS
4.1. Research Strategy
To explore heir apparent learning during the transition period, I used an interviewbased approach to understand the implicit structure of this learning experience (Sanders,
1982). I used a qualitative approach – phenomenology – as the research method to help
accomplish the objective of this study. The study’s research question is “how the
designation of executives as heirs apparent affects their learning and prepares them to
become CEOs”. The study aims at exploring and explaining the heirs’ apparent learning
process during the transition period and hence has two components better served by a
qualitative approach (Yin, 2009, 2011).
One of the primary motivations for this study is to fill the existing gap in our
understanding of the CEO succession transition period and the learning which happens
during this period (Giambatista et al., 2005). Previous studies on this topic relied heavily
on large-sample archival data to understand the impact of proxy variables to measure the
unobserved theoretical construct related to incoming and outgoing CEOs, mainly on
organizational performance (c.f. Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). These
quantitative

studies

described

simplified

relationships

between

variables

(c.f.

Antonacopoulou, 2001) and resulted in the process of “learning,” within the CEO
succession literature, being accepted as “obvious”. The choice of a phenomenological
approach, based on interviews, comes in response to the call for more qualitative research
by Giambatista et al. (2005). One aim of this method is to validate some of the
interpretations of the quantitative studies on CEO succession phenomena and, more
specifically, in our case, the inference regarding the learning of heirs apparent during the
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transition period (cf. Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004). Alternating between qualitative and
quantitative approaches enhances our understanding of organizational research
phenomena (Lee, 1991; Miller, 2005).
There is no single perfect approach for conducting a study. The choice of the
appropriate qualitative approach depends on the idiosyncratic features of the study, what
can and cannot be done in this context, as well as the researcher’s worldview and
previous experience (Creswell, 2013). Different approaches have different foci and are
better suited for different types of research topics. The focus of narrative research is to
capture and investigate the stories or experiences of the life of one individual or a small
number of individuals (Clandinin, 2007). The focus of the grounded theory approach is
to build theory from field-collected data or from the perspective of research participants
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Ethnography emphasizes understanding and explaining the
shared constituents of a specific group belonging to the same culture (Wolcott, 2010).
The case study approach is more appropriate for research (1) investigating “how” and
“why” questions, (2) where the researcher has little or no control over the events, and (3)
studying contemporary events (Yin, 2009, 2012). The phenomenological approach is best
suited for research seeking new knowledge of human experiences, behaviours, and
relationships (Moustakas, 1994).
Choosing a specific approach enhances the rigor of the study by providing a
structured guideline for conducting the research (Creswell, 2013). In the context of heirs
apparent, this study aims at understanding their (1) learning experience, (2) social
context, (3) behaviours, (4) meaning making of encounters, and (5) relationships with
other parties involved during their transition period. These objectives fit more with a
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phenomenological approach design than the other qualitative approaches available, as
explained below.
Phenomenology seeks to understand human experiences and their meaningmaking process within the complexity of their lifeworld (Giorgi, 2009), which coincides
with the objectives of the perspectives used in building this thesis’s theoretical
framework. Both the learning and sensemaking perspectives used to build the theoretical
framework of this research help us to understand how individuals change their cognition,
behaviour, and identity based on their meaning-making process. Phenomenology also
allows for a prior understanding of theoretical underpinnings to direct and limit datacollection efforts (Moustakas, 1994). This approach allows for the comparison of data
collected to theory, either to validate or refute the theory, in order to enhance the internal
soundness of the research. The process of analyzing data using a phenomenological
approach is presented later in this chapter.
The fields of psychology and education frequently use the phenomenological
approach to understand human experiences within the “person-environment fit”
(Edwards, Cable, Williamson, Lambert, & Shipp, 2006). This approach also holds the
potential to enhance our understanding of how executives operate within organizations
(Conklin, 2007; Ehrich, 2005; Heil & Whittaker, 2007; Sanders, 1982). This is true
especially in terms of executives’ sensemaking and learning processes – concepts deeply
rooted in social psychology and education. A phenomenological approach enhances this
study’s efforts to understand executives’ learning experiences within their organizations,
triggered by their designation as heirs apparent. This contributes to questioning,
validating, complementing, and strengthening the current wealth of quantitative research
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available on CEO succession while providing insight from people with relevant
experience.
Since Sanders (1982) saw phenomenology as a “new star” in organizational
research methodology, several management-related studies used this approach to explore
their phenomena of interest. Gibson (2004) unraveled the important themes in the
experience of mentoring relationships of female faculty. Conklin (2012) used the
phenomenological approach to explore the experience of finding one’s calling and its
relevance in the organizational world. Chikudate (1999, 2000) explored the type of
mechanisms blocking change in Japanese communities and the behaviours which lead to
ethical problems in organizations. Catino and Patriotta (2013) used phenomenological
interviews to understand how pilots and airline staff members assess errors and learn
from them. Smerek (2011) used phenomenological interviews to describe the tension new
presidents experience between “learning and being”, using the sensemaking and
sensegiving lenses. These studies, and many others, use phenomenology to understand
strategy and management challenges as processes and practices where the human
dimension is a strong element.
Qualitative and quantitative researches were historically associated with inductive
and deductive reasoning approaches respectively. While these reasoning approaches may
have different starting points, they both can lead to acquiring new knowledge (Hyde,
2000). Inductive reasoning, conducted usually by researchers subscribing to a relativist or
interpretivist paradigm, aims at building theory from observations or data from the
fieldwork. Deductive reasoning, undertaken usually by researchers subscribing to a
positivist or post-positivist paradigm, aims at validating whether theories apply in certain
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circumstances (Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011). However, recently qualitative
researchers have been advocating the use of deductive qualitative research or in other
words using qualitative research for theory testing in addition to theory building
(Bitektine, 2008; Hyde, 2000; Yin, 2009, 2011).
Research on CEO succession has been dominated by quantitative methods
(Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994) using deductive reasoning. The
extensive use of quantitative research has led to situations where hypotheses are tested
using only measurable proxies to represent the underlying variables, such as using the
title of COO or president to identify heirs apparent, or heir apparent tenure to measure
cognitive capture between the incoming and outgoing CEOs. This reductionist approach
to theory testing required most researchers to assume some of the processes, such learning
during the transition period, as acceptable or obvious in their theory building. The lack of
adequate quantitative measures to understand the dynamics of learning processes during
CEO transition period can be overcome through the use of theory testing using qualitative
methods (Bitektine, 2008; Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Yin, 2011).
Case studies (Shane, 2000; Yin, 2009, 2012), pattern matching (Hyde, 2000), and
descriptive phenomenology (Creswell, 2013; Giorgi, 2009; Giorgi, 2006) are examples of
procedures used in theory testing using qualitative research. This research adopts the
descriptive phenomenology method. It allows me to approach the research question with
an a-priori lens formulated based on the assumptions adopted in the wealth of quantitative
research conducted on CEO succession. The structured steps described to analyse the
lived experience of designate CEOs with learning during the transition period allowed me
to verify or refute the theoretical arguments used to build the premises.
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I will use phenomenology in this research because it adds to our understanding of
organizational research and fills the qualitative gap in CEO succession literature. This
method allows for a validation, support, or refutation of current interpretations of the
learning processes of heirs apparent during the transition period as presented in the
findings chapter.
4.2. Research Design
Research design is what links the theoretical framework and the research
questions to the empirical portion of the research or data collection and data analysis
strategies (Yin, 2011). The research design “relates back to the question, is developed
solely to illuminate the question, and provides a portrayal of the phenomenon”
(Moustakas, 1994, p. 59). A thoughtful research design for qualitative research is flexible
and requires change as the study progresses. However, providing a research design at the
beginning of the study enhances the credibility of the research as well as its accuracy
(Yin, 2011). Qualitative studies are not quickly produced essays following conversations
with a few respondents. I spent a substantial amount of time designing the empirical
work, collecting and extensively analyzing large volumes of data (Bogdan & Biklen,
2007). Sanders (1982) identified three essential components in phenomenological
research design: (1) sample selection, (2) data collection, and (3) phenomenological data
analysis.
4.2.1. Sample Selection
The most important criterion for building a “participant pool” is to locate potential
participants who have experienced or lived the phenomenon (Moustakas, 1994;
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Polkinghorne, 1989). For this study, potential participants were individuals who were
heirs apparent before becoming CEOs. The purpose of this study was to understand the
heir’s apparent experience independent of age difference.

I therefore adopted the

definition of an heir apparent previously discussed in Chapter 2 – that is, any manager in
a company who was a senior executive, including the COO and/or president, before
becoming the CEO. This design allowed me to understand how the designation of
executives as heirs apparent affected their learning journey from designation to assuming
the CEO role. I continued recruiting participants until I reached sufficient variance in the
degree of change in the suggested properties of sensemaking among participating heirs
apparent and namely in the three hypothesized enactment forms. The design helped
understand the impact of change in these properties on executives’ learning outcomes. It
also allowed me to document how closely each participant’s experience conformed to the
sensemaking process and to associate the degree of conformity with the degree of
“success” of the heir apparent after assuming the CEO role. While this sampling strategy
allows me to comment on the learning of heirs apparent, it does not allow me to explain
the link between designation and actual company performance. The interviews I
conducted were all in large successful organizations.
In order to build my participants’ pool, I downloaded the names of all of the
companies headquartered in Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta from the Lexis Nexis
Corporate Affiliations database. Individual information on each company included (1)
company name, (2) complete address, (3) phone and fax numbers, (4) website address and
e-mail, (5) number of employees, (6) sales turnover, (7) industry, and (8) current CEO
name and e-mail address. To identify whether the current CEO had an heir apparent
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experience, additional information on whether the current CEO was a senior executive in
the company before becoming the CEO was gathered from other databases, namely (1)
Mergent Online – Executive Search, (2) Thomson ONE Banker – Director Search, and
(3) the Lexis Nexis people directory and subdirectories such as Marquis Who’s Who and
the Dun and Bradstreet guide. The resulting names constituted my potential participants’
pool.
Canada is an important country for research in this area because it is the ninth
largest economy in the world based on its gross domestic product (GDP)
(EconomyWatch, 2010). Following the 2008 crisis, the Canadian economy proved to be
one of the strongest advanced economies worldwide. I selected the provinces of Ontario,
Quebec, and Alberta for several reasons, most importantly their economic and financial
importance in North America and worldwide. Together, these provinces constitute around
75% of the GDP of Canada, with Ontario contributing around 40%, Quebec 20%, and
Alberta 15% (Statistics Canada, 2012). Ontario’s GDP alone is higher than the GDPs of
many major countries such as Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland and Ireland (Ontario
Government, 2012). Furthermore, Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta host more than 80% of
the companies headquartered in Canada.
Random sampling makes sense in the quantitative realm, where the researcher is
interested in the generalizability of the research findings to a population (Denzin &
Lincoln, 2011). Random sampling does not make sense in the qualitative realm or when
adopting the phenomenological approach such as in the case of this research, where the
purpose is to generalize back to theory (Merriam, 2002; Yin, 2011). Participants in a
phenomenological study constitute the main data sources for the researcher. The
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researcher carefully chooses participants based on their ability and willingness to describe
and share their experiences with the researcher (Polkinghorne, 2005) and their
accessibility to the researcher (Seidman, 2006). Qualitative research uses sampling
strategies to provide a better understanding of the research questions at hand and to
contribute to the existing knowledge of the phenomenon under study (Creswell, 2013).
The theoretical sampling in this research included heirs apparent who were appointed
CEOs from within organizations (to control for new learning related to industry or
organization knowledge) and those who became CEOs not more than eight years ago. I
limited the years of CEO experience to eight based on a study by Sherlock and Nathan
(2008) which showed that CEOs can reliably remember their experience if it was within
this range. CEOs were chosen from large organizations in different industries to control
for the impact of company size on the quality and quantity of the learning that may take
place during the transition.
Though very rare in large organizations, some of the organizations in the
participants’ pool were family run businesses. Family members were appointed heirs
apparent and became the CEOs such as in the case of Linamar Corporation where Ms.
Linda Hasenfratz succeeded her father, Mr. Frank Hasenfratz, as the CEO. These cases
were excluded from my sample as they may constitute a confounding factor to my ability
to generalize back to the theoretical framework.
Even large family businesses are different from other enterprises in many ways
including family aspects, management, and succession practices (Filser, Kraus, & Märk,
2013; Lansberg, 1999; Pearson, Carr, & Shaw, 2008). Hence the designation of heirs
apparent in the case of family businesses is a different process. Lambrecht and Lievens
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(2008) found family businesses prefer to have boards of advisors rather than boards of
directors since they do not necessarily want to be directed. This dynamic is different for
large companies where the boards of directors are actively engaged in directing the
organization and who have CEO succession as their second priority after financial
performance.
While succession in family businesses remains an important topic (Filser et al.,
2013; Strike, 2013), these businesses usually seek advice primarily on strategic issues,
followed by organizational issues and CEO priorities, and last about succession (Strike,
2013; Ward & Handy, 1988). The leadership in family businesses is different from that in
publicly held organizations for several reasons (Stewart & Hitt, 2012). First, while leaders
enjoy long tenure and are entrenched in family businesses, they experience high turnover
and are subject to market discipline in publicly held organizations (Oswald & Muse,
2009). Second, successors who are family members are trained on the job and hence
accumulate different, more personalized, knowledge about the business while successors
in large organizations are trained in educational institutions only before joining the
organization (Jorissen, Laveren, Martens, & Reheul, 2005). Third, leaders in family
businesses are drawn from a limited kinship pool, while successors in large organizations
are drawn from a large pool (Pérez-González, 2006). Goldberg (1996) found that
effective successors in family businesses are assured ascension to the top job very early in
their life, even as early as high school age. Therefore, the designated family members and
others in the company know they are likely the heirs apparent even before officially
joining the organization. For the above reasons, I excluded heirs apparent who were
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family members from the sample as their identity and social context may have existed
prior to joining the organization.
Appendix A describes the sampling strategy based on learning needs. It highlights
the possible origins of the heir apparent as being from within the organization, different
organization but same industry, or coming from a different organization from a different
industry. Heirs apparent recruited from different organizations and different industries
may need to spend their transition period learning about the organization and industry
specific characteristics. Those recruited from same industry but different organization
may spend some of their transition period learning about the organization’s specific
characteristics. In order to focus on learning the requirements of the CEO role as much as
possible, I only chose participants who were designated as heirs apparent and promoted
from within their organization (the shaded area in the table).
Sample size is a similarly important issue (Creswell, 2013). The aim of
phenomenology is to inform the research question and the phenomenon, rather than to
generalize the findings to the population (Moustakas, 1994). Attaining large sample sizes
alone is not the goal. In phenomenology, research sample size has been recommended to
be between five and twenty-five (Polkinghorne, 1989). I was able to access and interview
22 participants. Two of my interviewees were female constituting 9% of my sample size.
While the number is low, the number of female CEOs for large organizations is less than
5% in the top 1000 public companies in Canada (Eisenschmid, 2010). The female
representation in the sample is therefore approximately representative of the national
representation in Canadian public companies.
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The sample size of 22 was high compared to the sample sizes in similar previous
research, which range from 10 to 20 elite participants (Gabarro, 1987; Smerek, 2011;
Welch, Marschan-Piekkari, Penttinen, & Tahvanainen, 2002). The large size of my
sample provided me with theoretical saturation and enough variation based on the
enactment argument (see Figure 4.1) (Creswell, 2013). The sample size also provided an
acceptable representation from the three provinces (see Figure 4.2). Almost half of the
respondents were from the finance and insurance or the oil and gas industries (see Figure
4.3). All the findings and discussions provided in chapters 5 and 6 respectively should be
interpreted given the characteristics of this sample especially given that the respondents
are currently CEOs of large organizations and 21 of the 22 respondents followed
successful incumbent CEOs.

Figure 4.1: Sample Composition by Type of Enactment
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Figure 4.2: Sample Composition by Province
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Figure 4.3: Sample Composition by Industry
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4.2.2. Data Collection
This study aimed at understanding how the designation of executives as heirs
apparent affected their learning and prepared them to become CEOs. This process
involved the meaning making heirs apparent experience during the learning process.
Jarvis (2006), a renowned researcher in the adult learning field, argued interviews are the
best available tool to collect data about the participants’ learning process, as we need to
understand this process from their perspective. Participants know this process better than
the researcher, who is external to them. Observation would enable the researcher to see
only the resulting behaviour rather than have access to the thought process. Without
discussion, any attempt by the researcher to analyze the thought process behind the
behaviour would reflect the projected thought process of the researcher rather than the
participant (Gallagher, 2012).
Consistent with similar previous research I used semi-structured interviews as my
primary data collection method for this study. One study examined how leaders learn (cf.
Seijts & Gandz, 2013). The second one explored how partners in a joint venture learn
from each other (cf. Inkpen & Crossan, 1995). The third one investigated how CEOs of
non-profit organizations learn (cf. Sherlock & Nathan, 2008). The fourth one studied how
outside college presidents use sensemaking and sensegiving processes (cf. Smerek, 2011).
The fifth one researched how individuals make meaning of their own professional calling
(cf. Conklin, 2012). According to Hopf (2004) “(B)ecause of the possibility of enquiring
openly about situational meanings or motives for action, or collecting everyday theories
and self-interpretations in a differentiated and open way, and also because of the
possibility of discursive understanding through interpretations, open or semi-
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standardized interviews provide important opportunities for an empirical application of
action-theory ideas in sociology and psychology.” (p. 203). Semi-structured interviews
allowed me to conduct an open enquiry to understand participants meaning and motives
for action and self-interpretations of their everyday theories.
Hence, semi-structured interviews were the most appropriate tool to understand
the heirs apparent self-interpretations of their identity change, their perceived social
context, and their motives for interacting with their new environment. Observation on the
other hand, would have only allowed me to interpret their actions using my own theory of
mind. Weick and Roberts (1993), for example, relied heavily on data collected from
interviews when they attempted to describe (1) how the interaction of individuals with
their environment and (2) how they made sense of the situation led to heedful
interrelating. Data collection through interviews was also consistent with my theories. I
argued that observation alone could lead the heir apparent to understand the mental
models of the CEO using his or her theories of mind, while an interact would help the heir
apparent to understand the mental models from the CEO’s point of view. Similarly, I
argue observation allows the researcher to infer the participants’ mental models using
his/her own mental models. Interactive interviews, on the other hand, bring the researcher
closer to the participants’ mental models, which is the focus of this research.
Adopting interviews as the main source of data raised two types of challenges: (1)
access to elites, in this case the CEOs, and (2) access to adequate data. I discuss each of
these challenges below.
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4.2.2.1. Access to Elites
Access to elite members of society such as CEOs is difficult because they build
barriers with the rest of the society (Hertz & Imber, 1993), but this issue may have been
overstated (Ostrander, 1993). Researchers who have studied corporate elites have
received acceptable response rates (Welch et al., 2002). For example, Simons (1994)
received the acceptance of 10 top executives out of 12 asked to participate in his study.
Thomas (1993) recommended two important factors for getting access to elites – being
well prepared and having a sponsor.
Being prepared was highly recommended by scholars who researched elite-related
questions (e.g. Ostrander, 1993; Thomas, 1993; Useem, 1995). One advantage of
conducting elite research is that participants are usually highly visible and most of their
demographic information is publicly available (Thomas, 1993). Preparedness reflects the
seriousness of the researcher and radiates a positive image (Harvey, 2011). As such, in
preparing myself, I collected as much information as possible about the executives prior
to the meeting from different databases such as Lexis Nexis, Mergent Online, and
Thomson ONE, as well as from various business news sources. I looked for published
newspaper articles discussing the participants in any way during their transition period.
The information collected was not used to consciously build preconceived ideas
about the participant’s learning experience during the transition period, but rather to make
the best out of the interview and not ask for details about events I could learn about in the
press. I also allowed a great deal of flexibility in time and location to accommodate the
participants’ busy schedules in order to increase the response rate (Mikecz, 2012). The
interviews with CEOs who were promoted from within their organization were conducted
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over the period extending from October 2013 till May 2014 and distributed as presented
in Figure 4.4. Most of the interviews (16/22) were conducted at the interviewee’s office.
The others (6/22) were conducted over the phone.

Figure 4.4: Interviews Distribution per Month
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Based on the individualized research, I prepared a customized invitation letter for
every potential candidate to solicit their participation. The invitation letter introduced the
research topic to the participants without revealing the theoretical underpinnings of the
research. Appendix D provides an example of the main content of the letter sent to
participants. One week after sending the letter, in cases where I did not receive an answer
from the potential respondents, I followed up with an e-mail informing them of the letter I
sent and I attached it to the e-mail, and asked them if they would give me one hour of
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their time. Some participants asked for more details before accepting and others asked to
see a sample of the interview questions. I prepared the participants who accepted to do the
interview by telling them the interview revolved around the time they served as heirs
apparent and that I needed them to recall events or episodes which led them to change or
affirm the way they think or do business. I asked them to take personal notes, including
how these experiences changed them for the better or worse.
Some of the participants were approached directly; others were approached using
the help of a sponsor. Securing the help of a sponsor had mixed recommendations. Some
researchers believe that elites are more willing to meet and be more open during
discussions if you share a connection (e.g. Ostrander, 1993; Thomas, 1993). Other
researchers believe a sponsor can do more harm than good either because participants do
not like your sponsor (McDowell, 1998) or because the sponsor may misrepresent your
research objective (Seidman, 2006). A researcher on leaders’ learning found no difference
in the openness and acceptance to participate from elites according to whether they were
approached directly or through a sponsor. To increase the likelihood of my chosen CEOs
to participate in the study, I secured the assistance of the following people: the incumbent
dean of Ivey Business School at the time of the research, my thesis supervisor, board
members from the Canadian Foundation for Governance Research, and members from the
institute of corporate directors who agreed to introduce me to some of the participants in
my sampling frame.
My sponsors helped me reach out to 10 participants, six from Ontario, two from
Quebec, and one from Alberta. However, previous research suggested that 12 participants
were usually needed to reach theoretical saturation (Creswell, 2013). To reach my
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initially proposed sample size of 12 to 15 participants, I sent letters of invitation to
participants from Quebec (8 invitations) and Alberta (16 invitations). I did not search for
more participants in Ontario given that I already had secured 9 participants from the
province (6 with the help of a sponsor, 3 approached directly). After following up one
week later through e-mail, I received eight positive answers from participants in Alberta
and two from participants in Quebec. Figure 4.5 presents the distribution of participants
per province based on whether they were approached through a sponsor or directly.

Figure 4.5: Type of Approach
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4.2.2.2. Data Collection
Scheduling an interview with corporate elites does not guarantee the quality of the
data to be collected. After a review of the literature around the interviewing of elites,
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Welch et al. (2002) identified two major issues that may affect the quality of the data
collected: (1) the power of elite interviewees and (2) the openness of elite interviewees.
Previous research found CEOs were tempted to be in charge and accustomed to
directing everyone else around them (Cochrane, 1998; Mikecz, 2012). They were trained
in communicating and so they might, consciously or not, divert the course of the
interview to serve their own agendas rather than to adhere to the main objective of the
researcher (Ostrander, 1993; Thomas, 1993). To balance the power of the elite
participant, I researched all publicly available information on the participants to be well
prepared for the interviews. Further, I met with a journalist who reported on CEO
succession events in large organizations in Canada to obtain insights on specific events
that might have happened during the transition periods. I found that my participants were
genuinely interested in the topic and were excited to openly discuss the subject.
Previous research also found that CEOs were used to representing their
organizations to third parties such as the government and media (Bennett & Miles,
2006b), so they would be tempted to give more socially accepted answers in support of a
positive image of their organizations (Mikecz, 2012). To work around this, Thomas
(1993) suggested differentiating between the multiple personae of the participant – as an
individual, as a company’s CEO, and as the company’s spokesperson – and addressing
the questions accordingly. To avoid getting “journalistic answers”, I formulated my
questions in a way that addressed the participants as individuals seeking their personal
insights and understanding of the situation.
It was not easy for CEOs at first to admit to struggling during the transition
period, especially at the beginning of the interview. To encourage CEOs to speak openly,
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at the beginning of the interview I explained to all participants the measures I was taking
to ensure their confidentiality and informed them about the procedure I would undertake
to disguise their and their institutions’ identities in the write-up. I also attempted to build
as much rapport as possible during the interview, and to let them express their feelings
and thought processes about the transition period as accurately as possible. At any point
during the interview where I noticed the respondent was speaking using the pronoun
“we”, I listened carefully and then rephrased the question using his name, for example, I
would ask: “what did you, Ralph, do when this happened?” I did this in order to
understand his/her actions and thought processes as opposed to discussing the company as
a whole. My participants were generally open and honest about their experience and
recounted stories to which neither the journalist nor the newspapers had access. All
interviews were audio taped with the participants’ permission. At the end of the
interview, I asked each participant to sign a copy of the letters of information and consent
(usually sent to them before the interview) presented in Appendix B and I provided them
with a signed copy for their records.
The long-interview format is the most appropriate for a phenomenological
approach (Moustakas, 1994). It encompasses an interactive process and is based on openended questions and answers or comments, yet retains structure. It is most appropriate for
a phenomenological study, as it is more concerned with participants’ shared meanings of
experience (McCracken, 1988), rather than their affective status, which is the main
concern of the in-depth interview (Seidman, 2006). The long interview is structured
around areas for discussion in a way which creates a relaxed environment for the
participant to feel comfortable in and then tackle the topic at hand to minimize wasted

78
time. Long interviews should last one to two hours (McCracken, 1988). An interview
guide helps the researcher cover all the topics under study in a fairly sequential manner,
in addition to establishing direction, and maintaining focus on the participant’s stories
rather than worry about the next step (King & Horrocks, 2010; Mikecz, 2012).
The aim of this research is to understand the transition experience of heirs
apparent as it exists in their consciousness. Hence, the suggested interview guide (see
Appendix C) was framed to detect their experience rather than attain context-free and
individual-free information about transition periods in absolute terms (Polkinghorne,
1989). The questions were especially formulated to be theory-neutral and to concentrate
on the experience rather than the learning the heir apparent had during this period. This
allowed the support for the proposed theory to emerge from the data instead of from
imposing a framework on the participants. I avoided questions asking “why” and “what
happened”. This line of questions generates answers based on the participants’ own
interpretations of their experience (Polkinghorne, 1989), while my aim was to be able to
provoke memories of the experience itself as much as possible. When the participant did
not provide details about the experience, I asked more clarifying questions, such as,
“What do you mean by … exactly?” “What did you do when … ?” and “How did this
affect you?” “Who” and “When” questions were also asked when appropriate (King &
Horrocks, 2010). I opened and closed the interview with open-ended questions in order to
build confidence and check for information completeness (Mikecz, 2012). I used the
interview guide to ensure I touched on all of the necessary areas for discussion during the
interview. The participants did not see the interview guide. When asked, I provided the
participants with a sample of the general questions before the interview. They were
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introduced to the subject of the interview in the invitation letter as presented in Appendix
D.
Though interviews constituted my main data source, I collected data from various
archival sources such as company websites and news articles related to the succession
event published in different business magazines such as The Toronto Star, The Globe and
Mail, and others. The purpose of collecting and analyzing data from other sources was to
limit the potential bias associated with the use of an exclusive data source. It was also
directed at strengthening the validation of theory through the “triangulation” of evidence
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The data collected from websites and
news articles were used to verify some of the stories told during the interviews. I studied
all the archival materials related to a specific organization before the interview which
enabled me to ask more specific questions and delve deeper into the learning and
sensemaking processes of the heir apparent. The data collected from archival sources
provided me with insights on how the transition events were communicated to the outside
world and a basis for comparison with the stories as remembered by the participants. I
was able to use the general story from the archival sources in my findings but not quote
any of them as I would risk exposing the identity of my participants or their
organizations.
In addition to the 22 interviews I conducted with CEOs who went through the
experience of designation and a transition period, I interviewed 3 outgoing CEOs, 3 exCEOs, 3 board chairs, 2 board members, and 2 senior executives. These interviews were
also audiotaped with the permission of interviewees. The purpose of these interviews was
twofold. First, I intended to understand the context of my phenomenon, or the succession
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process, from the perspective of main players in the process rather than just the
designated executives. Second, since the change in social context was a major construct
in the theoretical model; I wanted to validate the designate CEOs’ interpretation of the
expectations from their social context with members of this social context. These
interviews gave me insights into the board’s and incumbent CEOs’ role in the process and
their contribution or lack of it to the learning process of the designate executives. They
corroborated and contradicted some of the interpretations made by the designate CEOs
about the expectations of their social context. I also interviewed one consultant who
specializes in assisting organizations with the succession process, and one journalist who
reports frequently on CEO succession events in Canada. The purpose of these interviews
was gaining knowledge about the succession process in contexts external to the
organizations I studied as well as validating my findings.
To check for the learning experiences of heirs apparent during the transition
period, I tried to identify some executives designated as heirs apparent at the time of the
fieldwork. The task of identifying current heirs apparent was more challenging than
expected. These executives’ designation might not have been announced in the media
until a competition for the CEO role ended. Their transition period was shorter than I
anticipated based on the existing literature. The transition period was between three to six
months in most cases. Interviews with current heirs apparent would help provide a checkin point for the learning experience that CEOs remember as heirs apparent. Given the
potential insights in terms of comparing the experience of heirs apparent currently
undergoing their transition versus the meaning making of the experience of CEOs who
already experienced the learning during the transition period this group was desirable to
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include in the sample. I was able through a board member and with the approval of the
incumbent CEO to interview one heir apparent who was expected to assume the position
of CEO in less than a month from the interview date. There were many shared elements
in the experience of the heir apparent with the experience of heir apparency as
remembered by the participants.
4.2.3. Data Coding and Analysis
“The data must bear the weight of any interpretation, so the researcher must
constantly confront his or her own opinions and prejudices with the data” (Conklin, 2007,
p. 42). The phenomenological approach entails the postponement of all formerly
embraced judgements until they can be defended based on the findings from the field
(Creswell, 2013). The unit of analysis in phenomenological research is experience
(Polkinghorne, 2005). Giorgi’s technique is one of the most well-known and widely used
techniques in analyzing phenomenological data (King & Horrocks, 2010; Sanders, 1982),
and organizational studies currently use this method. . His technique is similar to the
reductionist technique proposed by McCracken (1988) for analyzing data collected
through the long interview with modifications to focus on the essence of experience of
the participant.
In coding and analyzing the data I followed Giorgi’s technique as proposed in
Giorgi (2009). The technique comprises four steps:
•

Step 1: Getting a sense of the whole

•

Step 2: Identifying meaning units

•

Step 3: Transforming the data
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•

Step 4: Describing the structure

The following subsections provide a description of how I applied these steps to
the collected data.
4.2.3.1. Step 1: Getting a Sense of the Whole
Each interview was audiotaped and transcribed verbatim, mostly within 24 hours
to 48 hours after the interview, in extreme cases the interviews were transcribed with 72
hours. A third party transcribed the interviews. When I received the transcript, I listened
to the recordings and read the transcript to ensure the quality and accuracy of the
transcription.
Since the aim of phenomenological research was to provide a holistic perspective
on the experience of the participant (Giorgi, 2006), I read each transcript in its entirety
multiple times. The first time was to understand the participants’ experience and the main
players in their social context. After the first reading but before the second reading I
replaced the names of the participants and the major players in their experience with
pseudonyms. In addition to my promise of confidentiality to the participants
confidentiality, another purpose for replacing the names with pseudonyms early on in the
process, as suggested by Bazeley and Jackson (2013), was to familiarize myself with
pseudonyms and focus on the experience of the participants. In doing so, the real names
of the participants faded away with time and I reduced the impact of conscious or
unconscious interpretation of the experiences based on my impression of the organization
or the person at the time of the interview. I kept a journal as a checklist for each
participant before the interview and after the interview in order to keep my biases in
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check as presented in Appendix E. I only referred to the related list when I had doubts
about my own biases interfering in the interpretation of the data.
I adopted a strategy for choosing pseudonyms to avoid any conscious or
unconscious choice of names for the different participants and the major players in their
social context. Since most of my participants were born in the 1950s and 1960s, I used a
website listing the most common names in North America during the two decades. I
systematically replaced the names of my participants with the names listed on the website
according to their sex. Where derivatives of previously listed names appeared, I excluded
them and continued on the list. Also given the status of my interviewees, I avoided using
juvenile names such as Bobby or Billy and used Bob and Bill instead. I also replaced all
organization names with “the company” and eliminated any reference to the industry to
which the organization belonged.
4.2.3.2. Step 2: Identifying Meaning Units
Meaning units are usually statements which mark a turning point in the meaning
as perceived by the researcher taking the phenomenon under study into account (Giorgi,
2009). There are no strict instructions on how to identify meaning units (King &
Horrocks, 2010). The importance of these units resides in their contribution to identifying
general themes and shared elements in the experiences of the participants.
I completed the identification of meaning units described above as soon as
possible following every interview. I then transferred the interviews to NVivo, computer
software widely used for the analysis of qualitative data. This software allowed me to
organize, analyze, and model qualitative data. I then created an initial list of meaning
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units reflecting the constructs presented in the theoretical model proposed in chapter 3
including identity, social context, and enactment style. Enactment style included submeaning units reflecting the different styles of act, interact, and double interact. Meaning
units were coded under “nodes”. I started the analysis early on rather than waiting for the
complete data collection phase to end, as recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994).
In doing so, I was able to think about the existing data and create “nodes” or meaning
units not solely based on my theoretical model, leading to the generation of additional
interview questions in the following interviews to explore newly discovered concepts.
NVivo allowed for great flexibility in coding the data. I began coding by reading
and re-reading each interview transcript and listening to the corresponding recording. I
divided the interview texts sentence by sentence, and then re-read the sentences to
identify where there was a shift in the meaning. For example, the participant might talk
about the impact of the designation on his/her identity, and then in the same text shift to
the changes he/she felt in the social context. The text referring to the impact on identity
was coded under the node “identity” while the other text was coded under “social
context”. I was able to code texts from the interview into more than one meaning unit. I
also was able to check and re-check my coding by looking at the whole interview in
parallel with the coded text under each meaning unit and the overlap of the meaning units.
I created subcategories for the meaning units (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) proposed
by the theoretical model. I also created additional nodes for the themes which emerged
from the data and were not specified in the model. Once a node was added, I re-read the
previously coded transcripts to see if there was any reference to the new node. This
process of interplay between concepts and empirical data is a cognitive process allowing
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for a “process of discovery rather than only a logic of validation” (Van Maanen,
Sørensen, & Mitchell, 2007, p. 1146). I discovered many concepts during the data
collection and data coding for this work, however, this thesis presents only some of my
findings and I may use the others in future research. After completing the identification of
meaning units for the interview, I proceeded to perform higher levels of data
transformation.
4.2.3.3. Step 3: Transforming the Data
NVivo allowed for the clustering of the interview text from one respondent coded
under a meaning unit or its subcategory to be presented in one place. This enabled me to
read the entire participant’s comments regarding the change in his/her identity
irrespective of where the comments occurred in the interview. I followed Giorgi (2009)’s
recommendation and added another column to the data entitled third person. In this
column I included the text interview related to every meaning unit and its subcategories
replacing the first person with the third person, for example I replaced “I” with “she or
he”. This process allowed me to focus on the participant and understand his/her
experience rather than project my own experience onto the participant which could
happen if I read their experiences with the pronoun “I” (Englander, 2012). Transforming
the data to the third person also helped me achieve higher levels of abstraction (King &
Horrocks, 2010).
During this step, I tried to answer the question “what does this mean?” for each
meaning unit in the context of learning during the transition period (Giorgi, 2009). I
summarized the texts under the same meaning unit several times until I believed I had
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reached the highest possible level of transformation. The number of transformations
needed was different for different meaning units and was different across participants.
4.2.3.4. Step 4: Describing the Structure
While the other steps were specific to each transcript or participant’s experience,
this step relates to the description of the event in more general terms, transcending the
specifics of each experience (Giorgi, 2006). The aim of this step was to produce a unique
structure to describe the participants’ experience generally with respect to the concepts in
the theoretical model.
In order to describe the participants’ collective experience with respect to each of
the constructs in the theoretical model, I clustered all relevant data from each participant
relating to one construct or meaning unit. NVivo allowed me to aggregate the submeaning units and the overall meaning units for all the participants. Examining the
participants’ collective experience, such as the impact of designation on their identity, I
was able to uncover all of the shared elements and produce a structure that described the
experience in general terms. This structure was presented in the findings chapter for every
concept. For the enactment construct, three structures emerged; one related to each type
of enactment namely act, interact, and double interact. These structures were reported
separately and similarities and differences across the structures were highlighted.
4.3. Reflexivity Statement
Unlike in the practice of quantitative research where the researcher is distant from
the research subject, the researcher is the main instrument in qualitative research (Yin,
2011). Thus, in order to conduct a trustworthy and reliable phenomenological study, it is
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recommended that the researcher be aware of his or her own potential biases and
preconceived ideas and try as much as possible to set them aside while conducting data
analysis (Moustakas, 1994). The purpose of this study is to understand the heir apparent
experience from the perspective of the participants rather than imposing my own
framework on their descriptions. In the following paragraphs, I first present my own
beliefs that may have shaped the design of the study and then reflect on my previous
experience as a management consultant and the skills I have gathered which may help in
achieving the goal of this study.
The use of a post-positivist approach to phenomenology is not arbitrary. I tend to
subscribe to the post-positivist belief system and I was educated in an environment which
considered hard sciences such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology superior
to other fields. My experience in the educational system was that only one truth exists and
that it is found in the external world. This has been reflected in my school, undergraduate,
and MBA programs. Even during my PhD, my elective courses were advanced statistics
which demonstrates my tendency towards this mindset. Many qualitative books I read
suggest that some researchers choose qualitative research because they do not feel
comfortable with statistics, but this is not the case for me. The choice of qualitative
research in general and of the phenomenological approach in particular has been guided
by the nature of my research questions rather than by an aversion to statistics. However,
the application of the post-positivist worldview to the phenomenological approach has
been influenced by my own belief system. This is reflected in the structure found in this
proposal, which uses problem definition, formulations of research questions, literature
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review, proposing a theoretical lens, and crafting a methodology section – a structure
different from proposals done reflecting other worldviews.
My choice of a phenomenological approach to conduct my research was not
random. Retrospectively, I believe I have used this approach in the past in my
professional career as a management consultant. I first realized that individuals have
different perspectives and that what applies in one context may not apply in another when
I attended a sales seminar my organization presented to the salespeople of one of our
corporate clients. Although I was amazed by the effectiveness of the techniques taught, I
was surprised to discover the participants did not share my opinion. I took the opportunity
to talk to individual participants over break time in order to understand their viewpoints. I
discovered that many of the participants believed these techniques could not be applied in
their context. After several discussions, I came to understand their perspectives and
reported my findings to my supervisor. Since then, the company has adopted the practice
of asking participants about their needs before preparing seminar materials.
Though my academic experience with qualitative research remains relatively
limited, my professional experience as a management consultant helped me acquire
several skills which assisted me in pursuing this research. Throughout my consulting
career, I met with business owners, managers, and employees. I was mainly assigned to
perform and write quick diagnostic reports for potential clients. Business owners or CEOs
would approach our company, sometimes with a general concern about the performance
of their organizations and other times with their own assessments of where the problems
lay. They would ask our company to prepare a diagnosis and assess the situation in two to
four weeks. My job was to attend at an organization, meet with relevant managers, try to
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either support or reject the CEO’s hypothesis, and report what I believed to be the
problem. The ability to listen to participants, to have a fresh look at the data despite a
suggested proposition (e.g. the CEO’s own proposition of the problem), and to read
between the lines are important skills in conducting qualitative research (Yin, 2011).
Fortunately, these were skills I acquired during my consulting career.
During my 12 years as a management consultant, I dealt with many issues
including planning CEO succession. However, I have not looked into the experience of an
heir apparent. Hence, I do not have any conscious preconceived ideas about this process. I
also believe that my move from Lebanon to Canada challenged many of my beliefs and
taught me to look at things from different perspectives and accept new ideas and modes
of operation. The context I worked in as a management consultant is quite different from
the Canadian environment. This helped me to pay more attention to the experiences of the
participants and challenge what they believe to be the norm.
By laying down my beliefs and previous experiences, I am not claiming to
completely set aside my personal experiences and potential biases with the research topic,
but rather am informing readers about them so that they can judge for themselves my
level of involvement in the data analysis process (Creswell, 2013; Morgan & Smircich,
1980).
4.4. Establishing Trustworthiness
To ensure the good quality of the qualitative research, issues related to
trustworthiness were addressed throughout the study from inception to completion (Yin,
2011). To enhance the trustworthiness of a research study, it is advisable to identify and
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follow the analytic steps of a specific approach to qualitative research (Creswell, 2013, p.
53). This study followed the structure proposed by Giorgi (2009), a well-known
researcher who developed a detailed description of the phenomenological approach. The
steps taken to collect data were provided in detail. In addition, all gathered material was
scanned and included in the NVivo database along with the interview transcriptions and
field notes taken, in order to provide a reliable audit trail (Given, 2008). Steps taken to
analyze data and move from participants’ statements to higher levels of abstraction were
described in as much detail as necessary.
The other issues of trustworthiness researchers face in phenomenological studies
are whether the findings echo the truthful experiences of the participants (Creswell, 2013)
and whether they constitute a solid ground on which policies can be generated
(Polkinghorne, 1989). I used several tools to minimize the chances of attributing to the
participants what I expected to find rather than what the participant is expressing (Gilbert,
1998; Jones, Kanhouse, Kelley, Nisbett, Valins, & Weiner, 1972; Jones & Nisbett, 1971;
Jones, 1977). It is advised that the researcher bracket his/her biases in order to be able to
minimize personal interference in reporting the findings or in this case the respondents’
experience. To insure a proper bracketing of my biases to the best of my ability, I
prepared a checklist of my biases toward this research, as provided in Appendix E. I kept
this list and filled it out before and after every interview. I referred to it when I attempted
to analyse the interview data. The aim of this list was to keep my biases in check and
improve my ability to analyse the findings from the participants’ perspective. I updated
this list after every interview if and when necessary. In addition to the biases, I found that
my worries played a major role before the interview and later during data analysis
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(Barley, 1995). In order to be conscious of my state of mind before every interview, I
recorded my worries, feelings and anticipated outcome as close as possible to before and
after every interview. I listened to these recording after I coded the interviews to check
for any possible influence on my coding.
I also used member checking to ensure the structural description relevant to the
participants actually represented the participants’ views of their own behaviours and
experiences rather than my interpreted views. Each research participant was asked to
carefully review the final draft of the structural description representing his/her
experience and to suggest comments to add or delete in order to strengthen the description
to better represent the experience (Moustakas, 1994). To improve the trustworthiness of
my findings I used data from 22 participants to move from a single participant’s
experience to the description of the phenomenon itself. The recurring themes provided a
more trusted basis for structure building than less recurring ones (Polkinghorne, 2005).
Also, to improve the trustworthiness of the research, I collected data from other sources
such as published material and interviews with board members, other senior executives in
the organization, outgoing and ex-CEOs, consultants, heirs apparent, and journalists
involved in the succession process whenever possible.
4.5. Ethical Considerations
Ethical issues should be tackled at several stages of the research process
(Creswell, 2013). During the planning stage, I submitted an ethics proposal and secured
the approval of the UWO non-medical research board before the start of the data
collection. Appendix F presents the ethics approval notice I received from the board.
Once the proposal was accepted, I began contacting the selected participants, informing
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them about the research topic and necessary time commitment for the interview, setting
the interview, and asking them to sign an informed consent form. I notified the
participants their participation was voluntary, they could refuse to answer any specific
question, and they could choose to stop at any point during the interview.
During the data collection stage, no manipulation of any sort of the participants’
or the locations was made. I reminded participants of their right to refrain from answering
any question or stop the interview at any time. I also notified them that the interview
would be audiotaped and informed them of the confidentiality measures I would take to
safeguard their identities. I also explained to participants how I would use the data. All
participants were asked to sign a letter of information providing details about all
confidentiality measures and a consent form of their permission to audiotape the
interviews. I avoided leading questions throughout the interview.
I maintained all data during data analysis, reporting, and presentation with the
utmost care and saved only in electronic password-secured formats. Pseudonyms were
assigned to participants early in the process. The list containing the correspondence
between the pseudo and actual names was password-secured, saved on my own laptop,
and accessed only by myself. Multiple perspectives and contrary findings were genuinely
reported. I was transparent in my coding and I provided detailed descriptions about the
process used to move from the specific transcription to more abstract themes.
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CHAPTER 5. FINDINGS
The model developed in this dissertation hypothesizes that the designation of
executives as heirs apparent for their organization has a direct effect on their identity,
social context, and the way they enact their environment, thereby affecting their learning
during the transition period. Previous research on CEO succession, namely relay
succession, assumed heirs apparent learn during the transition period and outperform
other types of successors regarding post succession organizational performance. In this
research, I explore the learning process heirs apparent experience during their transition
period and examine the enablers and barriers affecting their learning during the heir
apparency period. This chapter provides an overview of the research findings. The data
are presented to support, enhance, and/or question the premises constituting the
theoretical model and to explain the various constructs and relationships with empirical
examples (Lawrence, 1999).
This research adopted the phenomenological approach. The aim from the
phenomenological approach was to understand the learning experience of executives from
the time they were designated as heirs apparent until they have formally assumed the role
of CEO. Following the common practice in the descriptive phenomenological method as
suggested by Giorgi (2009), I present my findings below with respect to each of the five
premises developed in the theoretical model. Unlike narrative studies that analysed the
life of a single individual, the phenomenological studies attempted to describe the shared
meaning of the individuals’ experience. I therefore briefly describe the argument
developed theoretically for each premise and then present shared elements in the
participants’ experience. To validate my argument, I chose the experience of some of the
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participants and interpreted their experience to provide a clearer idea of the process I used
to interpret the experiences of the respondents. I then presented, in a table form, examples
from the experiences of other participants using their own words. At the end of every
section, I identified and presented the shared elements in the experience of most of the
participants.
The aim of this research is to understand the impact of the heir apparent
designation on the learning experience of the participants. Hence, the heir apparent
designation by itself becomes a critical element in interpreting the findings. The
theoretical model developed an explanation of the impact of the heir apparent designation
on the learning experience of the participants. The theoretical model was built based on
the way heir apparent designation was presented and defined in the CEO succession
literature, with some adjustments to fit the nature of this work. However, the fieldwork
showed the participants experienced a different reality from the heir apparent designation
compared to the literature descriptions. Hence, I start the findings chapter by presenting
the heir apparent designation process as experienced by this set of participants. The aim is
to clarify some of the assumptions presented in the literature review chapter and to
understand the impact of the heir apparent designation on the participants’ learning
experience. This will provide a better understanding of the process from the perspective
of how and when the participants felt they were designated which varies from what the
literature had portrayed using the COO/president proxy as described later.
5.1. Heir Apparent Designation Process
As described in the CEO succession literature, relay succession involves
identifying a CEO successor, whom Vancil (1987) referred to as the heir apparent, a few
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years before the actual succession event takes place. Given that heir apparent is not an
official title in any organization, researchers studying relay succession based on archival
datasets identified heirs apparent as officers who were named COOs and/or presidents of
their organization before receiving a promotion to the role of CEO (Cannella & Shen,
2001). Prior literature widely accepted Vancil (1987)’s classification of CEO succession
practices as either, relay, horse race, or outside successions. Finkelstein, Hambrick, and
Cannella (2009) expected the designation of heirs apparent following a horse race.
However, they still accepted the prevailing assumption these heirs apparent were
designated several years before the actual transition event. Data from the interviews
showed the boundaries between the two inside succession practices, namely relay and
horse race, were blurred. Most of the CEOs I interviewed were designated the CEO-to-be
following a competition with other executives from inside the organization and in rare
cases the competition also involved candidates from outside the organization.
All of the interviewees including: current and previous CEOs, board members,
senior executives in the firm, and consultants agreed the CEO succession process and
namely the selection of the CEO is the responsibility of the board of directors. The
incumbent CEO was always involved in nominating and providing evaluations on
possible candidates. The board of directors in some cases also sought help from executive
search firms or consultants to nominate candidates. None of the CEOs I interviewed were
designated the heir apparent and/or were designated years before the actual succession
event. Executives were designated for a period ranging from three weeks to a maximum
of one year before assuming the CEO position. Competition for the CEO role was the
most common experience the participants shared. Only three of the 22 executives were
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not part of a competition before being designated by the board as the CEO-to-be. One of
them was asked if he wanted to be the CEO only a few months before he assumed the
role. In the two other cases, the executives were appointed COOs and the incumbent CEO
told them covertly they were the designated heirs apparent. The transition lasted longer
than expected and the executives lost confidence in the process and needed a stronger
affirmation for the job. One of these executives asked the board to take action to ensure
his ascension or he would leave the organization. In one of the 19 cases, the executive
was explicitly promised by the incumbent CEO to be the only possible successor for the
position very early on. He found two years before the passing of the baton that the board
of directors was considering another internal candidate for the position. The board would
also conduct an evaluation at the end of the selection process to announce the next CEO.
While heir apparent is not an official title, the way it is identified in previous
research on heir apparent or relay succession studies is when an executive is the only one
appointed as the COO and/or president of the organization (Cannella & Shen, 2001;
Giambatista et al., 2005). In anticipation that this definition had been adopted in the
previous research due to the dominant quantitative nature of the research, I broadened the
definition to include any executive who was in a senior position before assuming the CEO
position. The fieldwork confirmed the appropriateness of the use of the adjusted
definition rather than the one in the literature and required the addition of a necessary
condition: the explicit designation by the board. The common story among all the
respondents was that they knew they would be the next CEO when they were explicitly
told so by the board. Some of the respondents were already COOs or presidents and the
board still required them to compete to be designated the CEO-to-be. Those who were
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COOs felt the title did not accurately reflect to the organization or the industry that they
were the designated heirs apparent. They felt the title of president would have sent a
better signal that they were the future leader of the organization. On the other hand,
executives who had the title of president felt the title of COO would send a clearer signal
to the industry they were the next CEO.

The executives felt they were the “heirs

apparent” upon the board’s explicit announcement of their designation as the CEOs-to-be.
For example, Martin explained 1 how he felt about being secretly told he was the
future leader:
I think he (incumbent CEO) sort of made a call; well he did make a call that he was
going to elevate one person as a sort of a potential successor. I am not sure that is
necessarily the best idea because he elevated somebody (referring to himself) but he
only elevated them half way. I am not sure I would do that again. My gut feel is when
you elevate somebody and you really want to be clear that they are the second in the
command; you should be pretty clear on that. And Ron (incumbent CEO), he was
clear with me but he was not very clear with the organization. The situation started
to improve overtime but I think providing clarity would be helpful. The current CEO
of our competitor had a clear path to the top job. He became instead of Chief
Operating Officer, an EVP then even the president and so it was very clear he was
going to be the guy. For us we never made that choice. We never went to that next
level of Martin is the president and the president, in most people’s nomenclature is:
‘oh, there you go, you have been named’.
Designate CEO Charles explained the doubt surrounding the secret processes with
some humour:
I’ll give you a little insight here, under the leadership of Thomas (the ex-CEO) they
had a room, and for that room there were only three people who had a key, the CEO,
the president, and the head of HR. And you go in that room and there’s nothing but
chalkboards with positions and who the likely people would be. And they were the
only ones that had access and the joke was, it was always chalk, because that could
be erased.

1

All quotes used in this research are verbatim, as said by the participants. Very minimal editing was
performed on these quotes.
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From the meetings with the executives it became clear none of them had really
experienced an “heir apparent” designation the way it was presented in the literature.
Most of them were designated as heirs apparent few months before the transition event.
Figure 5.1 shows the frequency distribution of the designation tenure per month for all 22
interviewed participants. The two who were given the title of COO, along with the
promise of the CEO title, lost their confidence in the promise along the way and had to
secure an overt designation a few months before the transition.

Figure 5.1: CEO-D Designation Tenure Per Month

99

I believe referring to the respondents as heirs apparent does not accurately reflect
their experience. Hence, from this point forward in the dissertation I will refer to the
executives as designate CEOs or CEO-Ds from the time the board selected them and
informed them they would be the next CEO. Incumbent CEOs would be referred to as
CEO-Is thereafter. I will only use the terminology of “heir apparent” from here onward if
referring to the existing CEO succession literature. I will also present the premises
developed in the theoretical model at the beginning of each section using the CEO-D
terminology instead of heir apparent. I have also broadened the definition of “heir
apparent” I started with to identify my participants to become the CEO-D definition as
such: any manager in the company who was a senior executive, including being the COO
and/or president, and officially designated by the board as the future leader of the
organization, before assuming the CEO role.
In addition to avoiding the heir apparent terminology, I will also avoid using the
“horse race” terminology. Though most of the respondents went through a competition
for the CEO title before being designated, I cannot refer to the competition as a horse
race. The literature defines a horse race as a competition among senior executives in the
organization for the CEO role (Giambatista et al., 2005; Rowe, 1996; Vancil, 1987). This
competition is usually public and leads to the exit of the losing horses in the race from the
organization (Lehmberg et al., 2009). However, in most of the succession events I studied
the competition was not public and the other candidates stayed in the organization.
Therefore, I will refer to the race for the CEO position as the competition and not as a
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“horse race”. I will only use the terminology of horse race when referring to the CEO
succession literature.
Nineteen of the 22 respondents were designated after a competition for the title of
CEO. The number of candidates competing for the CEO position was different between
companies. In most cases there were three, in fewer cases two, and in one case the
competition started with 12 candidates and ended up with three finalists before the board
chose a candidate. None of candidates experienced adversarial relationships with the
other candidates but they all felt the process was time consuming and psychologically
demanding.
In some companies, the candidates were known to each other and to the staff
members in the organization as described by CEO-D Philip:
The process was very open. There was me, there was the CFO, and there was the
woman who was made head of operations so we didn’t call it Chief Operating
Officer for her but it was. So what happened the three were identified, two were
identified before me. … We knew each other. We knew who we were competing
against and I honestly say and I think if you ask the other two, they would say we
never competed against each other. We just competed for the role and there was a
huge difference-huge. And the only testimonial I can give you about the difference is
they are still here today. So this wasn’t a blood in the streets, violent competition. It
was competing on your own merits in your portfolio but not against each other, just
for the role.
In other companies, the identity of the candidates was known only to the CEO-I
and the board of directors as stated by CEO-D Frank:
They came to me; Scott (CEO-I) and the Chair of the board and said we would like
you to participate in this process. I didn’t know whether there were lots of candidates
or a few candidates. I was told at the very beginning it will be an international,
external search as well as internal but would I participate…. in the very last bit of
period of time, like, you know, before the announcement, I knew that the process had
gone almost all internal. But I would say if the process was 2, 2 and a half years, I
knew that it had probably gone internal about 10 months remaining in the process so
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there was a good year, year and a quarter that I had no knowledge of whether
internal/external what was happening. There were lots of potential candidates
running around. So I didn’t know. No idea. I didn’t want to know either because
what was going to happen was going to happen. And worrying about who were the
other candidates was not going to be helpful to my psyche. It wasn’t going to be
helpful to me completing the process …
Most of the CEO-Ds said they underwent psychometric tests as part of their
assessment through the succession process. When the number of candidates was limited
to two or three, all candidates completed the whole process, however, when the number
of candidates was six or more, the board retained three for the final selection. Some of
these processes were short, lasting around six months from candidate nomination until the
announcement of the next CEO; some were lengthy, lasting two to three years. The board
asked all finalists to prepare a presentation explaining their strategic vision for the
organization. The CEO-Is were supposedly neutral and acted as a support for all of the
candidates in the competition. They did not give advice or participated in the decision
making process unless the CEO-D sought their help; however, their evaluations of the
candidates were taken seriously by the board. The candidates during this period
concentrated on doing their job and completing their assignments as requested and to the
best of their abilities, as well as equipping themselves with the tools they thought would
improve their chances, as described by CEO-D Carl:
Kathy (CEO-I) made it very clear I was her choice but it wasn’t her choice to make.
Clearly, her recommendation would carry a lot of weight but it was never a given
that it was me. So I didn’t presume that the job is mine. I knew there were some
hurdles and I also knew that there was a lot of time for me to make mistakes and
maybe get myself out of the race. I really thought I have to up my game. I needed to
be a lot better at certain things that I didn’t do on a daily basis and that is why the
MBA was so important to me to try to get a broader perspective on business in
general.
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CEO-D Carl emphasized that his aim was not to compete with the other candidate
but rather to concentrate on equipping himself with all the necessary tools. Had he been
officially designated, he stated he would have spent his time focusing on preparing
himself to be ready for the CEO role rather than to be selected the CEO-D. He said:
Before I knew about the competition, I was certainly much more tuned to watching
Kathy, understanding, listening to her on the investor calls and understanding how
she took the questions and how she presented to the board. Watched a lot more
keenly around putting myself in that role and then discussing things with her, just
trying to tell myself: ‘I may have to do this at some point so pay attention’. So it (the
competition) changed that certainly for me, I had to postpone this sort of learning.
Most of the executives felt the immediate change when they were designated the
CEO elect. CEO-D Frank described this moment as follows:
When she (the chair of the board) told me, it was on a Friday. It was here in this
room. I walked in. She was staring out the window almost philosophically off in
another space and she turned to me and said: ‘you know we were supposed to
announce this later but the board has reached this decision already. And there is no
sense waiting. So we are going to get it going’. So that put into gear, a rollout
strategy that followed, everything started happening sooner. It was a bit of a blur.
This was a train that was leaving the station. She told me on a Friday and she said
we will get started next week Monday. So think about it over the weekend and sign
the letter. You know (addressing me) there is an offer letter. And, I was probably
floored is the right word, not in a negative way. It actually hit me that it had arrived
and I was conscious that this was a new trajectory in my career and in my life that it
just happened and I had to digest that over the weekend. And then I think it was the
next week or the following week, the rollout started. The rolling out of who you tell
and when you tell and the senior management teams and where and how and
scripting of it, rolling out to the newspapers, informing the shareholders, the whole
bit and I now am the one selected to be the next CEO. That is it. It was just a
machine that had started rolling.
CEO-D Frank immediately felt the end of an era and the start of a new situation, a
change that impacted his career and life right away. He immediately started thinking of
the new social context he had to deal with both internally (i.e., the senior management
team) and externally (i.e., the shareholders) given his new identity: “I now am the one …”
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Having presented a brief description on what the succession process was like for
the participants and identified when and how they received the designation, I will
hereafter present my findings with respect to each of the premises formulated in the
theoretical model.
5.2. Premise One: Immediate Identity
P1: The designation of an executive as the CEO-D evolves a new identity along with
a new set of identity standards for this executive affects the way he/she interprets the
cues in a situation and affects his/her cognitive schemas and behaviour so that they
align with the new identity standards.
In premise one of the theoretical model I argued the designation of an executive as
the CEO-D triggers the creation of a new identity for the executive. I also argued the
designation as CEO-D affirms the identity of the executive as the organization’s next
leader (Bennett & Miles, 2006a). The designation provides the executives social
recognition from the board of directors, and in some cases the CEO-Is, for their new
identity. I also argued the designated executives would work on aligning their future
behaviours and processes with the new set of identity standards as perceived by the CEODs.
The period before the appointment activated an identity search process by the
executives, the identity as the CEO-D. However, the designation, with an offer for the
CEO position, motivated the CEO-Ds to align their behaviours and thought processes
with the new identity standards. This designation as CEO-Ds led the executives to reflect
upon who they were as well as who the others perceived them to be. Nineteen of the 22
CEOs interviewed mentioned feeling honored to participate in the competition for the
CEO position. However, with this honour came doubts as to whether the board saw them
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as the future CEOs, whether they would become the CEO, and whether they would be
able to bring value to the organization. Hence, the search for who they would be as CEOs
started the moment they were asked to participate as a CEO candidate.
For example, CEO-D Cheryl expresses this as:
Like I wasn’t convinced that they (the CEO-I and the board) saw me as a CEO, you
know when you are a very strong number two; you are not necessarily seen as a
great number one. And so I wasn’t sure that even if I threw my name in the hat that I
would get it. And I think both of them (the CEO-I and the chair of the board) made it
very clear to me that they did see me not only as a number two but as a potentially
very good number one. I knew I had to decide not after they offered it to me because
they wouldn’t offer it to me if I hadn’t really sold them on me. You know there were
12 people on the hiring committee. So, I knew I had to make a strong impression and
I think I knew before I went in that I was resolved and that I would get it, that I would
put everything I had into it and then I would get it… I really wanted it and I thought
there is nobody else who is better for it and then I really believed that. You know I
have days where I don’t believe it anymore. But that day I believed it.
CEO-D Cheryl needed affirmation from the CEO-I and the chair of the board that
she had what it took to be the next CEO. She needed to see herself in the role and to
change her mental models to the new potential identity first before expecting the hiring
committee to give her the role. It was only when the board asked Cheryl to throw her
name in “the hat” that Cheryl began considering her new identity leading her to believe
she needed herself she wanted the position to be able to convince the board to give her the
title. CEO-D Cheryl’s experience with doubt and need for affirmation during the
competition period was not the exception; it was more the rule. Appendix G provides
representative examples of the executives describing their thought processes upon being
asked to present their candidature for the CEO title.
In the 19 cases where there was a competition three of the executives participated
twice. Meaning they participated in the competition one round earlier and lost that round.
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All three of them knew that they would not get the job in the first round, due to age
constraints, lack of enough exposure, and mainly because the winning candidate was
better suited for the organization’s needs at the time. During the first round, they felt
honoured to have been even considered as candidates. All three of them, however, said
they felt they were the best candidate for the second round and would have left the
company if they did not get the job. CEO-D Henry said reflecting on his first time
participating in competition: “I mean I was honored at the time to have even been
considered for the job. It gave me enough confidence to sort of hang out the next nine
years with the existing CEO.”
The request to participate in the competition for the CEO title activated not only
the potential identity of the CEO-D, it also activated the potential identity of the “NOT
CEO-D”. After the feeling of “being honoured” to be asked to participate, the executives
gave deep consideration as to who they would be if they were not selected as the CEO-D.
The common question they asked themselves was whether they would stay at the
organization or leave. The sample included only executives who got the title, but their
thought processes and their espoused theories as to what they would have done were
wide-ranging. Eight of my 22 respondents admitted they would have left had they lost the
competition. Six of the eight were able to retain the other candidates when they were
selected the CEO-D. Seven of my respondents said they had to manage their expectations
during the competition because they actually liked the company and were not considering
leaving if they did not get the job. One of the seven executives had to fire of one of two of
the other candidates who ran against him in the competition. Another executive had to let
go of the only other candidate in the competition after assuming the CEO role. Four said
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they could not make up their minds during the competition and they did not know what
they would have done had the board not chosen them. One of my respondents had never
gone through any kind of competition; he was directly asked if he would like to be the
CEO. The other two were covertly told they were the CEO-D a long time before, and only
overtly announced few months before the actual transition, so they had no competitors for
the job.
CEO-D Frank, one of the executives who decided to stay if not selected the next
CEO, described his thoughts when he was considering presenting his candidature to the
CEO role:
I always made the assumption that while I had a shot at it, if I didn’t get it, which
was part of the thinking, if you didn’t get it, what was your response going to feel like
and because I started out from the perspective that I want the best thing for the
organization, I want the board to make the best choice they can and I had comfort
that they would make the best choice. I knew ahead of time that if I was not the
successful candidate, that would be okay because the board would have made the
right choice and the consolation prize, being a Senior Vice President in investments
and controlling several billions of dollars’ worth of assets globally isn’t such a bad
spot to be either. And so I was very comfortable that if I didn’t get it, I was not going
to: A) have to storm out the door and leave the organization which is typically the
model in the banks, B) that I was not going to be crushed because somehow I had an
imperfection that the board saw that I didn’t, that why was I not chosen as the next
leader. My ego does not work like that.
CEO-D Henry, one of the CEOs who decided to leave if not offered the job said:
If I wouldn’t have been offered the CEO role here, I would have taken one elsewhere
and I think that, you know, the company is fully conscious of that as much as I am. So
it’s, you know, both sides, the equation have to be as open as it can be.
Participating in the competition for the CEO position drove the executives to think
about who they would be if they were selected or not selected. The board’s overt
announcement of their designation activated the identity of the future leader of the
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organization. For the executives, the board overtly announcing their designation meant
having an offer letter and informing the internal and external stakeholders of the
organization. The offer letter activated the executives’ identity as the “future leader of the
organization” and allowed them to start aligning their thought processes accordingly.
The appointment of the executives as COOs was interpreted differently than their
appointment as the CEO-D. CEO-D Robert explained the difference:
It didn't change one bit the way I did what I did (his appointment as COO). I mean,
I've always operated at full speed. I was not waiting for something or a signal to start
going beyond expectations or trying to go beyond expectations or learn about
different things, read about different things and read about leadership. I think it was
more obvious to the outside world or my peers who were probably more sensitive to
it than I was myself. Because I don't think it really changed anything. It definitely
changed something when I heard that I would be the CEO in a few months.
Twenty-one out of the 22 respondents acknowledged they could not start aligning
their behaviours until the announcement was made public. To establish themselves as the
future leader and start making changes such as preparing their own executive teams, they
needed legitimacy. Table 5.1 provides support for the immediate impact of the
designation on the executives’ identity and the changes in mental models and behaviours
the executives undertook in order to establish and affirm their new identity.

Table 5.1: Representative quotations illustrating the immediate impact of the
designation on identity
CEO-D

Impact of the designation on the
executive’s identity

Alignment of behaviours and thought processes
with the new identity standards

Allen

As soon as I knew I was appointed
president and knew that the handover is
going to happen within 6 months, I felt
I needed to be ready.

I am going to start to manage the process as we go
forward and I need to start putting my team in place.

Bill

I entered the competition because all

I had to ask Jeffrey (CEO-I) to leave the leadership
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CEO-D

Cheryl

Impact of the designation on the
executive’s identity

Alignment of behaviours and thought processes
with the new identity standards

the other executives did, and then I got
the job. I believe I was a safe choice,
but I had a big challenge. Jeffrey
(CEO-I) was an iconic CEO, I am not
like that.

meeting. I had to bring the organization along that
his leadership style is not mine and that the
leadership team has to step-up.

I asked Janet (CEO-I) and the director
of communications to stay after the
meeting. Then I said, you are not going
to believe this, I got the job! … and
then I said what do I do? I was quite
naïve. What do I do now?

I think when I had a broader mandate; I took on
more of an organizational scope. So whereas I had
always been a real advocate for my own department
and for the work that we were doing, I felt like I was
the voice of other stakeholders in the organization
and I really had to drive their interests.

I had to make sure everybody understood that I am
not replacing Jeffrey (CEO-I); I am replacing the
CEO role.

I wanted to meet with the leaders in the industry,
clients and suppliers, and establish myself as the
new CEO. They were all welcoming. I don’t think
anyone will say no to the CEO of a large
organization.
I had to do my own hiring and firing and establish
myself as the new leader of the organization.
Frank

It actually hit me that it had arrived and
I was conscious that this was a new
trajectory in my career and in my life
that it just happened and I had to digest
that over the weekend.

I moved to the executive floor, not that it meant to
me, but it meant to the organization that I am on my
way to be the CEO.
I have met with the senior management team one on
one, sometimes for hours. Some of them I already
knew in my previous position, but I needed to meet
with them as the CEO-Elect and understand their
expectations and concerns.
I also met with the board members one-on-one, they
knew me, they have selected me after all, but I
needed to know them.

Randall

I felt honoured and a little bit
intimidated

There is pressure when the growth pattern and
metrics we have been able to produce have always
been very strong. No question there is definitely a
legacy (the CEO-I’s) that one needs to never forget.
I am also confident that my prior department played
a big part of how the company has grown and that I
have been a big part of the growth and the strategy
we have going forward.
You are always going to look over your shoulder,
but you have to be focused on the road ahead and
make sure that you have the right people and
strategy in place. I believe we do, so I am confident
looking forward.

John

I was almost sure I will get it.

How do I - in a way you’ve got to be authentic to
who you are but also adjust your behaviour to bring
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CEO-D

Impact of the designation on the
executive’s identity

Alignment of behaviours and thought processes
with the new identity standards
people on - because I think as a leader one of your
most important characteristics is how do you inspire
other people, and if you can’t inspire other people to
follow, then you’ve got a problem.
I mean I think it’s a phenomenal job so I think the
ability to interact with high quality people in the
business community and also internally is
phenomenal.

Margaret

I felt happy and I felt overwhelmed.

I was a woman in a man’s world so it was a big
thing in many ways but I just thought, okay, how are
we going to do this?

Robert

I was VP of Finance, and all of a
sudden I was there.

I think what’s really critical is this sort of credibility
you establish with the people that operate at your
level. I think when you sense that there is credibility
there, then you sense that you’re being given a lot of
opportunities. It’s natural that this is how things
happen if you want my opinion. If the team around
feels like following you and you have a decent CEOI and a decent board, I think people get that and it’s
natural. But, this process of sensing credibility and
support and sensing that people see you as the
upcoming leader is the purest signal.
I then, ran a big portion of the integration process
and so on. I think at that time, people saw a lot of
confidence. Out of circumstances, it would not have
happened like that had the CEO succession had not
taken place. I think these guys trusted me and we did
a fantastic deal and this was life-changing, certainly
for me but for the organization as well.

The designated executives were in control of aligning their thought processes,
however, their ability to align their behaviours was enabled or restricted by the behaviour
and thought processes of the CEO-I. I met three outgoing CEOs and three ex-CEOs
during the fieldwork. These CEOs had different understandings as to how the transition
should happen. Those who were looking forward to their retirement were more willing to
immediately withdraw and let the CEO-D take the reins of the organization starting the
day of the announcement. They were available for consultation on issues related to setting
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up the new executive team, the future strategy and vision of the organization, the budget,
and providing background history as to why certain rules or systems existed. Their
intention was to help the CEO-D build a better understanding rather than to drive the
decision their own way. CEO-Ds during this period had the opportunity to discuss their
strategic vision, build their executive team, and attend many meetings with outside
stakeholders with support from the CEO-Is. The freedom to act along with the debates to
understand why things were done in a certain way enabled the CEO-Ds to adjust their
thought processes and behaviours and prepare to assume the job. The CEO status and
hence identity transition in these cases happened along the way. The CEO-D gradually
acquired the CEO status as time got closer to the set transition date.
Other CEO-Is believed they need to remain the effective CEOs until the last day
of their tenure as the CEO-D needed time to settle in. These CEOs had a planning session
with the designated executive and mapped the different responsibilities each one of them
should handle. They also put together the time-line for each responsibility to be handed
over from the incumbent to the CEO-D. The CEO-Ds appreciated the opportunity to meet
members of their new social context and understand their perceptions and expectations.
The invitation to participate in major strategic meetings enabled them to understand the
decision as well as the decision making process improving their ability to make strategic
decision upon assuming the CEO role. The CEO identity transition in this scenario
happened all at once. While the CEO-D learned along the way, he/she acquired the CEO
status on the set transition date.
There were some extreme cases (5 out of 22) where the CEO-Is were unwilling to
leave and did not want to relinquish power to the CEO-Ds. These CEO-Is refused to
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recognize the legitimacy of the successor even after the board’s announcement. This fact
did not go unnoticed by the CEO-Ds. They felt the lack of space to act as the future
leaders.
For example CEO-D Allen preferred to have his new identity affirmed by the
CEO-I, but CEO-I Curtis was unwilling to do that. Allen described his experience as
follows:
I think of a handover like, you know, I (referring to Curtis) am going to take you to
see these politicians or these colleagues or these parts of the supply chain or these
big customers or these big owners. No, zero. As CEO, Curtis couldn’t handle the fact
that he will no more be the CEO, and I don’t think I ever saw him say, “Here is
Allen; my successor.” He never said that other than in front of the cameras and it
was carefully scripted and quick. This restricted my ability to do things I needed to
do in preparation for my time as the leader.
CEO-D Bill had the same experience with the CEO-I Jeffrey, who also did not
want to let go, but had to, upon request from the board. CEO-D Bill described his
experience as:
I went on two trips with him (Jeffrey) on investor relations where you go meet with
investors there, one hour meetings and you do about, in two or three days, you do 20
or 30 little meetings so very intense. We did them in the US West, US East, and in
Europe and not in one of those meetings did he introduce me as the CEO, coming in.
Both CEO-Ds sought affirmation of their new identity from a different authority.
Both asked the board of directors for the permission to take actions to help them establish
their new identity and provide them with the legitimate power to prepare their
organizations.
In summary, I argued in premise one the designation of executives as the CEO-D
creates the potential for a new identity for these executives. The CEO-Ds then align their
behaviours and thought processes with the new identity standards. The fieldwork showed
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in most cases the ascension to the CEO-D position usually happened after a competition
rather than a simple appointment to the position. The thought process for the new identity
started upon the acceptance to submit one’s candidature for the job. This acceptance
however also triggered thoughts about the identity of the “not CEO-D” in case they lost
the competition. The fieldwork confirmed the activation of the new identity as the CEO-D
happened upon the board’s overt designation, by informing the internal and external
stakeholders, of the executive as the future leader. The executive started the alignment of
necessary mental models and behaviours at the time of designation but this alignment was
either enriched or constrained by the behaviours and mental models of the CEO-Is.
5.3. Premise Two: Potential Identity
P2: The designation of an executive as heir apparent activates a potential identity
and leads the heir apparent to reflect on the assumptions on which his/her mental
models are built vs. those of the representative of the future identity or the incumbent
CEO. The heir apparent hence builds his/her own role identity standards, rather than
simply adjusting current behaviour or cognition to resolve equivocality.
Practice oriented research on relay succession showed that acquiring the identity
of the heir apparent was not enough for the executive to build the identity of a successful
CEO (Bennett & Miles, 2006a; Ciampa, 2005; Miles, 2011). Identity researchers found
individuals built identity standards for a new position, in this case CEO-D, taking into
consideration the expectations of the members of their new social environment and the
meanings they assigned to the role (Burke, 2006). To build the new set of standards for
the expected CEO position, CEO-Ds may use social learning (Bandura, 1977) and/or
direct socialization (Burke & Stets, 2009).
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In premise two I tried to explain the process through which CEO-Ds build their
new identity and its related standards. As suggested by identity researchers, I used
learning theories namely social and transformational learning theories to explain the
process. There are two major components included in premise two of my theoretical
model. First, I argued CEO-Ds, once aware of their new status as the future CEO, reflect
on the necessary standards corresponding to the new identity. Based on social learning
theory, I argued they look at the values, beliefs, and behaviours exhibited by the CEO-I
as their base case (Bandura, 2001). Second, using learning theory, I hypothesized that
rather than simply emulating the standards of the CEO-Is, CEO-Ds undergo a deep
thinking process. CEO-Ds evaluate the standards of the CEO-Is. They check whether
these standards fit with their overall personality including their other co-existing
identities, before building their new identity standards (Mezirow, 2012). In the following
paragraphs I present how my fieldwork shows support or lack of it to these sub
components of premise two.
Executives, once designated, embarked on the journey to become the CEO. In line
with Bandura (2001)’s argument that individuals consider behaviours they believe have
functional value relevant to their situation, all the respondents described the CEO-I’s
values and behaviours. Whether consciously or unconsciously, the first thing they thought
about when designated was whether they could have the same leadership and
communication styles as the CEO-Is. Irrespective of whether they liked, respected,
trusted, or were on good terms with the CEO-I, they started describing how the CEO-I
handled most of these activities. The main activities, they referred to, included their
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leadership style, communication style, handling of the outside stakeholders, and running
board meetings.
After elaborating on the values, beliefs, and behaviours of the CEO-Is, the next
step CEO-Ds took was asking themselves whether they could become like the CEO-Is. To
arrive at an answer, CEO-Ds went through a reflective learning process. The most
common process among my respondents was a self-dialogue around these standards.
They spent a significant amount of time thinking about whether they could or could not
adopt the CEO-Is’ standards, including behaviours and communication and leadership
styles. This process was intense. They attempted to determine what they would be like as
CEOs given their observations of the CEO-Is and the impact of CEO-Is behaviour and
attitude on their surroundings. Most of the respondents sought out someone who could
serve as a sounding board, not necessarily for direction, but for constructive dialogues.
For some of the CEO-Ds, the sounding board was (1) a consultant hired by the board, (2)
a mentor they chose themselves (usually a CEO or an ex-CEO from outside the
organization), (3) a family member who was or still is a CEO, and (4) for others they
went to the CEO-I. Some of the CEO-Ds used only one sounding board; others used a
combination of people. Most of the CEO-Ds found value in their discussions with
someone who had an experience as a CEO. They believed this person had more
understanding of their concerns than those who did not have such an experience.
All respondents went through a self-reflection process. Table 5.2 provides
examples of some representative quotations from CEO-Ds describing their thought
process and the premises for reflection.
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Table 5.2: Representative quotations illustrating the reflection process and some of
the premises for building identity standards for the executives’ new CEO identity
CEO-D
Bill

Thought Process
I had many thinking sessions
by myself, nobody helped
me through.

Premises for Reflection
I really had no plan when I got into my role, to replace
Jeffrey. Because I saw Jeffrey is just an individual that I
can never do any dent to, no chance.
It is just the way his leadership style is. I am just not that
type of person. I don’t like limelight. I don’t like speaking.
I don’t like being at the front of the room. That is just not
my style. I have never enjoyed it. It’s tough for me to do.
So I just felt that that is not me, I enjoyed being behind the
scenes. I enjoyed doing a senior leadership role but not the
senior leadership role.
I am not replacing Jeffrey. I can never replace Jeffrey so
don’t put me in that position because I’ll fail and if you are
actually believing that we are going to tell staff Bill is now
replacing Jeffrey, no you are wrong, I am replacing the
role of CEO and we need to define that differently.
Bill, you have a hard time making decisions. You continue
to walk away from stuff. Yeah I know. I am very open
about it but that is why I will make sure I have got people
beside, me they will push me and we will all make the
decisions together so but I did have a lot of discussions
with the board about that and the board still fights me on
that.

Cheryl

I had many debates with
myself, Janet, and my
husband

I am never going to be like her (CEO-I) but I actually have
different strengths and that was part of what she kept
saying to me.
I think she is very sure, when she decides something is
right, she is very sure whereas I tend to be, well let me
hear what the opposition has to say.
We don’t have the same leadership style at all and even
that was in conflict sometimes and so I would say to her I
appreciate that. That is who you are, that is not who I am.

Frank

I went through a deep soul
searching process.
I had many debates with the
consultant.

I am who I am. I lead the way I lead. I am always open to
learning. That is one of the things that define me as I love
learning; I always have. I am a bit of a closet analytical
academic person reading papers all the time. Having said
that, I have got to be who I am going to be and I don’t
want to get into this under false pretences.
They (the board members) said to me the ex-CEO was
known for that, the CEO-I is known for this, what will be
your thing? I said, I do not know yet, I need to think about
it.

Henry

I observed a lot, and I did
workshops at Harvard.

I tend to involve all people in the end decisions and
sometimes those clash. I want sort of consensus before we
move forward. He (CEO-I) was willing to move forward
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CEO-D

Thought Process

Premises for Reflection
without consensus and sometimes that resulted in a better
outcome and sometimes it resulted in a worse outcome. So
both styles have their end of pros and cons and there is no
perfect one.
If you have got people that are open minded enough to
listen at the view points and at the end of the day the buck
stops and the CEO is going to make a decision, so I mean
he is going to make it with his style or her style. And you
need to be comfortable with your own.

John

I watched David (CEO-I)
and I could feel the reaction
of others to his style.

David (CEO-I) did not like to take direct questions during
town hall meetings, he liked to know the questions ahead
of time and prepare his answers. I believe people knew
that, they always felt that the questions are scripted and
inserted. I like to take direct questions, even if they are
challenging.
He liked to read and re-read e-mails he was very
concerned with formalities, I am not. I believe I am more
concerned about contents.

Margaret

I discussed it with myself
which I do a lot.

So when you get a job like that as a CEO, you can actually
do whatever you want. If you want to spend 80% of your
time outside, you can do that. If you want to spend 80% of
your time inside on the floor and doing things, you can do
that. You actually design your days exactly, exactly as you
want. And, but to me, the role of the CEO, the
fundamental role of the CEO was to make sense between
the outside and the inside. You need to talk to the outside
to explain everything great that you do and you need to
talk to the inside of what is happening outside, the threats
and opportunities and your job, because if you don’t do it,
not many people will do it in the organization. The way
you do this interaction between the outside and inside, it’s
yours and Russell did that in a very different way.

Philip

I admired Ralph (CEO-I). I
had many discussions with
him and with one of our
board members.

I learned so much from Ralph. The most important thing I
learned is: “don’t change”. So be who you are. Ralph is
the same guy he was before. He was a sales guy for 30
years. It is unbelievable. I always told Ralph he doesn’t
know he is a CEO because I have worked for other CEOs
and they change and Ralph said: ‘look, you are who you
are. You are a good leader, you are approachable, and you
are a regular person. Just be that person still. Don’t try to
be what you think the board wants you to be. Don’t try to
be what you think your other stakeholders want you to be.
Just be who you are. That is what got you here.’
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The fieldwork shows CEO-Ds took time during the transition period and
experienced a deep thinking and learning process to reflect upon their identity standards
as the future CEO. They started by evaluating the behaviours and leadership styles of the
CEO-Is. They compared these behaviours with their own understanding of what the job
was as well as their current standards. They thought about which standards to internalize
and which ones do not align with their own beliefs and values and standards of their other
identities. To help them through the process, most of the CEO-Ds turned to other people
as sounding boards to help them determine these standards. What is evident from the
interviews is that they did not try to blindly adopt or emulate the identity standards of the
CEO-I.
5.4. Premise Three: Social Context
P3: The designation of an executive as the CEO-D changes his/her social context,
and leads the CEO-D to heed and behave in ways that meet the endorsement or
perceived expectations of the members of the newly created social context.
I argued in premise three that the designation of executives as the future leader
changes their social context and hence affects the cues that they select. Therefore, they
will need to change their cognition, behaviour, and identity standards in order to meet the
expectations of their new social context. My data showed the CEO-Is were aware of this
change as they had experienced this previously. In many situations, the CEO-Is took the
responsibility to socialize the CEO-Ds to their new social context. They introduced them
to the outside world and pushed them to understand the internal environment of the
organization from the perspective of a CEO. Outgoing CEO Steven, for example, made
sure his successor took the time during the transition period to meet with the executive
team members, the board members, and members from the outside community.
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My advice to Donald (CEO-D) is: ‘in the 6 years span that you are CEO that is the
team that is going to be there for you, so take your time to know them and understand
what their expectations are’. He (CEO-D) has been going through a process of really
getting to know all the players so right now, he is having a two hour meeting with
one of the directors and he had done that with all of the directors. And then he had
two hours sessions with all of the members of the executive team so that they would
explain to him how they are working in a formal setting as the CEO-to-be. He, right
from the very beginning, was included in every meeting with government people.
Other CEO-Is had a different perspective on how to handle the change in social
contexts. They knew there would be a change in the relationship dynamics once the
announcement of the successor was made. So instead of staying and socializing the CEODs, they left and let the successor establish his new status. They also wanted to save
themselves from dealing with the emotions related to the loss of power. Outgoing CEO
Howard described his experience as such:
When you have been the CEO of a powerful organization of $6 billion and around
15000 people, power is everything. You lose it when you say you are leaving and you
are giving your power away at the same time. The dynamics in the office change.
People will look at the new one. And it’s very difficult for someone who was on top
like that to hand over and say: ‘it’s done’ and still stay around. It makes no sense
because nobody would want to talk to you. Right now, I have someone who is helping
me out of this thing and that is the first thing he told me: ‘once the next one is
announced, you have to quit, fast, because it makes no sense to stay around.’ He
(CEO-D) does not need me around.
The change in social context was a major change CEO-Ds faced when designated.
Only one of the 22 CEOs I interviewed said she did not feel the change in her internal
social context. For her, it was a continuation of her previous experience. She said:
They (the staff members) didn’t change because I didn’t change. And, actually the
leader of the union came to me and he said: ‘Margaret, make sure that nobody ever
calls you Madame’. That was the best lesson ever: You are Margaret, you stay
Margaret, and I remember it. Just make sure nobody calls you Madame. If I met the
brand new employees, they call me Madame because they don’t know me, right? But
the people who were there before I was appointed, they called me Margaret.
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However, though she did not feel the change internally, she felt it from the
outside. Suddenly, CEOs at other companies would not refuse her requests for a meeting.
She also instantaneously became the person the community activists invited to
fundraising dinners or asked for sponsorships.
All of the other CEOs I interviewed felt immediate change in their social contexts
effective the moment of the announcement. Some of the change was only their perception
about how the social context recognized their new status while part of the change was
based on actual experience. Executives distinguished amongst three social contexts in
which they felt the most change: (1) their staff members – peers and others; (2) the
important outside stakeholders of the organization – government representatives,
suppliers, or customers; and (3) the most frequently mentioned social context was the
board of directors. In the following subsections, I present a brief summary on the
collective experience of the executives about the change they felt in each of these social
contexts.
Upon designation, the executives felt the increased impact their behaviours,
emotions, and words suddenly had on their immediate context, such as their peers and
staff members. There was a major shift from being a member of the executive committee,
and perceived as a peer, to becoming the CEO-D, the future boss. They felt their words
gained different meanings and they were viewed very seriously; they knew they could not
tell jokes anymore “they (the jokes) will come back and haunt us somewhere”. They also
noticed how their emotions were suddenly interpreted in terms of how the company was
performing rather than them being happy or sad. Most of them also noticed how their
presence in the executive meetings suddenly made everybody cautious in choosing their
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words or even stopped ongoing discussion. Most of the CEO-Ds admitted they had to be
mindful about the words they chose to address people, their attitude – be it positive or
negative, and the impact of their presence on the people. This meant adjusting their
behaviours and mental attitudes to manage the perception of their team. Christopher said
“I keep forgetting sometimes that it’s not that I am any different a person. It’s just that I
have a different title”.
In addition to the change in their immediate social context, they also felt the
change in the outside community. They immediately became the new face of the
organization which had a major impact on them. They were surprised at the difference in
how outside stakeholders suddenly treated them. CEO-D Philip said: “if I am meeting
another CEO as a VP, it’s like: fine, the guy could be. There is a big difference between
that and: ‘he is or he will be’ and that relationship changes at the time of the
announcement.” Their words gained more credibility and they chose them more carefully.
Their personal opinions became the opinions of the organization. The level of people they
interacted with changed and they knew they needed to adjust their messages accordingly.
CEO-D Frank said: “It is just the same thing but different messaging”. They suddenly
belonged to a different social class which required different behaviours and mental
models. They needed to adjust to meet these requirements gradually during the transition
period.
The third social context in which they noticed change with the most impact on
their cognition and behaviour was the board of directors. Actual or perceived, all of the
CEOs felt the pressure presented by the fact that the board members became their bosses.
All of the designated CEOs, previously exposed or not to the board of directors,

121
mentioned how important for them it was to meet with the board members in order to
understand their expectations. All CEO-Ds felt the pressure to show to the board
members they did not make a mistake by designating them as CEO-Ds. On the other side
of this relationship, the five board members I interviewed, confirmed the CEO-Ds’
opinions that the board looked and listened to the designated executive with more interest
once the decision was made. Board members gave CEO-Ds the same attention, if not
more, than they gave to the CEO-I during the board meetings. Louis, the chair of the
board, said:
Once chosen to be the next CEO, you start listening more carefully to what they say
because their words will reflect in the company’s performance. Not only you listen
more carefully, we have a saying in Quebec “tu tournes ta langue sept fois dans ta
bouche avant de parler” which means you think more than twice before you speak
with them since the announcement. It is totally different when they are attending the
board meeting as COO or VP. At that time you listen to them but then immediately
turn to the CEO and say: ‘what is your opinion?’.
Table 5.3 provides further examples from representative quotations from CEO-Ds
describing how they felt the change in their social contexts and the change in their
cognition and behaviour needed to meet the expectations of the newly created social
context.

Table 5.3: Examples of change in the social context
CEO-D

Bob

Change In Social Context and Managing Expectations

Resulting Change in CEO-D’s
Behaviour and Cognition

The one thing that is probably the most obvious is people
are somewhat more careful about what they may say. So I
don’t know if that is a surprise, but it’s a reality. You have
to be aware of that, and you need to know how to get the
story.

Bob expected that people would
become more careful in dealing
with him, but to deal with the
reality of this recognition, he
knew he had to change the way
he dealt with them to encourage
them to tell him the true story
rather than they though he
wanted to hear.

Well, it’s just, if you are part of the team, and you work in
the trenches every day, there is this different level of
communication that might be if you are the, like when
you are the next CEO, what people say something to you
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CEO-D

Change In Social Context and Managing Expectations

Resulting Change in CEO-D’s
Behaviour and Cognition

knowing you are the next CEO, I mean they have to be
cognoscente, mindful about what they say, you know, so
things like office politics for example probably don’t get
mentioned unless it’s a serious problem. And that is bad.
Carl

Well it certainly changed the way I thought about my
career and what I needed to do in the business. I started to
think about my executive presence about how I dealt with
my colleagues. I don’t think they are inherently yes
people. I think they kind of fell into that certainly in the
last couple of years under Kathy. I want to open that up a
bit. I don’t want to leave any good thoughts or ideas off
the table because they are too afraid to speak up. So I
want to give them that sort of power back to feel
comfortable in challenging things and I think that is going
to be very healthy for us as a leadership team. I had to
work for this. When it came time for me to be the CEO, I
was talking with Christina, one of my previous reports,
and I said, you know, I want to have open discussions. I
think leadership in general needs to understand that I am
open to that and she said you know Carl when you first
told me that, I kind of thought oh yes, yeah I am sure, you
know but not so much. And she said but you totally
walked the walk and I was, within six months, I bought in
and you never wavered from that and you are very
genuine about that.

Carl realized, as soon as he was
designated that he needed to
win the trust of his new
executive team. He knew he had
to think harder and act in a way
that would entice his staff
members to challenge him,
especially that the CEO-I was
not that open to incompatible
ideas.

Charles

The designation changed the dynamics. So I needed to
convince the board that I am the right one. The board is
the body who appointed you, right? So you need them to
know that they did not do wrong. No doubt about it, the
CEO played a very important role too. He could have
provided a veto, okay? You need to understand their
expectations. I always tried to be honest and I guess it
worked. I tell the story: “I went to the board and told them
that at the beginning of the year I said we were going to
make 20 million dollars in this project, at the end of the
year we had to write off 600 million dollars, and a year
later they made me CEO.”

Charles had to act according to
what he believed the board
expected from him, like being
honest and admitting mistakes
no matter how costly they were.

As you get up people tend to become yes sir, I agree with
you, and all that kind of stuff, they are not telling you the
other thing, I’ve never ever believed in that. And this gets
into collaboration and understanding how your staff
members think. So I always say if you’ve got a problem
it’s got to surface quickly because if it surfaces quickly
maybe we can collectively do something about it. So if
you asked me, especially during a crisis, Friday
afternoons was my time of the week.
Cheryl

Suddenly you are it and that really, you can theorize about
it but I was struck even on every level. First of all the
buck stops at you, especially that Janet made herself

Charles tried to also establish
this as a culture in the company
where he had to understand
“how your staff members
think”. He had to come up with
a system to make his staff
members come forward with
problems.

Cheryl felt the immediate shift
in her colleagues’ attitudes
towards her. They started
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CEO-D

Change In Social Context and Managing Expectations

Resulting Change in CEO-D’s
Behaviour and Cognition

scarce at the organization, so anything that is going to go
wrong, it’s yours. You own it.

looking at her for directions
rather than recommendations.

But it’s much more than that. I was struck by how my
colleagues immediately shifted to their deference like that
just blew me away how quickly they shifted to well
‘Cheryl what do you want?’ I was like ‘really?’

She knew she had to learn how
to overcome barriers and get
people to “establish new lines of
communication”.

I was struck by just the way people and across the
organization, staff that had always been very comfortable
to just stop by my office stopped. You need to learn to
overcome this and establish new lines of communication.
I was struck by the invitations that came into the
organization only for me. You know there is a dinner,
there is a …, just everything. You need to know when and
how to say yes or no.
Christopher

Well managing people I knew was going to be tough but
it’s tough. John did, my coach told me but even you learn
at business school and business in general, everyone says
when you get into a role like this you lose touch because
you are removed now. And I said no! That is not going to
happen to me. But you know what, unless you really force
yourself to go out there and talk to people, you are
removed because no one will come in here and talk to you
unless it’s one of my direct reports. Very few people just
walked down the hall and come in and want to have a chat
because, look at the office. It’s remarkable actually
(referring to how intimidating the office is with all the
expensive furniture and decorations). So you are in a bit
of isolation and you have to be careful. You can lose sight
of what’s going on if you are not very careful.
People take what you say literally. Like to the point where
I have to catch myself because sometimes I will just say
something half-jokingly and they will take it the wrong
way and because now it’s out of President’s mouth, you
know it’s it. I keep forgetting sometimes that it’s not
that I am any different a person. It’s just that I have a
different title. Even now once in a while I forget that and
I say something and I know that is going to haunt me
somewhere.
Once I was told I was getting the job, then, what we did is
we arranged dinners in Paris. So me and two directors, I
don’t know six dinners, whatever. So I had a chance to
talk with them ... It was for me to hear from them where
they thought the company was. I think it meant more to
give me some input to help me formulate a vision than it
was for them to give me a vision of what they want. They
wanted to hear from me but they were trying to give me
as much information as they could to help put the vision
together.

Though warned before about
the change that would happen in
his social context upon
designation, Christopher was
still surprised by magnitude of
the change.
He learned the impact his office
had on the people, his actions
and words had on the people,
and he learned to really consider
what he should say before
telling any” jokes”.
He also learned to listen to his
new bosses, or board of
directors, understand their
expectations in order to put his
vision for the organization
together.
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CEO-D

Frank

Change In Social Context and Managing Expectations

Resulting Change in CEO-D’s
Behaviour and Cognition

It was a six months transition. It took me three months to
get out of my old position. During the first three months,
it changed in small ways. People in the elevator would
smile and say hello. But when I was sitting in meetings
with my colleagues, there was not an all of a sudden they
would stop talking when I walked in the room kind of
thing. What I have noticed, the biggest move is, when I
left the previous floor, and came up to the executive floor,
now when I came into meetings, I have to be much more
aware of the impact my presence has. I have to make
people feel comfortable that it’s still me. I am the same
person so let’s have a conversation. There is a different
dynamic and I work real hard to not have that dynamics
slow things down. I don’t want to be shutting down
conversations. So I am very sensitive to that issue in terms
of when I am now in the elevator, I try to convey the
message: “it’s still me. It’s okay.”

Frank noticed the change in his
colleagues attitudes as soon as
he was designated CEO-D, but
he also noticed that this change
became more obvious when he
physically moved offices to the
executive floor.

I needed to understand my executive team. I have spent
three hours with every single one of them going in their
offices, going through all the nuts and bolts of their
department. So that was part of the transition process very useful.

He had to understand the impact
his presence had on even the
executive team. He had to think
and act in ways that relays the
message “it is still me. It is Ok.”
Frank also had to understand the
expectations of his executive
team members and the board
members in order to be prepared
cognitively for the CEO
position.

They (the board members) know me a little bit but they
don’t know me well. But I need to understand what their
issues are. I spent three hours with every board member
during the transition period. I need to understand who
they are. I need to understand what their biases are. I need
to understand what they think could be done better. If you
found out that seven out of the nine board members
believed that we were on the wrong strategic trajectory, I
want to know that, going in. I also believe that you have
to build up a personal rapport. Very important to
understand where your board is coming from. They are
your boss at the end of the day.
The expectations from the board were about more like
Frank, you are going to be out there public speaking all
the time. And, I did that anyway. So these were not big
things to me. The one thing is, well I did it globally. It did
not bother me. But it’s one thing to be speaking at an
industry level globally, it’s another thing to be speaking
to, Kathleen Wynne and Tim Hudak and Jim Flaherty and
talking to central bank governors. I wasn’t quite sure what
that transitional gap would be. I have come to realize it’s
the same thing just different messaging actually.
Henry

Get yourself acclimatized to the job first because there is
just a big shock from where you were before to this job
and if you hadn’t done it before, you got to acclimatize
the staff, the capital markets, and suppliers all to this
notion. So that is what I did for that year (transition
period). We have supplier symposium where all of our

Henry took the transition period
as an opportunity to learn about
his social context and mainly
his internal social context.
Though he knew them before
but the designation added
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contractors come in. I would be the guy for all of those
folks. You are getting to know the CEO.

another dimension to his
relationship and understanding
of the social context. He also
felt the need to let his social
context get to know him in his
new status.

Harold (CEO-I) handed over to me our internal town halls
like we get all the employees together twice a year so my
job to talk to all the employees so it was getting the
organization ready for transition. So everybody knew
what was coming. Now he is running the organization
The external shareholder market was something that I had
a really good handle on and probably spent more time
than he did. That wasn’t his (the CEO) forte to deal with
shareholders. So I would say those (the board) were, the
primary ones were around organization and around the
particularly prickly personalities at the board. I mean they
are all individuals and all need to be sort of managed as
individuals as opposed to collectively called the board
because once you are in the job, you actually are dealing
with them one on one as much as you are dealing with
them as a whole board.
John

He realized he was not dealing
with the board as a collective
but also as individuals “one on
one”.

Everybody hangs on every word that you say so you have
to watch what you say, how you say it and you’ve got to
be very consistent in how you say things, because
otherwise they’ll be thinking you’ve got seventeen
different messages.

John noticed the impact his
words had on his environment.
He learned to watch what he
said and how he said it. He also
learned to watch his attitude.

Some people treat you differently after the announcement,
for sure and I think because they respect the position
partly, they respect hierarchy.

He changed the way he dealt
with the board in order to win
them as a resource helping him
to identify problems that he was
not aware of.

I think you need to always have a positive attitude - like if
I walk out that door and have a frown on my face people
are looking at me saying what’s the problem? Right. … It
starts the moment you are announced to be the next CEO.
The impact that you can have by being positive on
everybody else around you and how they look at things is
actually quite significant.
I developed a different relationship with the board than
there was there before and I look at, everybody looks at
things different ways, my view is anybody that can help
me be more successful then I should tap into it. So I don’t
look at the board as a nuisance if that’s the way to put it,
or somebody who questions me, etc. but it’s good for me
to be aware of their expectations and then I want to know
if there’s a problem out there that I need to manage.
Margaret

And it’s not a matter of being friends with the senior
executive team. I don’t invite, I don’t go out in couples,
with my VPs. I don’t invite them home. I don’t buy them
drinks. I don’t do that. We go drink with the unions and
everything but I don’t have a personal relationship,
absolutely not. You need to keep some professional
distance.

Margaret learned to keep a
professional distance with her
colleagues/subordinates.
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Ron (CEO-I) and I had a lot of time to talk and our
relationship maybe changed a little, not too much because
there were things that I would be able to start doing, and
things I wasn’t able to do in public. Neither one of us
really appreciated how much, within a minute of the
announcement, I thought there, within a week of the
announcement Ron’s phone didn’t ring and people elected
me for everything and so the relationship stayed strong
and I kept trying to go and say hi to Ron, and it was really
clear that although he had the actual responsibility for
stuff, he didn’t have any practical responsibility for
anything and so it went from boss/employee to former
boss/employee within a minute.

Martin was surprised by how
fast the public, internal and
external, perception changed
upon designation. He was
careful even in dealing with the
CEO-I because most members
of the social context wanted to
deal with Martin.

So for me it first started with people not strategy. Our
strategy was rounded typically well. It changed the
dynamic with the board, in that the chairman and I,
elected at the time but not yet the CEO, spent a lot more
time together. Suddenly for me, it was me and the entire
board. It was a lot of change.

He started understanding the
board’s dynamics from a
different perspective. The chair
of the board wanted to talk to
him on one on one
conversations.
He also learned to become the
face of the organization and to
manage the perceptions of the
external environment.

There were lots of things relative to being the face of the
company, officially the face of the company which is sort
of bizarre that also changed public perceptions. A lot of
change occurred then.
Mike

I would like to think that I haven’t changed. My wife
might tell you a little bit different but she reminds me
often that I don’t work for you; she doesn’t work for me
so. So I do believe here is one of the nuances about being
promoted from within is that you, transition from peer
relationships to subordinate relationships. Call it whatever
you want, that is what they are. The challenge you have is
how you transition that relationship: how you treat people,
how you engage people, and how you include them in the
transition and your new vision, just the new vision and
strategic goals for their company.

One of the challenges Mike
dealt with during his transition
period was how you smooth the
transition in own status from
colleague to boss. He learned to
engage people in the
organization’s new vision and
goals.

Philip

Because through the race, Ralph (CEO-I) would equally
socialize us to the world. But it’s a huge difference
between here is Philip, he is our EVP. Ralph would never
say he is in the race. I think a lot of people would know
that and so if I am meeting another CEO, it’s like: fine,
the guy could be. There is a big difference between that
and he is or he will be and that relationship changes at the
time of the announcement.

Ralph learned during the
transition about many things.
He learned how people changed
their perception between he
may be the next CEO, during
the competition, to he will be
the next CEO.

Look, there are two things that happen when you are
announced. You immediately become taller and better
looking. Ralph is obviously thinking: well, I don’t want to
make a big change here if Philip is going to be in the chair
in a month or two months. So what happens as soon as I
was announced, people said to me what about me now.
My career was put on hold or my opportunities were put

Ralph noticed how internally
start looking at you different
“you become taller and better
looking”. He noticed how the
designation made him the go-to
person for major decisions
regarding people’s careers.
Also, he noticed how people
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on hold because of the CEO race. I want to talk about my
career.

prepared reports differently.

But the other thing that happens is you are the last to
know on a lot of things and many things that are put in
front of you after your announcement are well scripted,
well reviewed and well documented and so your
information channels inside the company slow down a
little bit and that was very visible to me.

He also changed the way he
dealt with board, because board
members become more open
with him and he needed to learn
to cope with that.

Ralph has helped me with how to manage a board. One of
my biggest learnings now that I am in the chair is just the
time requirement and the amount of CEO time is taken by
managing the board. The board became much more open,
less formal, very prepared to say we liked this, we didn’t
like that. We would like you to fix this; we would like you
to fix that. Never heard any of that until I was announced.
Randall

The transition from being a peer to being the boss requires
preparation and immediately after being selected I read
different things about that. The relationship does change
and while I would not treat anybody differently, people
treat me differently.
I think the conversation then changes from a conversation
to more of a recommendation to me, because the key
difference is when you become the designate CEO, you
are the one that has to make that final decision. So that is
where the conversation you had before as a peer now
becomes a different conversation, because what you say is
what turns in action as opposed to just discussing
possibilities.
I also needed to understand the board from a different
perspective. I had a board interview as well at a dinner
without the CEO. We had a “get to know you”
conversation, lots of questions. Even though they had
known the “credit side” of me, they wanted to see the full
person as opposed to just the business side.

Robert

The reality is that I knew the investors’ base very well. I
knew the asset side pretty well. I was comfortable with
the asset side, investments. I knew the operations cold. I
knew finance, capital management and so on very well. I
had been involved in building the team. I had been
involved in building the strategy, so I understood how this
organization worked. I got into this period in 2008 with a
fair bit of confidence that I knew the business very well.
My big challenge was the board. Financial crisis, 36-yearold candidate for the CEO job...is that the right timing
here? A bit of skepticism, you know? Living with
skepticism.
I had never spent time thinking about what their role was.
I had never spent time thinking about how you build

Though Randall did not feel like
he changed the way he treated
people, he noticed people
changing the way they treated
him. The conversation changed
because what he said suddenly
started turning into action
instead of being interpreted as a
suggestion and he learned to
understand the change.
He also learned to deal with the
board in the absence of the
CEO-I. He noticed the board
was trying to know him as the
full package as opposed to just
his technical side.

Robert’s main concern upon his
designation was the board. He
felt the board was skeptical
about his ability to lead the
company forward during crisis.
He needed to learn a lot about
the board during the transition
period from the CEO-I and he
was relieved knowing the CEOI would stay as the chair of the
board.
His biggest insight was
understanding that the board
was an oversight body and his
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relationships with 13 different people. I had not spent
time realizing that I was the boss and they were an
oversight body, they were not the boss. You go from you
have a relationship with one individual. You understand
roughly what their expectations are and you operate with
that in mind. When you get to deal with the board, there’s
no such thing. There’s no one relationship. The board is
13 different individuals who express a point of view and a
perspective involved in governance. And this skepticism
was intimidating to me. It took some time, because again,
I think people were nervous. It was the financial crisis.
Our majority shareholder was in bad shape and I needed
to find a solution.

boss. He learned to deal with
board members accordingly and
learned to convince them of his
abilities.

Rodney

The board at the time thought: Rodney is smart enough,
he can be the CEO of this company if only he can learn
operation but has he got the package? Is he able to, they
would have said, you know, and by the time they chose
me, I think I still surprised them. Because you grow in the
role and all of a sudden you got the chair. But I think by
the time, through that journey over the years, they had
enough chances. I was named CFO of the year and I had
become a board member for another company as opposed
to just an executive here. I developed a persona; I showed
them I had the full package if I can call it that.

Rodney knew the board had
confidence in his technical
skills but doubted his
management and operational
skills, He took several actions to
build the board’s trust such as
becoming a board member to
acquire management skills. He
worked on his persona or his
full package to satisfy the board
expectations.

Stanley

It gave time to get our investors comfortable with it. In
February, we went on a weeklong investor relations tour.

It surprises me and sometimes disappoints me that people
look up to the CEO or CEO to be and they want to tell
them what they believe this CEO wants to hear rather than
say what they think.

Stanley appreciated the time the
transition period availed to him
to understand the expectations
of his executive team and to
learn how to deal with his
people especially those who
prefer to tell the CEO or CEOD what they think the CEOs
like to hear.

Alex (the CEO-I) told me, when you say something as a
CEO, it is so much louder, heard more than somebody
else and so your actions, your comments, how you
approach things you need to be very thoughtful about.

He also saw how his words had
stronger impact and how he
needed to be mindful of what he
said.

I was a board member for a long time before I ran for the
CEO job, you know, I know them. I extracted myself
from the board of directors during the competition for the
job. One thing that really taught me is: I need to manage
the expectations of the board and that was when I made
my presentation as a potential CEO. I thought the board
was looking for a 45 minute interview with me and I
thought it was more of a one on one interview. My
approach was be prepared for the question, have the
details but answer in an informal useful manner. My note
was handwritten. Others who presented had dressed up in
suits and ties. They had power point presentations. Mine
was more of a narrative: “You want to hear what I think

Though Stanley, unlike other
CEO-Ds I met, was a board
member before running for the
CEO role, he was surprised how
the expectations of the board
changed once they decided to
designate him as CEO-D. they
had expectations as to his
physical look and the aesthetics
of his presentations rather than
just the content. He learned then
that he needed to exceed their

So there had to be some fences mended if you will or
some understandings built with executive team.
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of being CEO, here it is” … After the meeting, the
consultant, I know him well, came to me and said: “I have
one question for you that the board asked me to ask and it
is do you really want this role? One of the board members
said everyone else came prepared; you did not have the
same level of preparation.” It was interesting to me how
perceptions of tactical part of the presentation could affect
people rather than the actual presentation. Since then,
whenever I am presenting to the board, I make sure that I
am prepared beyond what I think personally about what
they expect.

expectations every time.

To conclude, the designation of the executives as the CEO-D created a new social
environment for them. First, though they came from within the organization and knew the
employees, the designation gave their behaviours and opinions more impact than prior to
the designation. Accordingly the CEO-Ds adjusted their mental models and behaviours to
be mindful of the powerful impact of their words and behaviours on their new context,
such as foregoing jokes and negative attitudes both inside and outside the organization.
Second, despite the fact that most of CEO-Ds were senior executives and dealt with
stakeholders outside the organization, the new status as the next leader of the organization
gave their opinions a more powerful level of meaning. They learned the new social
context interpreted their words as reflecting the position of the organization. They were
mindful their behaviours and words were binding to the organization. Third, the board of
directors also changed from the social environment they knew, even if the executive had
previous dealings with them. After the designation, the board members gave the CEO-Ds’
behaviours and visions more consideration. CEO-Ds realized the board members were not
looking only for suggestions. Rather, board members wanted to hear ideas with a
potential to become beneficial actions for the organization.
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5.5. Premise Four: Co-Enactment
P4: The designation of executives as CEO-Ds creates a new environment for
enactment; however, it is the subsequent actions taken by the CEO-Ds and the CEOIs that affect their learning outcomes.
P4a: CEO-Ds who double interact with CEO-Is are more likely to have the
opportunity to induce the change in their mental models, behaviours, and identity
standards and prepare them for the CEO position.
P4b: CEO-Ds who are limited to act and/or interact with the CEO-Is are more
likely to miss the opportunities to induce the change in their mental models,
behaviours, and identity standards to prepare for the CEO position.
Information from the fieldwork showed how CEO-Ds who adopted different
enactment modes in their environment had different learning outcomes. Experiences of
CEO-D participants ranged from those who had many opportunities to create physical,
temporal, and emotional environments for enactment

and to secure the CEO-Is’

commitment to this environment to others who had almost no opportunities to benefit
from such interactions. CEO-Ds who had greater opportunities for double interact with
the CEO-Is learned more about the CEO role by changing their mental models, their
behaviours and identities as described in the next subsections. In contrast, those who had
fewer double interact opportunities acquired the relevant knowledge and adjusted their
mental models mainly after they assumed the role of CEO. During the interviews, I rarely
found a CEO-D who was limited to one type of enactment, whether act, interact, or
double interact; however, in many instances one of these types dominated. In the
following sections I present examples on all three different enactment styles and how the
dominating style affected the learning outcomes.
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5.5.1. Act
Acts are a mode of enacting one’s social context by relying on his/her mental
models. They usually result in single-loop learning as described in chapter 3. Among
different types of interaction, acts are the least likely to reduce ambiguity or equivocality
and create a collective understanding in a specific situation (Weick, 1995, 2012; Weick &
Roberts, 1993). Some of the interviewees learned through act during the transition period.
In certain situations, they resorted to acts because it was the only available mode, while in
other cases they deliberately chose “act” because they wanted to distance themselves
from the CEO-I.
CEO-D Bill’s experience during the transition period is an example of a CEO-D
who resorted to act as his enactment mode due to the unavailability of other modes. CEOD Bill found himself left alone after being selected to be the next CEO. He knew he had a
lot to learn especially because CEO-I, Jeffery, chose not to involve or expose CEO-D Bill
to many of CEO-I Jeffery’s activities. This was because CEO-I Jeffery enjoyed his job
and wanted to perform his activities alone. The organization defined CEO-I Jeffery and
the realization of his imminent exit as CEO led him to withdraw himself totally from the
transition process, leaving CEO-D Bill on his own as described below:
At the time they selected me. Then about a week later, I had a meeting with Jeffery
and it took a month to meet with him because he was busy. I met with him in
December and we talked about what the transition would be and he said: ‘you got to
do your own thing. I can’t help you.’ I went on two trips with him for investor
relations because as part of a public company, that is something that he did himself
100%. He wouldn’t take anybody along. He would meet with the investment
community. He would make between a 100 and 200 meetings a year. He loved it. He
enjoyed it. He also enjoyed doing acquisitions. He would do anywhere from three to
ten acquisitions a year. Jeffery did all of them himself, all of them, right from the first
meeting to the last negotiation, because he loved doing that. That is what really
turned him on, was doing a deal. The negotiation associated with the deal, the
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discussions, and the personality. So I had no experience in acquisitions 2. I had no
experience in investor relations. I went on two trips with him on investor relations
where you go meet with investors there, one hour meetings, and you do about, in two
or three days, you do 20 or 30 little meetings, so very intense. We did them in the US
West, US East, and in Europe and not in one of those meetings did he introduce me
as the CEO, coming in.
CEO-I Jeffery could not accept he would no longer be the CEO and CEO-D Bill
had been selected as the next CEO. CEO-I Jeffery refused to help CEO-D Bill establish
his new identity as the incoming CEO and declined to introduce CEO-D Bill to the new
social context Bill entered of which the investment community is a major part: “not in
one of those meetings did he introduce me as the CEO, coming in”. CEO-D Bill sensed
CEO-I Jeffery was unhappy with the reality of leaving the organization. Bill knew Jeffery
was not going to be helpful or even involved in passing the baton to him and he had to act
on his own to determine what he needed to learn during this period.
He was not willing to let go. …. That’s Jeffery’s style. I accepted it and I didn’t
expect anything different but the clock was ticking and there was no real
preparation. In February, I sat down with the leadership team and we had our
meeting in preparation for the board meeting and that is when I said: ‘Jeffery, I
would like to lead the leadership by myself’. So I had Jeffery in the room. We talked
about what he had achieved in the ten years and where we are today and then said:
‘Thanks very much. You leave now and the leadership team is going to talk’, and my
message to them was the world has changed. 
Instead of using the transition period to learn about the CEO role and develop the
necessary behaviours, mental models, and identity standards, CEO-D Bill spent his
transition period trying to establish his status and sending signals to the organization that
the leadership changed in terms of both the person and style. CEO-I Jeffery set a very
optimistic vision for the organization 10 years earlier when he became the CEO and he
achieved it. He became a driving force and led the company on his own. At the end of his
2

Numbers in circles represent the previous statements. These numbers are then included in the summary
tables at the end of every mode of enactment to refer the reader back to the underlying statement.
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tenure, CEO-I Jeffrey refused to interact with CEO-D Bill or discuss a vision for the
organization going forward.
CEO-D Bill was nevertheless able to learn from CEO-I Jeffrey through
observation. Bill realized he was interpreting CEO-I Jeffery’s behaviour using his own
mental models: “what I think I saw …”, but he did not have the opportunity to actually
understand any of the CEO-I’s behaviours and evaluate their efficiency. Bill had to act
based on what he thought the company needed and was in its best interest.
Certainly I worked with him (Jeffrey). Like he hired me. I worked for him in a
number of different ways. I would not say shadowed him in anyway. Nobody
shadowed Jeffery. Jeffery was very independent, very strong but I never mimicked
him because I am not that way. I just don’t have that personality. So I certainly
learnt from him but I would have to say I also learned what not to do because I saw
that we needed him at the time. If we didn’t need to be questioned, we needed that
singular leadership that was just going to drag us to success and he did it. He just
dragged us kicking and screaming to success but that had a timeframe to it. You
couldn’t continue that type of leadership. We got to the point where we were so big;
you needed a change to take us to the next level. ….. I would say yeah, I learned from
watching him and seeing what worked and didn’t work. That gave me a very good
sense of okay, what do I need to do differently and what do I need to focus on. And
what I think I saw very clearly is we needed to focus on getting more people (leaders)
to the table. 
Although CEO-D Bill’s mindset changed and he realized what he needed to do
differently and adopted the new behaviours, the organization was not ready to accept
these behaviours due to external and internal factors. By all financial and market
measures the organization was successful under CEO-I Jeffery’s leadership. Any sudden
change in direction and strategy would have affected the confidence of stakeholders in the
organization. When Bill took control of the organization the economic downturn severely
affected most industries. Despite any preparation during the transition period, Bill had to
act. Supported by the board of directors, after becoming CEO, he cut CEO-I Jeffery’s
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influence immediately. Bill then began familiarizing himself with the senior management
inside the organization, establishing a new identity and a course of action for the
organization.
It came out to the AGM in May. That is when the torch was going to be handed over
to me and I asked Jeffery before that: ‘what’s going to happen after. So the day after
that happens, what’s your opinion’ and his was maybe let’s give me about a week or
two to clean my office up and maybe by the end of May, I will find me another office
in the building, a spare office down the corner, I will move down there and I will still
help you in acquisitions and I would like to do that because I am very focused on
acquisitions.’ I said: ‘well we have a problem, because from my perspective there
needs to be a clean break since you are such a strong personality, you are such a
strong leader that every day you walk in the office, people are going to continue to
look at you and to say, okay, what should we do and that’s going to be a struggle for
me. I got to do this on my own so no office, no involvement.’ He became a board
member right away. So he was on the board and I said: ‘you got to be board
member. No longer can you be a CEO. You have to be a board member and there has
to be a total split so no phone, no office, no involvement with management in the
company and we will see you at every board meeting’ and I was supported by the
board. The board said that is what we feel should happen. So I told him the board
basically is, that is what they wanted to have in as well. He was very upset but he
agreed. ‘Fine that is it, alright, no problem. I will just wash my hands and I will walk
away.’
During the first couple of years in his role as the CEO, Bill had to learn how
senior management members think and had to acclimatize them to his leadership style
which resulted in firing some key people from the organization. He never had the chance
to discover why CEO-I Jeffery adopted a forceful leadership style nor did he understand
why people followed this style. Bill reasoned Jeffery’s style was appropriate for the
period and he needed to change it for the best interest of the organization.
We have an internal magazine and the last one they did was Jeffery standing up on
stage at the AGM. We have a very strong marketing team here and our marketing
communications team had the next edition of the magazine. They had me standing up
on the stage and I said I don’t want that and I said we need to change it, and they
disagreed. They said no, you need to make people aware there is a new leader. You
have to make people aware of who you are. So this edition is going to be about you,
who you are, what you did to get in the role and what you are doing to replace
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Jeffery. I said first mistake, I am not replacing Jeffery. I can never replace Jeffery so
don’t put me in that position because I’ll fail … no, I am replacing the role of CEO
and we need to define that differently. So I said on the magazine cover, I want the 12
leaders so I want all of us in there and standing in the room, and they took that
picture and did it. The head of the marketing said: ‘you don’t get it Bill’. I said: ‘no,
you don’t get it’. I actually had to terminate this person. 
After surviving the economic downturn, CEO-D Bill learned the soft side of the
organization. He tried to discover the organization’s strengths and weaknesses to better
prepare for what he believed to be better economic conditions. He also realized the
organization had lost its identity after ex-CEO Jeffery left. Bill had to figure out how he
would lead the organization and in which direction. To conclude, Bill was restricted to
“act” as his enactment form during the transition, given the attitude of the CEO-I. He
tried his best to learn during the transition about the organization and the skills necessary
for a CEO such as how to structure M&As. He started establishing his identity and
leadership style during the transition period by sending messages to the leadership team
to take more initiative and stop expecting one man based decisions. He continued to
establish his identity after becoming CEO and fired some of the executive team who felt
uncomfortable with his participative decision making approach. However, most of the
changes in his behaviour and mental models occurred after the transition, which affected
his performance for the first couple of years after assuming the role of CEO. He changed
not only his mental models; he also had to motivate change amongst the employees to
improve the organization’s performance.
It was the economy that hit everybody else so let’s get through this, find out who we
are and find out what we do well and let’s make sure that we are doing the right
things. When we came up 2010 and into 2011, I realized, okay, now it’s time to do
something to take advantage of what we felt was going to be an improving economy.
And we hired some consultants to assist us in repositioning ourselves because we had
lost our identity. We had this identity, the Jeffery’s identity we were going to be a
billion dollar company, 10000 people. So when you achieve that, then what’s next?
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There wasn’t what’s next. … It wasn’t about just being the size anymore and that is
what was… we grew the company through acquisitions. … The big firms are getting
bigger … everything was about being bigger. Not at all being better.
Table 5.4 shows representative quotes from a selection of interviewees to provide
additional examples on how adopting the “act” style of enacting their social environment
during the transition period limits or delays CEO-Ds’ learning outcomes.

Table 5.4: Examples of act style during the transition period and the resulting
learning outcome
CEO-D
Christopher

Act
He (CEO-I) just trusted me and let me run and I can’t think of
anything I wanted to do where he said no. He just let me go.
It was an odd relationship. Very odd. Very odd, like very little
feedback. Not adversarial.
I mean Dale (CEO-I) was an operations guy from his training.
He was never a development and numbers guy so a lot of what
I did was sort of over his head a little bit. In hindsight he
shouldn’t have got that job but they were so determined to have
somebody from within, take on that role when Craig left that he
kind of got it as by default.
I am not sure, but I believe that after a while the board wanted
him to leave, he did not like that, I believe. But he was
courteous, he did not give me a hard time, he did not interfere.
He took me to a quick meeting with the developers and
introduced me, but that was it. 
Well managing people I knew was going to be tough but it’s
tough.
I belong to an organization called the Canadian Council of
Chief Executives it’s about 120 people, CEOs of banks, oil
companies, big manufacturers from across Canada, like the
who is who. And I sat on a panel; we have about 3 to 4
meetings a year. They always have one in January which they
just had last week and they asked me for the first time to sit on
a panel and there was four of us to talk about business
conditions for the coming year. So I sat there with all these
guys talking about business conditions. At first I was not, now I
am confident enough and comfortable enough to be able to
mingle, to be able to mingle with a crowd like that and feel
good about it and project a certain image. And there are lots of
people who freeze in those kinds of situations. 
He was a nice guy, he did not like firing people and we never
had proper evaluations during his tenure. So I had to start that

Learning Outcome
Due to the lack of
interaction with the CEOI, there was no or little
change in the CEO-D
behaviour or mental
model.
Christopher was surprised
how tough it was to
manage people as the
CEO.
It took Christopher some
time to feel comfortable
meeting with other CEOs
in the Canadian Council
for CEOs.
He had to evaluate the
employees and let go of a
significant number
Had to refocus the strategy
of the organization on
different key areas.
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CEO-D

Act

Learning Outcome

Even the chairman of the board, after the appointment almost
recused himself of naming me. I said: ‘that is not the way to do
things but that is what he did’. He was very keen to designate
me but after he did that, he had a lot of pressure from the other
stakeholders. He felt like maybe it was a mistake but at the end,
nobody regretted. 

The CEO-I left as soon as
CEO-D Leonard was
appointed. There was
basically no interaction
with the CEO-I.

when I got the job. 
Leonard

Small stakeholders were strongly for me, they trusted me. Their
general manager didn’t trust me. He always said: ‘oh, he (CEOD Leonard) has no business skill and all that. The other
candidate was a lot better. So the first six months there was a
struggle between the small stakeholders and the general
manager. 
I was on my own for 6 to 12 months, I took the road and I met
them (the stakeholders) one after the other and make meetings
and create the dream and so I was on my own again. The other
candidate hung on for a year, expecting me to fail. He left a
couple of years later. 
I did not have the background of the stakeholders. But I went:
‘here is the dream that we should do together so it worked that
way so what was challenging is that the staff not very kind to
me but after 1 year I knew I got them so internally I was very
skillful and having a good team with me, going on never in
fighting. For the last few years, I never got a fight inside. We
were always loyal so that helped me a lot but the most
challenging thing was to convince people that I could do the
job. 

Though, Leonard was an
internal candidate, the lack
of interaction with the
CEO-I left him in the dark
on many sides of the
business. He had to do all
the preparation during his
first year as a CEO. Many
people expected him to
fail.
Change in his behaviour or
mental models started after
getting the job. Instead of
being ready to go upon
getting the job, he needed
6 to 12 months to finish
firefighting and start
performing.

The CEO-Ds (4/22) who enacted their environment mainly through “act” during
the transition period experienced minimal cognitive, behavioural, and identity learning
opportunities. Table 5.5 connects the minimal learning to the statements provided by
CEO-Ds above. These CEO-Ds were unable to change their mental models and set of
behaviours to prepare to become the CEO because they did not have the opportunity to
interact with the CEO-I. They acted based on what they believed to be the best course of
action for the organization. Most of their learning commenced when the board officially
appointed them as CEO. They selected their leadership team and redefined the role of
CEO according to their comfort level. They faced resistance from people who preferred
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the previous leadership style so, in certain cases, they fired those employees. Their
organizations were originally strong, faced the economic downturn in certain cases and a
change in leadership so their company’s stock decreased after their appointment.
However, after the CEOs learned about the organization and made changes based on their
learning, the company’s stock price rebounded to a higher price than prior to their
appointment. The next section presents cases where the CEO-D and CEO-I interacted and
the learning outcomes from the transition period increased compared to the cases where
CEO-D and CEO-I engaged in act alone.

Table 5.5: Connecting learning from act to CEOs Statements
Minimal Learning Statements
CEO-D
Bill
Christopher
Leonard

Cognitive

Behaviour

Identity



















5.5.2. Interact
While act refers to the CEO-D taking action based on his/her own understanding
of the CEO-I’s behaviour, interact refers to the CEO-D seeking clarification of the
observed behaviour before taking action (Weick, 2012). Interact happens when the CEOIs and the CEO-Ds have different perspectives and where the CEO-D feels comfortable
debating with the CEO-I. In these cases, CEO-Ds sought the CEO-Is’ input or challenged
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the CEO-Is’ opinions to understand their behaviour and thought processes rather than to
build shared mental models.
CEO-D John had a good relationship with CEO-I David at the time he was
announced the CEO-D. Previously John felt CEO-I David favoured him over the other
candidate in the competition and was grooming him to become the next CEO. John
believed the other candidate was in the competition merely to satisfy the board members
and provide a choice. CEO-D John was one of the few people who would challenge CEOI David during a meeting. John felt comfortable having debates with David which made
“interact” a possible way to enact his environment during transition.
We (CEO-I and John) had a great relationship and if you have two people that are
strong personalities the chances of them agreeing on everything are zero. Zero,
right? Hopefully there is fairly strong alignment on a number of things because I
think you need some level of alignment in order to work effectively as a team, and
that’s important. Having said that, you need people to push you so I was the person
more than anybody else that pushed David, and I would debate and challenge him not many people like to do that. 
Feeling comfortable debating with a partner helps one to understand the mental
models and reasons behind the other person’s actions. It also helps the CEO-D learn how
to work with the partner throughout the transition period for an increased likelihood of a
smooth transition. Understanding the differences in style and how the CEO-Is perceived a
task helped the CEO-Ds adapt their behaviour in order to deal with the situation. Note
that this process did not affect the CEO-Ds’ cognitive maps. CEO-Ds’ change in
behaviour would not hold after assuming the CEO position. This case is very similar to
the “forced learning” category described by Inkpen and Crossan (1995) when the change
in behaviour is not followed by a change in cognition making learning a short lived
experience. CEO-D John described how he realized CEO-I David was concerned about
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being accurate and correct in his communication with staff members at the company,
whereas John was much more concerned about the information inside the e-mail rather
than its aesthetics. CEO-D John acknowledged neither style was “good or bad”, but rather
merely different. While CEO-D John did not want to change any of CEO-Is styles, he
learned how to communicate John’s way given that the e-mails had his signature. John
managed to keep a good relationship with CEO-I David and to seeking David’s advice on
major issues including “fatal flaws”.
We would have regular debates and we had different styles. I communicated
differently, so when I first came in the role, he would re-write some of my messages
and stuff that I would send to people, right, and then I said, well this is ridiculous, I
don’t write that way - we just communicate differently, not good or bad, and then I’d
tell him: ‘I’m sending out a note and he’d say where is it, and I’d say I’m not giving
it to you because I’m not interested in you re-writing it. And trust me, it’s dealt with’
and drive on. So I adapted my – I figured out how to manage him. I wouldn’t give
him a week in advance because if I did, he would re-read it, he’d re-write it, that’s
who he was. He liked to do that. I go: ‘well that’s ridiculous, bad use of time and I
don’t like it because my style is not your style, and my name’s on the bottom.’ I want
it to be the John style of communicating and so then I learned, I said: ‘okay, how do I
fix that?’ I started giving it to him the morning of, and he can tell me whether there
are any fatal flaws but he would not have time to re-write it. So to me you just adapt
to the people that you deal with.
CEO-D John observed CEO-I David at work and discussed with him several
important criteria for CEO success. The most relevant thing he learned from CEO-I David
was to listen to people rather than forcing a solution. He learned how important it was to
engage people in decision making rather than enforcing his decision. CEO-D John
changed his cognitive schemas; he understood “the process of reaching the decision is as
important as the decision”. He also changed his behaviour, he started doing a “lot more
listening” and letting “the people getting us there” as compared to him making the
decision. Though the decision might end up being the same, he believed the new process
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resulted in increased engagement from most of the team players and an enhanced culture
and environment inside the organization.
I think my pre-disposition when I entered the executive team was I’ve got the answer,
I know what it is, let’s do it, let’s drive on next versus let’s have a conversation
around why you think that’s the right way to do it, etc., made me be even more
probing on questions. So I do a lot more listening today than I did when I first came
in - and that’s probably the biggest difference for me and we might end up in many
cases in the same spot or similar spot, but it’s the people getting us there, the team
getting us there, versus me making a quick decision and saying let’s go. And so it’s
about understanding that the process of communicative decisions is actually
sometimes as important as the decision because it can have a huge impact on the
engagement of the people. And that was probably the style of communication; the
way you interact with people has a huge impact on the culture of the organization...
David (CEO-I) was good at this, and he gave me this advice, and I believe it was a
good one.
CEO-D John observed and interacted with CEO-I David on many occasions
during the transition period. John and CEO-I David worked closely together before
John’s appointment as CEO when John was one of the three top executives in the
company. The executive team included David (the CEO-I), John (a senior executive at the
time), and another senior executive (the candidate who was in the competition for the
CEO role).
CEO-D John thought the executive committee was too small and increasing the
number of executives would add value to the company. However, he did not voice his
opinion with CEO-I David until immediately before becoming the CEO. He appreciated
CEO-I David’s opinion and asked for his perspective. Despite the fact that CEO-I David
found the idea to be dangerous, CEO-D John implemented the change upon assuming the
CEO role. John believed it was better than the current arrangement. CEO-D John believed
CEO-I David was more comfortable with a smaller executive committee because he
worried about handling increased diversity in decisions. John commented he considered
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CEO-I David’s opinions when he thought they aligned with John’s mindset. This scenario
highlights that CEO-D John analyzed CEO-I David’s opinions and decisions and judged
them based on his own mental models. After John became the CEO, he increased the
number of participants in the executive’s committee; however, two years into his role he
was considering reducing this number.
Right before I became CEO, like I told him, I said: ‘I’m going to change the structure
and this is what I’m going to do’ and he said: ‘well I don’t really think that’s a very
smart thing to do’. I said: ‘that’s good, you had your day’. And like I’m going to be
the CEO, so I didn’t need his approval, I asked for his perspective because I
respected his perspective, and if he’d brought other things to bear that I thought
were important, I would have considered them.
Table 5.6 below provides examples of the interact style some CEO-Ds adopted
during the transition period.

Table 5.6: Examples of interact style during the transition period and the resulting
learning outcome
CEO-D
Frank

Henry

INTERACT

Learning Outcome

I effectively had three months of transition period. The first
three months I used them to set up my department and appoint
my successor. 

Frank fairly interacted
with CEO-I Scott during
the transition period.

During these months I had to absorb a lot of information. It was
helpful having Scott (CEO-I) as the CEO in charge. I had time
to get to know my executive team, the members on my board of
directors and their expectations. Scott remained in charge till the
day he left. I would go to him ask for his advice and opinion
about many issues regarding the executive team, government
related issues and some of the restructuring I am thinking about
doing. So the transition period was really important for me. 

He asked for advice and
background information
on many of the issues,
but he made his own
mind on his strategy
going forward.

And so the way we sorted out differences in opinion, I mean he
(CEO-I) is the boss so at the end of the day, I would raise my
concerns. But he makes the decision. 

CEO-D Henry and CEOI Harold had a good
relationship
professionally.

He (CEO-I) did not feel he needed to have everybody on board
with this has to be his call to say that is okay, I am okay with
that. And he would make his decision. But he was fine with me
raising the issues which are what you expect your people to do.

They had different
perspectives on things,
but Henry accepted the
fact that Harold was the
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CEO-D

INTERACT

We do things differently. We look at the world differently but
we are open enough with each other to agree that we do look at
the world differently but there is a positive in having different
viewpoints on the table. He was the boss. In my world as long
as he is boss then he is the boss and that is, my job is to support
him, make him look good and make sure that the company is
successful and was not to fight with him. I don’t have any time
for internal politics and all those kinds of things. 
Harold (CEO-I) was helpful because there wasn’t that many
folks you go talk to about it. You are going to have your own
ideas but you know, he would say what about this person, what
about this person. You have managed this person for this long.
Here is my view of them. A lot of times you would be
consistent or he provides an insight. So I would say that was
very useful in coming through to what you thought, probably
more in terms of your assessment of your management team
which is an important piece. You are getting his feedback. 

Mike

I do believe that if I would have been pushed off the dock (i.e.
no transition period) and told to go swim, I think I would have
reached out to the board and we have got some ex-CEOs on our
board of directors. And I would have used resources to help get
through those times of challenge. 
But as it turns out, I had the ability to be mentored (by the CEOI) into that role that was great. The thing I learned most from the
(incumbent) CEO that left was just really around
communication  and I think it probably goes back to a big part
to my management style and it’s just about ensuring that you
have credibility and that crosses the boundaries and whether it’s
credibility with your employees, with your customers or the
capital market. So your investors’ analysts, that whole capital
market community. You need to be, not transparent, but you
need to be clear and concise, believable and say what you do
and do what you say. And, I think that transfers through all of
the facets of your organization and the impacts that you have as
a leader.

Rodney

We (CEO-D Rodney and CEO-I Barry) had a great relationship
all the way till when he left. His genius was in the operations
side of the business. So I learned from him about that. 
CEO-I Barry still wanted to stay. I wanted to make it clear that
we have a process and I wanted to recruit my successor and I
wanted to get things going. So most companies would not do it
this way but I thought in the circumstances, I thought it was best
to get the cat out of the bag and make it public after the decision
was made. No coming back, we are all clear. 
Once it’s public , then I can recruit the CFO and everybody
understands why because it’s public. Otherwise, how do you do
that and so that gave us (CEO-D Rodney and CEO-I Barry) a
head start. Though Barry was reluctant, to get the CFO in place,

Learning Outcome
boss and he needed to
support him.
CEO-D Henry sought
the incumbent’s CEO’s
advice many times and
he admitted the he
provided him with
insights on many things.
But Henry had his own
ideas about issues and he
might adjust them based
on the feedback he got.
The change in Henry’s
mental models was
based on Henry’s
judgement.

CEO-D Mike felt
fortunate to have had the
opportunity to have
CEO-I Doug around
during the transition
period.
CEO-I Doug taught
CEO-D Mike the most
about communication;
however, Mike believed
it was his management
style and the credibility
he had with the staff
members that helped him
through the transition
period.

CEO-D Rodney and
CEO-I Barry worked
together to put a CFO in
place after the
announcement. They
worked together in
planning the transition
period. So CEO-I Barry
was running the
organization, while
CEO-D Rodney went to
understand the
operations and worked
with operators for that
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CEO-D

INTERACT
gave us a head start to get the other guy (the other candidate) to
decide whether he wanted to stay or not. He decided to leave.
So already you are in motion. So new CFO, new Chief
Marketing Officer which I made the decision shortly after I
became CEO. I waited for Barry to leave to do the other
changes I needed to do. 

Learning Outcome
period.
Yet, Rodney did not
share all his future
strategies with CEO-I
Barry.

In summary, there are many common elements in the experience of CEO-Ds
whose dominant style of responding to their environment during the transition period was
“Interact”. They all had “good” relationships with the CEO-Is which created the
opportunity to ask for clarification and challenge some of the CEO-Is’ behaviours and
opinions. Most of these CEO-Ds respected the CEO-Is’ perspective on several things and
learned from them. These CEO-Ds also analysed the CEO-Is explanations using their
own mental models and retained what they believed to be good and rejected what they
deemed unsuitable for the organization or their own style and identity. Compared to
CEO-Ds who were limited to act, CEO-Ds who had the opportunity to interact with CEOIs learned new behaviours and understood some key factors to prepare for the CEO
position from the CEO-Is. However, CEO-Ds who interacted with the CEO-Is did not
probe for background information on the current practices of the CEO-Is nor did they test
their own plans and future visions with the CEO-Is. After assuming the CEO position,
most CEO-Ds implemented many of the decisions they made during the transition period
without involving the CEO-Is in their thought processes.
Table 5.7 connects learning from interact to the CEOs’ statements provided
above.
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Table 5.7: Connecting learning from interact to CEOs’ Statements
Learning From Interact Supporting Statements
CEO-D

Cognitive

Behaviour

John





Frank





Henry







Mike













Rodney

Identity

5.5.3. Double Interact
According to Weick and his colleagues, among the different types of interaction,
double interacts are the most likely to reduce equivocality while creating a shared
understanding in a specific situation (Weick, 1995, 2012; Weick & Roberts, 1993).
Similarly, I argue in the theoretical model that double interact helps CEO-Ds to create the
mental models, behaviours, and skillsets necessary to become a CEO. In its simplest
form, a theoretical double interact in a transition period is when the CEO-Ds observe a
behaviour by the CEO-Is without the CEO-Ds understanding the reasoning for the action.
If the CEO-Ds believe they would have acted differently, they would firstly ask the CEOIs for the reasons behind their behaviour. The CEO-Ds would secondly also explain their
thoughts (Argyris & Schön, 1992), regarding what the behaviour should have been. The
resulting learning is not a new behaviour or a new theory (cognition) based on their
existing mental models, which is the case in “interact”. The learning is a change in
behaviour or cognition based on an analysis conducted by the mental models of the CEO-
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Ds and CEO-Is and resulting in the creation of shared mental models between the two
CEOs.
CEO-D Cheryl believed CEO-I Janet forced her to learn the set of skills needed to
become the next CEO. CEO-I Janet involved CEO-D Cheryl in many aspects of her job,
especially in the strategic planning for the organization. CEO-I Janet always raised the
issue of CEO succession telling Cheryl explicitly that she wanted Cheryl to be the next
CEO and she was convinced that Cheryl would be a good one. Though Cheryl was not
eager to take the job, her interaction with CEO-I Janet helped her to more fully
understand the job and the expectations of a CEO.
The strategic plan was the big thing because that really was a year-long initiative.
And every time we would have a discussion about succession planning or anything
like that, she would always come back to it and I would always say actually Janet,
don’t waste your time. She (CEO-I) really pulled me into some of these other things
where I had – I was kind of forced to learn. She was really persistent. 
Though CEO-I Janet did not designate Cheryl as her CEO-D officially (since it
was the board’s decision and not Janet’s), Janet treated Cheryl as the CEO-D and
prepared Cheryl as her only successor from inside the organization. CEO-I Janet took
Cheryl out of her comfort zone and involved her in many of the organizations’ activities.
CEO-I Janet asked Cheryl to be involved in departments Cheryl had not worked with and
on projects for which she was not normally/otherwise responsible. CEO-I Janet tried to
expose Cheryl to the organization as a whole rather than merely providing more
responsibility to CEO-D Cheryl in Cheryl’s own department and comfort zone.
She looked for opportunities to engage me and force me to work outside of my
department. She involved me in many of the major projects that our organization was
doing. 
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As CEO-I Janet’s set retirement date neared, Janet created a new position in the
company for Cheryl: the Chief Development Officer. CEO-I Janet required all senior VPs
to report to Cheryl. This act extracted Cheryl from her collegial status with other senior
management team members to become their boss, in preparation for her to be the boss.
The position also helped CEO-D Cheryl gain a broader view of the organization, assist in
long term strategic plans, and acquire a more complete sense of what the CEO role might
be like, despite her resistance.
I think Janet felt that it was very important to acknowledge it was a new title. I didn’t
really. But because I then had Vice Presidents reporting into me, I needed to have a
title other than Vice President … but I would say it helped me take on a more
organizational scope so whereas I had always been a real advocate for my own
department and for the work that we were doing, I felt like I was the voice of other
stakeholders in the organization and I think when I had a broader mandate, I also
took on more of an organizational scope and that was very much what Janet was
pushing for. … She put me in charge of the strategic planning process. She said I
want you to lead this process. I want you to help me build the vision and she was
really pushing me to have organizational scope and at that point, she had spoken to
me about succeeding her as CEO and I didn’t want to and I said you know, you could
get someone else to lead the strategic plan. I am not really that hungry and I don’t
want to be the next CEO so if this is an opportunity for you to build somebody else,
feel free. But she was quite insistent and she felt it would be good for me and for the
organization and so I did it. But that I think helped me see the organization
differently. I really took on a broader scope and a keener interest in what was
happening across the organization.
CEO-D Cheryl’s resistance to being considered for the CEO position stemmed
from her espoused theory on what the CEO’s identity standards and skill set should be.
Her work with CEO-I Janet and her own understanding as to what made CEO-I Janet a
successful CEO led her to believe that a CEO needs a specific set of skills to be
successful such as a strong legal understanding and an outgoing personality to talk to
other CEOs in the city. She discussed her beliefs with CEO-I Janet and they had several
discussions about what leadership was. CEO-I Janet did not stop encouraging Cheryl,
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“she kept on me about this”. Janet explained to her that being a CEO does not mean
having to know and do everything. Janet also explained to Cheryl that the reason the
organization grew and became successful was not because of CEO-I Janet alone, but
because of Cheryl too. This type of conversation was not a one way conversation; both
were willing to test their theories, whether espoused or in use. The results of these debates
were shared mental models where CEO-D Cheryl understood what the CEO needed to be
successful:
And she just kept on me about this. Leadership is not about being able to do
everything. Leadership is about being able to surround yourself with people who can
help you get it done. I knew that from my own job. I mean, we have done a great job
but I didn’t do it all; I had great people around me. And so I learned that nobody
does it alone, that you have to have people around you who are good at the things
you are not good at. So she really pushed me to accept that great CEOs cannot be
good at everything. 
CEO-D Cheryl and CEO-I Janet have different leadership styles and did not agree
on all issues: “there were times when we agreed to disagree”. However, the two debated
most of the time. The most important factor in their debates was that they were honest
with each other: “it is always better for me anyways to know where I stand”. They would
say what they thought and why they thought as such. The process through which they
reached the decision was as important for them as was the final decision. They double
interacted through most of their relationship and more so after CEO-I Janet decided to
name CEO-D Cheryl for the CEO position. CEO-D Cheryl acknowledged this style of
interaction was challenging but it helped each of them feel comfortable to raise their
concerns and explain their theories during the transition time.
We don’t have the same leadership style at all and even that was in conflict
sometimes and so I would say to her: ‘I appreciate that. That is who you are, that is
not who I am and you would have to trust that my way will work’ and she would say
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the same things: ‘I know you don’t agree with this but this is how I want to do it’. So
there were times when we convinced each other and there were times when we
agreed to disagree. But we were, I would say 98% of the time, we were very
forthright and honest with each other. So there was no kind of issues or unspoken
things. And that is sometimes really hard. I find it hard now with some of my
colleagues but it’s always better for me anyways to know exactly where I stand. 
Closer to the handover date, CEO-D Cheryl prepared herself more intensely to
take over from CEO-I Janet. Cheryl had many sessions with CEO-I Janet to discuss issues
related to who should be on her team, who should do the hiring and firing during the
transition period and why, as well as how she should establish herself as the new leader of
the organization. This was in an intensive learning period for Cheryl where she said: “I
called it my period of immersion”. Double interacting with CEO-I Janet helped Cheryl
build her standards, behaviours, and skill set necessary for her to “sort of be in place” as
the CEO from day one.
There were three changes at the executive level that I felt needed to be made and that
was going to be a very difficult thing. She knew that they needed to be made and we
talked about whether should she make them before she leaves or should she leave
that to me. I really would have loved it if she made them before she left but she felt it
was an important mark of a new leader to make those decisions yourself and to make
the hires yourself. But we talked a lot over the summer about what would my new
team look like, how would I manage that process…. what did I need to do to sort of
be in place. She also really encouraged me to get out and to talk to everybody in the
city, like all the leaders like city leaders, municipal, provincial, corporate leaders, all
the important people across our city and so I started setting up, I called it my period
of immersion and I just immersed myself in all of the CEO issues .... It was a very big
learning curve for me…
Table 5.8 below provides examples of the double interact style some CEO-Ds
adopted during the transition period.
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Table 5.8: Examples of double interact style during the transition period and the
resulting learning outcome
CEO-D
Carl

DOUBLE INTERACT

Learning Outcome

One of the things I didn’t agree with is there was a great deal of
cost cutting in order to make the quarter or to make the year and
I thought it was short-sighted. I thought we had a much more
competitive environment right now and it was not the time to
back off. It was time to push forward even if we had to tell the
board, look, we are going to have to invest over these years.
This is not the time to back away. I would talk to her (CEO-I
Kathy) about it and say you know, look, I really think we need
to invest more here. She would explain: ‘you know look, it’s
important to make this quarter. We don’t want to signal to the
market that we are in some sort of decline because of the
competition’. So we didn’t want to deal from a standpoint of
weakness and if people were to see that our income was trailing
off, that you know maybe they would have that perception. I
think that was her mindset to a great degree which I understood.
I tried to put myself in her shoes. I didn’t agree with it but I
certainly understood that she was looking at it from a different
lens than I was. 

CEO-D Carl and CEO-I
Kathy would debate
many strategic decisions
related to the
organization. Though, in
respect to increasing the
investment at the
expense of reporting
lower income, CEO-D
Carl did not agree with
the mindset CEO-I
Kathy was adopting, but
he was able to
understand her position
and reasoning as the
CEO.

She was pretty good, especially near the end, I think
understanding that I would potentially take her position, I think
she let me go a little bit more, we would debate decisions, but
she let me sort of, if you really feel that is the right way to go
about it, then go ahead and do that. 
So it was overall good relationship. You have your fights but at
the end of the day, everything turns out okay. So I think it was
short but good. 
Charles

One of the strengths that I think about that is, if there is a lot of
opposition we usually didn’t do it. Again, this is where I know
the importance of CEO’s, but this is where also if a CEO thinks,
he doesn’t have a good relation with his successor, or he is
taking too much of one person’s advice, or he is only taking his
own advice, I think that’s when big corporations get themselves
into trouble. So again, now, obviously if you fight all the time
with your designate CEO, if Richard (CEO-I) and I were in
constant battle, and I am not talking about intellectual battles
where you can go a little further, I mean, you know, we always
got to point out the weaknesses of our ideas and then up them to
strengths at anything you do. 
But I would say that we were more on side than our side and the
few times we were off, you know, you deal with it. There was
one or two times where we really disagreed, so I walked around
the block, cooled myself off and I came back. You (referring to
the CEO-I) can have debates with your reports and then he can
be very strong-willed, as they can. But it’s never personal. 
So we debate rigorously but then we think about it a little bit.
And that’s why we met daily. So when we have a fight, Richard
and I, but first of all let me make it clear that we agreed much

Closer to the handover
date, CEO-I Kathy
would discuss things
with CEO-D Carl, but
would also let him have
the opportunity to test
his ideas/theories under
her leadership.

CEO-D Charles makes
the distinction between
battles and being
continuously in
disagreement.
Double interacting with
the CEO-I does not
necessarily mean being
in constant battle or
always agreeing. It
means having the
opportunity to discuss
your opinion and being
open to expose
weaknesses and then “up
them to strengths”.
It is more about the
learning that happens
during the process of
debating than about the
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CEO-D

Robert

DOUBLE INTERACT

Learning Outcome

more than we disagreed. When we disagreed there were a few
times he said, I don’t care, this is the way we are doing it
because he’s got the broader picture. And there were one or two
bigger decisions that most of them involved customers, so this
is where he said: ‘we should do this deal’ and I think: ‘you are
crazy’, or I wanted to do the deal, alright. I remember there was
a very large project and that I said: ‘we shouldn’t do the deal’.
And then he got very upset because he thought very much that
he should do the deal and we knew all the people involved after
a big debate we did the deal, and I am glad in retrospect that we
did. 

decision itself.

I've learned very specific things. He (CEO-I) is quite different
from me. He's a guy who is very comfortable in the grey zone,
not from a governance point of view but more from the fact that
the world is not black and white. There are lots of nuances to
what you hear, what you read, what you interpret, what the
market tells you and so on. James (CEO-I) was very good at
deciphering the direction of the grey. So, very thoughtful. I
raised the issue with him after a meeting with government
officials, his behaviour seemed so compassionate and I could
not understand why, so I asked him. He was very generous, in
that he was willing to discuss why he acted the way he did. I
was not used to being in grey areas and he taught how to think
and to be better at managing those situations. 

CEO-D Robert believed
he was fortunate to learn
from CEO-I James. The
attitude of James was
also helpful. James was
willing to discuss his
behaviours and thought
processes which helped
CEO-D Robert learn
how to be comfortable in
grey zones and how to
think of other
stakeholders from their
perspective.

I recall all the debates we had on strategy on what target we
should go after and so on. And how multi-dimensional his
thought process would be in the discussion and debate which we
would have together, and learned a lot from that. 
The other thing that he was really good at which I've learned
from is that he had this incredible empathy. In other words,
putting himself in other people's shoes and thinking about
situations and negotiations and so on from the other people's
perspective. These were two real big strengths that I learned
from James. I've seen that in negotiations. I've seen that in
negotiations with the government where you would think, "Why
would we bother with what they want?" Well, here's why and
here's how they might feel and here's the way to-- so, empathy
was a big strength.
And, he was a very good strategist, thinking two or three moves
ahead. 
Stanley

Jim (CEO-I) and I went and visited all major investors across
Canada. It’s not a big number by the way but we did an investor
relations tour and hit any significant institutional shareholders.

There was time for us to figure out the transition plan. There
was time for digestion of the fact that I was the designate CEO.
We had time to debate what our understandings of what the
CEO job was. This was really helpful. 
I had the opportunity, during the transition period, to talk to the

CEO-D Stanley had not
thought about what it
was like once he
becomes CEO. However,
the transition period
gave him time to build
his mental models and
take actions that he
debated several times
with CEO-I Jim to be
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CEO-D

Wayne

DOUBLE INTERACT

Learning Outcome

executive team, the senior management team and to formulate a
plan for leading the team and going forward. So it gave me time
to evolve my strategy with Jim (CEO-I) because I hadn’t
thought of the strategy of being CEO. 

CEO ready.

I have spent time debating with founder and CEO-I Dan, we
worked and still do as partners. I think over time, Dan and I, we
have built a very deep trust in each other and we also built a
personal friendship and a relationship. We keep very connected
probably three four days a week, we have breakfast together. I
have learned from him a lot about being a CEO. I was
fascinated how differently a CEO founder thinks from a CEO.


CEO-D Wayne is the
only one amongst the
interviewed CEO-Ds
who did not have to go
through a competition or
was overtly told he
would be the next CEO.
He was the only
executive asked if he
wanted to be the next
CEO, few months before
he took the job.

Founders have a real, not only a sense of ownership, they have
ownership. So they are not playing with anybody else’s money
so therefore, your decisions are very value oriented. People
always say how you get along so well with the founder because
lot of times that is difficult, but I keep saying it’s very simple,
the founder is focused on value. So if you are a person who is
not focused on value, for sure you are going to have a problem.
But I am focused on value so I have no problem. The only
discussions Dan and I have, if we have a difference - and we
don’t have many - it’s not about creating value. It’s what the
best way is. So those are very good discussions because no
matter which way you go, it’s designed to create value. So my
relationship obviously strengthened throughout that period and I
think he got a clear sense of my ability to deliver results. 
I don’t care about my office what it looks like or where it is.
This goes back to what I say, you see, I have learned through
my close relationship with Dan that the shareholders don’t care
about that. This is why you get in situations where people take
on all the trappings of it but when analysts call, they never ask
me about any of that stuff, they ask did you deliver. 

CEO-D Wayne was able
to create shared mental
models with founder and
CEO-I Dan. He was able
to understand business
from an entrepreneurial
perspective where value
creation is the purpose
rather than big egos or
office spaces.
CEO-D Wayne had to
change his previous
mental models about
what the CEO role was
about given that he had
already been a CEO at a
subsidiary before he
joined the company.

In brief, there were many common elements to the experiences of CEO-Ds who
had the opportunity to double interact with the CEO-Is. Most of the CEO-Ds had a
different leadership style from the CEO-Is, but this did not prevent double interacting.
CEO-Ds were able to communicate openly with CEO-Is, discuss issues with them and
test their understanding of the situations throughout the transition period. The most
common point the CEO-Ds stressed during the interviews was their debates consistently
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focused on the best interest of the organization rather than style or preferences. CEO-Ds
valued the learning gained during the debates more than the decision reached. The
debates allowed the CEO-Ds to create shared mental models with the CEO-Is. This
enabled the CEO-Ds to learn and build the necessary skill set to be operational
immediately after their appointment as CEO. The CEO-Is also helped to make this period
a productive one, maybe because they accepted the idea they would leave the job soon.
Table 5.9 connects learning from double interact to the CEOs’ statements provided above.

Table 5.9: Connecting learning from double interact to CEOs’ Statements
Learning From Double Interact Supporting Statements
CEO-D

Cognitive

Behaviour

Identity

Cheryl







Carl





Charles





Robert







Stanley







Wayne







When reading the summary tables above (Table 5.5, Table 5.7, and Table 5.9), it
is important not to misinterpret identity as having resulted in little change. Previous
sections covered statements reflecting change in identity. However, it is important to note
the increase in change mental models (cognitive) and behaviour from act, to interact, to
double interact. These tables also provide support for the argument CEO-Ds who double
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interacted with CEO-Is were able to achieve more cognitive complexity during the
transition period than other CEO-Ds.
5.5.4. Double Interact turning into Act
Based on data from the fieldwork, I presented in the previous sections the
differences in the learning outcomes amongst the three categories of enactment types: (1)
act, (2) interact, and (3) double interact. I conducted the comparison based on the specific
experience of interviewed CEOs. Each CEO’s idiosyncrasies might have contributed to
the difference in learning outcomes during the transition period along with the type of
enactment. A particularly interesting case (1/22) arose in the research where the
relationship between the CEO-D and the CEO-I started as a double interact and evolved
into act. Though it was one case, it provided insight into the two types of enactment and
their impact on learning outcomes on one individual.
Double interact during the transition period requires both the CEO-D and the
CEO-I to be willing and able to work together. If one of them does not commit the time,
physical and emotional environment for this interaction, double interact fails (Baker et al.,
2002). The experience of CEO-D Allen revealed a case starting with a double interact at
the time CEO-I Curtis informed Allen he was the successor. The relationship turned into
act as the transition date neared. CEO-I Curtis selected CEO-D Allen as his successor
even though the board was considering three of Curtis’ inner circle as candidates for the
CEO role.
When I joined the company, I had the ambition to become the CEO. But at the time,
the incumbent CEO had his own executive committee and I always felt an outsider to
that group. When discussions about CEO succession started in the company, I was
considered with three other executives, who were close friends to Curtis (CEO-I) as
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candidates for the CEO position. After that, Curtis told me that I was the heir
apparent, and the chairman spoke to me soon after that just to make it formal. My
understanding and I believe everybody else’s understanding was that the transition
will happen within two years.
When Curtis appointed CEO-D Allen as COO, CEO-I Curtis introduced Allen to
the shareholders and to the important industry members, sending a signal the company
was transitioning. Allen and Curtis started working together on important projects
affecting the future of the organization as well as drafting the future strategy for the
organization. CEO-D Allen discussed with CEO-I Curtis major issues and Allen had a
solid understanding of the industry. CEO-D Allen particularly benefited from CEO-I
Curtis’ experience leading a small company on the verge of bankruptcy and turning it into
a 20 to 30 billion dollar company.
Since I was appointed the COO, Curtis (CEO-I) introduced me to the shareholders.
… There were one or two very big industry committees where the two of us would go
so it was a relatively clear signal to the industry that there was a transition in place.
That happened like three or four years before the final handover. I already had all of
the contacts by the time we got to the final transition. So all of the industry contacts,
all of the political contacts, and that had been with CEO-I Curtis’s help.
Two years into what CEO-D Allen thought was a sufficient transition period, he
and CEO-I Curtis engineered a major acquisition. The acquisition was successful and the
company grew. CEO-D Allen noticed CEO-I Curtis became reluctant about leaving and
started avoiding any open discussion with him regarding the timeline for the transition.
The board communicated to CEO-D Allen that since the company had recently undergone
a major acquisition maybe it was for the best interest of the organization to let CEO-I
Curtis stay 2 to 3 years longer until the organization fully integrated the acquired
company. CEO-D Allen accepted even though he played a major role in the acquisition
and did not believe CEO-I Curtis’s stay was necessary. He noticed thereafter his

156
relationship with CEO-I Curtis changed. Every time CEO-D Allen attempted a structural
change within the organization, CEO-I Curtis would oppose. The board of directors
supported CEO-I Curtis, as if “they were indebted to him”, Allen noted.
Three years after the acquisition, when discussion began regarding how the
transition would occur at the next AGM, CEO-D Allen became eager to start preparing to
be operational as soon as he became CEO. Allen’s attempts were thwarted because CEOI Curtis blocked most of his proposals for change. The board gave CEO-D Allen more
power and appointed him president nine months prior to the next AGM, the time for the
handover. When the board appointed CEO-D Allen as the President, CEO-I Curtis
stopped talking to him completely. So CEO-D Allen was forced to act alone and get his
team together in preparation for being the CEO.
CEO-D Allen, as the president, went on to prepare the company the way he
believed was in the stakeholders’ best interest. He co-ordinated his executive team, and
set his own vision for the organization. However, on the other side of the organization,
CEO-I Curtis was closing long term strategic deals. The board approved the deals. CEOD Allen did not have a significant say about the deals although they included long term
commitments of the corporate resources. He later ended up spending significant time and
money to end those deals when he became CEO.
I think the management of that process was bad, primarily because of the way it was
managed by the board, only the board can take responsibility for that in the end. The
CEO (CEO-I) tried to set the strategy for the next ten years just before he left. So he
put out a ten year plan within a year of leaving. He did a large joint venture with
another corporation. And the board approved it. I didn’t have much of a say because
of the way we worked, the CEO was the only guy who had the real say. The future
team was largely disregarded. When I got the job, the first thing I had to do was to
say “I think we need a different strategy”.
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To summarize, the case of CEO-D Allen presented support that enactment type
affected the learning outcomes even within the experience of the same person and not just
amongst experiences of different people. During the double interact era of his transition
period, CEO-D Allen worked closely with CEO-I Curtis and learned a lot about the
CEO’s job. Allen was able to connect with major shareholders and industry members and
was involved in building the strategy of the organization. This period of CEO-D Allen’s
experience had a lot of common elements with the experience of CEO-Ds who double
interacted with their CEO-Is including the creation of shared mental models, the
participation in shaping and executing the strategy of the organization. However, for
reasons related to power and self-interest, CEO-I Curtis did not want to let go when the
time came to hand over the reins of the organization: “he did not want to become a sitting
duck and he did not want to lose some of his pension”. Cannella and Shen (2001) also
found that in high performing organizations, the more powerful the CEO, in this case
Curtis, the less likely the successor would ascend to the CEO role. Despite the learning
during the previous period, CEO-D Allen suffered from lack of knowledge during the
period closer to appointment as CEO because CEO-I Curtis did not want to interact with
him. The board and CEO-I Curtis excluded Allen from major decisions committing the
organization’s resources for ten years, nine of which would have been under Allen’s
tenure as CEO. As a result, CEO Allen spent money to end some of those commitments
and to drive the organization in a new direction. The later period of CEO-D Allen’s
shared many common elements with the experience of CEO-Ds whose enactment mode
of interaction was limited to act with their CEO-Is. Those elements included adversarial
relationships, inability to proceed with desired changes, and seclusion from the
participation in the organization’s strategy.
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5.6. Premise Five: Sense-ible Strategic Change
P5a: CEO-Ds who double interact, unlike CEO-Ds who act/interact, with CEO-Is,
have more opportunity to build mental models with both preserving and prospecting
abilities enabling them to take plausible action upon assuming the CEO position.
P5b: CEO-Ds who act/interact, unlike CEO-Ds who double interact, with CEO-Is,
feel less committed to the ongoing strategy of the organization and are more likely to
build prospecting abilities and to take action to change the status quo of the
organization upon assuming the CEO position.
In the last part of the theoretical model, I argued two competing premises. The
first proposed that CEO-Ds who double interact with the CEO-Is are more capable of
taking plausible action to change the status quo of the organization than CEO-Ds who
act/interact with CEO-Is. The second proposed that CEO-Ds who act/interact with CEOIs are more capable to take action to change the status-quo of the organization than their
counterparts who double interact with CEO-Is. Though competing, both premises
challenge the grounds on which the CEO succession literature built arguments to explain
heirs’ apparent ability to induce strategic change (Shen & Cannella, 2002). The prevailing
literature focuses on two aspects. First, it focuses on the similarities between the mental
models of heirs apparent and incumbent CEOs (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002). Second, it
argues the CEO-I’s socialization of the CEO-D leads to the CEO-D’s psychological and
emotional commitment to the ongoing status-quo of the organization (Fondas &
Wiersema, 1997). Both aspects result in assuming CEO-Ds’ cognitive capture from CEOIs. The fieldwork conducted during this research provided reasons to question these
beliefs. CEO-Ds who double interacted with CEO-Is were actually involved in strategic
orientation of the organization before they officially assumed the CEO role. Also, CEODs who acted/interacted with CEO-Is built no/partial shared mental models with the
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CEO-Is and in cases where CEO-Ds acted with CEO-Is they were not socialized by CEOIs.
As insiders to the organization, CEO-Ds knew the strengths and weaknesses of the
organization. Engaging in double interact with the CEO-I allowed CEO-Ds to become
more aware of the opportunities and threats facing the organization. When CEO-Ds
engaged in double interact with CEO-Is, they built new mental models different from
their espoused theories. The new mental models were also different from the CEO-Is’
beliefs (Weick, 1979).

The CEO-Ds new mental models facilitated actions and

behaviours different from those of the CEO-Is. CEO-D Philip for example, appreciated
the debates he had with the CEO-I Ralph because they helped him appreciate the different
types of growth strategies an organization may adopt and when to use each. He changed
his mental models from focusing on organic growth to appreciating that M&As also
provide potential for organizational growth.
As I started to get closer and closer to this chair I needed to understand why the
company is the way it is. It’s come from Ralph (CEO-I) and he has taught me how he
thinks about the future, how he thinks about the strategy, execution of the company,
how he built the company. That has helped me quite a bit… I remember once Ralph
says to me: ‘if I give you a billion dollars Philip, what would you do with The
Company? So I give you a billion dollars, what would you do with the money for the
company?’ And I remember sitting there (pointing to where I was sitting) and Ralph
is a mergers and acquisitions and he has built this company and he has done big
deals and I knew that and so I said: ‘I would reinvest it in our base business. I would
improve our assets. I would make sure we can run more streamline’ and he looked at
me and said: ‘nobody has ever told me that. Everybody has always said to me buy
this or buy that’ and I said: ‘I know and that is one way to have a healthy company is
to grow by M&A but the other way to a healthy company is to invest’ and so we have
these philosophical discussions, right? You can then understand the advantages and
disadvantages of the strategies he used versus the ones you think are better (CEO-D
Philip)
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I argued that CEO-Ds who double interact with CEO-Is develop “preserving and
prospecting abilities” enabling them to take plausible action that might lead to
organizational renewal (Hurst et al., 1989), preserving the core and experimenting with
change, rather than mere strategic change. Under the competing premise, I argued CEODs who act/interact with the CEO-Is miss the opportunity to build shared mental models
with CEO-Is and also miss the conversational environment giving them background
information enabling them to build preserving abilities. Hence, I argued CEO-Ds who
acted/interacted with CEO-Is were more likely to build prospecting abilities enabling
them to take action and possibly change the status-quo of the organization. The aim of
this research was to show the ability of CEO-Ds to change the status-quo of the
organization rather than whether the change was good or bad.
Data from the fieldwork provided indications to support both competing premises
based on the enactment style of the CEO-Ds. This may be due to a limitation in my
sample, namely the survival bias. The survival bias in this case is that I only interviewed
CEO-Ds who successfully became CEOs and are still in the CEO role. However, my data
provided reasons to doubt the premises used in the CEO succession literature to argue for
the limited ability of heirs apparent to induce strategic change compared to other
successors types. What is interesting nevertheless is that although all participants
provided examples of action leading to strategic change, there was a difference in the
timeline during which the change was implemented between the CEO-Ds who engaged in
double interact with CEO-Is and those who were limited to interact and/or act. CEO-D
Carl realized his lengthy experience within the organization, more than 20 years, might
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lead to strategic myopia. Carl also knew that he needed to continue implementing
necessary change while keeping the core of the business alive in order to survive.
I do recognize that there is certain DNA that exists within me because I have been
here so long. So I challenge myself all the time to think outside of that box. So you
know the potential always exists for me to fall into that trap. But I am aware about it
enough I think to understand if that starts to happen I need to be looking for new and
different ways to do things without upsetting the core essence of what we have here. I
want to add to it and I don’t want to blow it up but I do recognize we have always
changed and will have to continue to change.
All but one of the 22 CEOs I interviewed replaced successful predecessors.
Journalist Arthur who covered many succession stories, reflecting upon my sampling
frame, said: “you are looking at transitions where the current CEOs have succeeded
larger than life personalities”. Appendix H provides a sample of how some of the CEOs
described their predecessors. Business newspapers have given the CEO-Is powerful
aliases, unfortunately, I am not in any position to list these because this would reveal the
identity of my respondents. This factor is important because as new CEOs they were
cognizant that they were being watched closely by all stakeholders. The new CEOs could
not and did not want to rock a boat that had been working well. They were aware they
needed to use their “preserving abilities”, either because they believed they needed to
defend the core as is or because they wanted the change to be slow and not to shake the
trust of stakeholders in the company. Yet the new CEOs knew they needed to change the
organization’s course of action. In most cases the new CEOs needed to change their
leadership team. Sometimes the new CEO needed to change the organization’s structure
and in other cases they needed to change the direction of the organization.
CEO-D Bill believed he won the competition against the other two candidates
because his presentation to the board focused on a story about continuity rather than
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change. He believed since the company was doing well, he should not suggest major
changes which might shake the confidence of the board. He thought the board believed
that if the company was really doing well there was no need to change strategy and
direction; there were no justifications to take unnecessary risks.
I asked the other two candidates: ‘can I see your presentations?’. Jeff said no, that
was the other one. Stanis said sure. It was a remarkable presentation. But it was a
little bit too much. I think both of them were really talking about changing the
company and my point was: ‘that is the last thing we want to do’. So I think again
that was one of the things that attracted the board to me, I was safe. My plan and
strategy was don’t rock the boat. We are doing really well. Let’s continue the path.
Whereas Stanis had a vision and Jeff had a vision and I think that may have hurt
them as well. In this case you don’t want a vision.
The main difference between CEO-Ds who acted/interacted with the CEO-I
versus those who double interacted with the CEO-I was when rather than whether a
change took place or not. CEO-Ds who double interacted with the CEO-Is implemented
changes prior to the transition day relating to executive team members and strategic
orientations with the CEO-Is extending through their tenure. The CEO-Ds engaged in
debates with the CEO-Is and sought their advice. The CEO-Ds trusted the CEO-Is’
opinions and did not fear the CEO-Is would force their strategies. The CEO-Ds also
discussed the execution of these changes with the CEO-Is such as who should execute the
change: the CEO-I or the CEO-D? Together, they evaluated the benefits and risks of
different courses of action and made decisions accordingly. Table 5.10 shows a sample of
reports from current CEOs who engaged in double interact during their transition period
to provide a description about the strategic changes they put in place and the time line for
these changes.
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Table 5.10: Reports of strategic change implemented by CEO-Ds who engaged in
double interact
CEO-D
Carl

Strategic Change
You understand that maybe the strategies are bought into to the extent that
they should be. And you have your own opinions as well. Like I said I
didn’t always agree with Kathy (the CEO-I). I had different opinions on
doing things so it’s different than if I was a clone of Kathy and I agreed
with everything Kathy did and Kathy is the only way to go about and I
think you may fall into that trap. But I don’t think that is the case here. I
think we really, I am really looking at everything I have learned and I have
talked to Kathy about how we see change and what areas should be
exploited that we haven’t exploited. What are the sacred sorts of cows that
we need to just say: ‘look we need to challenge this now?’ So I feel fairly
well equipped to take that on and I also understand the ripple effect of
making certain decisions on the entire organization and on the business so
you won’t be able to know for some time whether or not I am successful at
that so sitting here right now, I feel very confident about it but we have a
bit of a rough patch to get through here at the company and we need to be
prepared to come out at the other end stronger than we were when we had
the rough patch. There is a lot of work between now and then and I think
the people here who wanted some change I think are happy and optimistic
about me being in this role. I have certainly heard a lot of that from a lot of
people so…

Timeline

Upon
Designation

Especially near the end, I think understanding that I would potentially take
her position, I think she let me go a little bit more, we would debate
decisions, but she let me sort of, if you really feel that is the right way to
go about it, then go ahead and do that.
Charles

Cheryl

Margaret

We all have different management styles, my predecessor had one, I have
one, and my successor will too. I have selected my own management team
after I took over, my successor will select his own team, it’s a consistency
and it changes our progress is evolutionary, not revolutionary. And that’s
sort of what we mean, keep the culture. Change, but change and do it the
right way.

Upon
Designation

There were three changes at the executive level that I felt needed to be
made and that was going to be a very difficult thing. She (the CEO-I)
knew that they needed to be made and we talked about, should she make
them before she leaves or should she leave that to me. I really would have
loved it if she made them before she left but I think she felt it was an
important mark of a new leader to make those decisions yourself and to
make the hires yourself. But we talked a lot over the summer about what
would my new team looks like, how would I manage that process. I mean
there were two people that were going to be immediately gone. There was
a third person who I really wanted to give a chance to work with
differently. In the end that person also left.

Upon
Designation

I said you know, we went through a phase about 10 years ago where we
needed more collaboration between the people in the company the silo
things and so we started to hire people and adopt things that we would find
collaboration in everything at one point I would say wow time out, we are
like kittens without nails anymore, so we don’t challenge ourselves enough

Upon
Designation
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CEO-D

Strategic Change

Timeline

so we went back and because challenge is extremely important both from
the individual perspective and the company’s perspective and to me it’s, I
was raised like that and my father had an old book when he was young and
now he is 84 and he still have the same old book and it’s called the art of
contrary thinking just to make sure that everybody doesn’t go into the deep
hole. But it was always done in a lot of respect and yeah, we challenged
one another. I discussed this with Russell (the CEO-I) and I started the
change in culture before I even took over the job and it is still going on.
Philip

Ralph (the CEO-I) and I would have hours of closed sessions discussing
the future of the organization. How would it go? Well we each have a list
of things that we wanted to talk about and we would just sit here or we
would go off site at a quiet restaurant and just talk for hours about every
topic under the sun, organization structure, strategy, key staff, high
potentials, what the culture of the company is like, what the industry is
doing, what do we think the market is going to look like 12 months from
now, it ran the gamut of every topic under the sun.
He was briefing me on, like I said on his direct reports now who were my
peers. He was briefing me on the board dynamics and helping me
understand all the players on the board and all their views on the company
and of course strategy.
We talked an awful lot about how they (industry players) are, can you trust
them, what happened in the history with the companies, what they are
looking for, what we should be looking for. It was complete download on
all the industry players.

Few weeks
after
designation
but long
before
assuming the
role

By the time I got the job, I had chosen most of my team members and
drafted the future organization strategy with input from Ralph.

CEO-Ds who mainly acted and/or interacted with the CEO-Is made changes after
their appointment as CEO. In most cases I heard the sentence “I would not change the exCEO’s company until he or she had left”. They all felt the pressure to show continuity
given the previous success of the company under the ex-CEO. The new CEOs were
mindful about the optics of the change: making change appears seamless and a
continuation of the ex-CEO’s success to avoid losing stakeholder confidence.

The

stakeholders the new CEOs considered included the board members, the shareholders,
and the staff and senior management teams.
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Table 5.11 shows a sample of reports from CEO-Ds who engaged in act and/or
interact with the CEO-Is during their transition period to provide examples about the
strategic changes they put in place and the time line for these changes.

Table 5.11: Reports of strategic change implemented by CEO-Ds who engaged in
act/interact
CEO-D
Bill

Strategic Change
So the ex-COO was there. He was really Jeffrey’s guy and so I had to tell
him to retire. He agreed.
In the first year as a CEO, we laid off 1100 people of the company. So we
didn’t, I didn’t want to make any drastic changes because what had
happened to the company wasn’t as a result of succession, it was because
of the economy.
So if you go to our investors and talk to them about the company, the one
fact they loved is there was no change in the company. So when Bill took
over, no things just stayed the same, the company sounded the same. It’s
been a gradual evolution. Basically I think on the outside, the world
probably felt it was smooth, it was perfect, it was no real change but
internally there is a whole bunch of moving parts going on and internally
there were some major changes. Internally it was a major shift in our
personality of leadership but externally they didn’t need to know that.
Public does not need to see that and never did because that is a bit of a
scare. Any time in a public company you give them the feeling that things
are changing especially when you are doing well. There is panic. If they
are going to change, that means they could not do as well next year as this
year so then your share is going down. So I guess the success, you never
measure success by share value but as I said, we went down to $18 in 2010
and we are now at $65. It’s been an amazing year in that respect and I
think the investment community is looking at it and feeling very
comfortable about where we are and what we are doing so that is what
makes the job harder now, it’s managing those expectations.

Bob

Timeline

I don’t think I really started making any footprints for a couple or three
months till I got confident even though you are doing a lot of the job, there
is still a few things that you just have to make sure that you are confident
that they were right, so I think the first three to four months, it’s more or
less of a feeling out and a confirmation that that is exactly how everything
is laid out in the periods of three to six months starts slowly but surely
putting out your thoughts and looking for some perhaps slightly different
results. Garner the confidence of your board of directors, a confirmation
that they have made the right choice. I think in our case which was pretty
much status quo and the company was established and not having any real
problems, when you are having the negative hurdles that you had to
overcome in a short period of time I think then you would be having to
make more rapid changes then perhaps I would have made, we were quite
successful and we changed the company in the last five years to a big

Forced
changes
during the
first year due
to economic
conditions

Major changes
started 2 years
after assuming
the role

Nothing for
the first four
months

After four
months started
strategizing
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CEO-D

Strategic Change

Timeline

degree but we did it slowly.
I think everybody in the organization knew it was coming a long time
before that and I had de facto fairly firm hand on it anyways. So the first
month and a half were, as I said was really a nothing. We didn’t do a
whole lot of anything different than what we had done. It was the period
after that where we kind of strategize about what we might want to do and
so on, so forth. You know, say you took over a company that was dodging
in and out of bankruptcy type of issues would be a much more different
situation but that isn’t the case, not our case at all. So it was really, to be
frank the first two or three months, just evaluating the people that work
directly for you to confirm that they are right people and so on, so forth
and move forward.
Christopher

Because by September (two months after taking over) I had an idea of
what I wanted to do. Then I involved the other Executive Vice Presidents
and we spent from September to January planning how we were going to
do some of these things.
When you come from the outside, I think you even more so try and shake
things up for the sake of shaking things up and sometimes for the wrong
reasons so that is always a risk.
Except when I looked around the company, there were lots of people in
roles they should not have been there and some of them in senior roles. So
we had to let people go over time and I am guessing we let, we certainly
let over a 150 go, not in one shot, like 1 here, 2 there, selective and it was
thoughtful and it was done quietly. But one by one, we kept letting, and
many of them, like I just fired my head of HR, the last big one, I did last
May. I fired a head of HR who reported directly to me and she had been
here 31 years and never worked anywhere else. Started as a secretary, now
was the head of our HR. How did that happen, I don’t know but we had a
lot of stories like that. We had another one who started as a secretary and
then got into leasing, who ended up running a whole portfolio with no
clue.

Douglas

… that big personality of the entrepreneurial guy that took the business
one place isn’t necessarily what is going to sustain the business for the
long term … That maybe one of the reasons why after 10, 11, 12, 14 years,
it’s time for somebody else to come in with a new point of view from a
different area, take a look at the business, make an assessment and solve
some of those things that you just don’t see because you have been there
for 14 years.
When I came in, the biggest change I think I made was in the overall
direction of the organization. And that then had repercussions throughout
because I took a very different point of view. I said this is our Parent’s
business, this is the business they deployed globally so what we need to do
is duplicate their processes and align our offer with their global offer to
become completely seamless as much as we can. We will do it our parents’
way because this is a global business. So that sort of big strategic change
has repercussions down the line. All sorts of repercussions come from it.
All sorts of alignment issues and the way you manage the place and how
you manage it, what you are willing to let go and move over to your
parent’s changes. But I could not do it immediately, I had to plan it slowly,
don’t forget Terrence (the ex-CEO) was successful, very much a great guy

Changes
started a year
or so later

Nothing for 2
months

Started
planning to
change
months after.

Implementing
change very
slowly at first,
picking up the
pace after 2
years

Nothing for
the first year.

Planning a
presentation
for change to
the board for
one year

Implementing
started 2 to 3
years later
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CEO-D

Strategic Change

Timeline

and just a wonderful man. And people just willingly would follow him
anywhere, I would, you know great going personality. So I had to make
sure not to shake the company completely.
Henry

John

What I spent most of my time thinking about because I am not going to
change Harold’s (CEO-I) organization till Harold was gone. Think about
understanding what we have and how I would change it. So you have the
key things sorted day one. Who would I put into some jobs because once
executives take themselves out of the organization, then you got to backfill
that job, who the rest of the management team are, what’s their tenure.
They do want to retire with the CEO if they have been loyal to the CEO
and have just been waiting for him to retire.

Thinking
started during
the transition
period, but
implementing
did not start
till at least one
year after
assuming the
role of CEO

You know I waited until he was then gone and then we had as an example
a people first strategy, and I said no, gone, don’t agree with that, and it’s
not that I don’t believe in people by the way, but our people first strategy
was making our people had got to me, me, me, me culture. So I was on it,
we developed a new vision and I took it out to all the senior executives and
I got input from everybody around it, etc, etc. And then out to our people,
and I started with laser focus on the market, and that was my kind of,
that’s my, if you talk to people they’d say yeah, laser focus on the market
that’s John, and employer of choice okay. But not people first because if I
don’t have clients, I don’t need any people in this organisation. And so
people are really important that we attract, develop, retain but you know
what, we’re in business and we need customers, so for me that was a
dramatic shift in the culture of the organisation was needed. So that was
one of the big changes I’d made because David (ex-CEO) had brought in,
not good or bad, just different, he brought in people first, and I didn’t think
it was right to put it up on a pedestal.

Thinking
started during
the transition
period, but
implementing
did not start
till at least one
year after
assuming the
role of CEO

If there was anything like that (a disagreement with CEO-I), I’d just avoid
dealing with until I was there. I wasn’t going to make any decisions that
would “in a way embarrass or put in a position”. I learned very quickly
through that process that I wanted to restructure the management team. I
learned through the process that I wanted to make some changes of people
but I wasn’t going to do those until after I was in the seat.

Thinking
started during
the transition
period, but
implementing
did not start
till at least one
year after
assuming the
role of CEO

Lee

Comparisons amongst the experiences of CEO-Ds who double interacted with
CEO-Is versus those who acted/interacted with CEO-Is provided indications for strategic
change actions with differences in timeline. The special case of CEO-D Allen provided
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support for similar findings within the experience of the same person. During the double
interact era with CEO-I Curtis, CEO-D Allen co-authored and co-implemented many
strategies of the organization. Should CEO-I Curtis have left as originally planned, CEOD Allen would have started his major changes during the transition and continued them
after assuming the role of CEO. The change in enactment style from double interact
enabling CEO-D Allen to start the changes he needed before assuming the job, to act
prevented CEO-D Allen from implementing any of his planned changes. CEO-I Curtis
opposed anything Allen wanted to do before assuming the job.
CEO-D Allen induced major strategic change in the organization’s direction by
halting some of the big strategic decisions made prior to his ascension to the job. He took
the company in a different direction. He supported his decisions in a subtle way, the
industry analysts portrayed his move in the business newspapers as the most appropriate
strategic move for the success of the organization 3.
In summary, I argued for two competing propositions in premise five of the
theoretical model. The first being CEO-Ds who double interact with the CEO-I are more
likely to build preserving and prospecting abilities, hence more cognitive complexity,
than their counterparts who only act/interact with CEO-Is. The CEO-Ds with double
interact exposure thus are more capable of taking actions leading to organizational
renewal than the others. The second proposition was CEO-Ds who are limited to
act/interact with CEO-Is may miss the opportunity to create shared mental models with
these CEO-Is. These CEO-Ds are therefore more likely to acquire prospecting abilities
enabling them to take action that may change the status-quo of the organization. My

3

To keep my respondent’s identity confidential I am not able to quote directly from the newspapers.
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fieldwork did not provide difference with respect to the cognitive complexity or abilities
CEO-Ds build during the transition period. However, CEO-Ds who double interacted
with CEO-Is built the preserving abilities faster as they had the help of the CEO-Is, while
CEO-Ds who acted/interacted had to spend time after assuming the job building these
abilities. Being able to build prospecting and preserving abilities during the transition
period enabled CEO-Ds who double interacted with CEO-Is to start implementing
changes faster than CEO-Ds who acted/interacted with CEO-Is as represented in Figure
5.2 below. This figure shows CEO-Ds who double interacted with CEO-Is start thinking
about and implementing change in the organization during the period from designation to
assuming the CEO role. They had the support of the CEO-Is who pushed their thinking
further and helped start the implementation. On the other hand, CEO-Ds who were
limited to act/interact with CEO-Is started thinking about and implementing change in
their organization after assuming the role in most cases. Only in very few cases these
CEO-Ds started thinking about change in the transition period but decided to implement
the change after the departure of the CEO-Is.
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Figure 5.2: Timeline Difference
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The fieldwork provided ground to doubt the premise on which the CEO
succession literature built its argument to compare the heirs apparent ability to induce
strategic change, at least for successful companies. The fieldwork provided indications
that CEO-Ds built mental models which differ from CEO-Is, either evolved/shared mental
models in case of double interact or distinct models in case of act/interact. The research
also shows CEO-Ds are not necessarily socialized to their social context by CEO-Is; this
is mainly in cases of act. These CEO-Ds took action to change the strategic direction of
the organization; they were mindful they were taking the helm of successful
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organizations. They knew they needed to implement changes but remained mindful of the
impact of advertising major changes in the media on the perception of the markets on
their organization financial performance. The sample in this research did not include
external CEOs or CEO-Ds, and hence I could not compare the strategic change that
internal CEO-Ds implemented to the change external CEOs and CEO-Ds implement.
I believe the data showed enough examples to motivate re-conceptualizing or
reconsidering the operationalization of the strategic change construct. The researchers
mostly operationalize strategic change as change in diversification or power in the
organization 1 to 3 years following the succession event. However, data from the
fieldwork showed this operationalization may not be accurate to measure change induced
by CEO-Ds. CEO-Ds who double interacted with CEO-Is started the change a few
months before assuming the CEO role. CEO-Ds who acted or interacted with CEO-Is
introduced the change smoothly and gradually as they were mindful of the negative
impact of radical strategic change on the organization external evaluation. Revisiting the
conceptualization and operationalization of the strategic change construct might provide a
more complete understanding of the difference between the ability of external versus
internal CEOs to induce change. I also believe the ability to induce strategic change
between CEO-Ds selected from inside and those selected from outside should be
conducted with some caution. Successors recruited from outside, and sometimes through
public horse races, have the mandate to change the course of the organization (Helfat &
Bailey, 2005). Outside and public horse race successors feel the need to advertise the
changes they make. In doing so, these executives attempt to convince the board members
they made the right choice selecting them. Successors recruited from inside have to be
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mindful of the impact of publicly announcing their suggested changes on the
organizational performance.
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION
6.1. Overview
The initial aim of this research was to answer the following research question:
“How the designation of executives as heirs apparent affects their learning and
prepares them to become CEOs”. The purpose was to examine an assumption
dominating the CEO succession literature about the learning heirs apparent obtain from
hypothetically working closely with the CEO-I during the transition period (Bigley &
Wiersema, 2002; Cannella & Shen, 2001; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004, 2006). I focused
on uncovering the impact of the executives’ designation as CEO-Ds on two
characteristics – identity and social context – which might affect their learning during the
transition period. In addition, I explored how CEO-Ds managed their relationship with the
CEO-Is and enacted their new environment affected their learning and sensemaking
during the transition.
This research explored the impact of the designation as the CEO-D on executives’
learning during the transition period using the two theoretical lenses of sensemaking and
learning. Sensemaking explained the impact of identity, social context, and different types
of enactment on learning. Learning explained how the CEO-Ds created the standards for
their changed identity and transitioned from the identity of an executive/CEO-D to the
identity of CEO. These processes combined explained the learning of CEO-Ds during the
transition period, a phenomenon situated at the heart of CEO succession literature. In
doing so, I contributed to a call by Inkpen and Crossan (1995) to explore the learning
process itself rather than merely the relationship between the input and output variables of
learning.
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To study the research question of this thesis, I used a phenomenological approach
to understand the learning experience of executives who went through the transition
period. Using interviews as my main data collection tool (Creswell, 2013; Giorgi, 2009;
Moustakas, 1994) supported by secondary data, I collected a rich data set allowing me to
provide insights into the learning experience of CEO-Ds during the transition period. I
mostly interviewed CEOs who experienced the designation as the CEO-D to understand
their learning experience. I also interviewed outgoing CEOs in the process of passing the
baton to the incoming one; CEO-Ds in the process of receiving the baton, ex-CEOs,
senior executives, board members and chairs of boards in order to have a more complete
understanding of the phenomenon. I also interviewed one consultant who is involved in
CEO succession phases with the companies and a journalist who has reported on CEO
successions’ news in a major newspaper in Canada. These interviews provided me with
independent analysts’ perspectives on CEO succession in organizations. In doing so, I
contributed to a call by Giambatista et al. (2005) asking researchers to use qualitative
research to help in explaining some of the conjectures derived in the CEO succession
literature dominated by the quantitative type of research.
This research provided four main findings. First, while trying to establish the
impact of the heir apparent designation on the executives’ learning, I discovered the
prevailing understanding of relay succession and the associated heir apparent definition
may not hold true in the situations I studied. The appointment of executives as COOs was
not enough to signal their designation as heirs apparent. The explicit designation was
what triggered the new identity for the executives and enabled them to start preparing
themselves for the next step more than the implicit designation.
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Second, I found the impact of the social change remained a major surprise to
CEO-Ds despite their anticipation of the change. Some executives read several practice
oriented publications discussing the change in the social context for the executive
between being a senior executive and becoming THE CEO; however, they felt the change
was more intense. Their designation changed how their peers, stakeholders external to the
organization and the board of directors treated them. The power their opinions and
behaviours acquired alerted most of the CEO-Ds to think before they spoke, to posture a
special attitude, and/or to behave according to certain expectations in a social gathering.
Third, relay succession research assumed the longer the heir apparent period, the
longer the incoming and outgoing CEOs worked together, therefore the more likely they
were to build similar cognitive maps (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002). This research showed
this was not necessarily the case. While some of the CEO-Ds had the opportunity to work
more closely with the CEO-Is, others did not have this opportunity for multiple reasons.
In all of these cases, the CEO-Ds seemed to have developed complex cognitive schemas
different from their previous ones and those of the CEO-Is. This research showed,
irrespective of their enactment styles, all CEO-Ds were able to build preserving and
prospecting abilities. The major difference in their learning was the time line. CEO-Ds
who double interacted with CEO-Is during the transition period learned and acted faster,
while those who acted/interacted with CEO-Is took more time.
Four, previous research on heirs apparent based on quantitative databases
proclaims heirs apparent are the least likely among their counterparts to induce strategic
change once attaining the CEO position (Shen & Cannella, 2002). This research showed
there might be an alternative explanation to the premises used to build the argument for

176
this hypothesis. When boards of directors selected CEOs from within, the new CEOs may
have avoided advertising the changes they made to the media to prevent negative impact
on their organization’s stock price, or they might have postponed the change for a while
after the succession.
6.2. The Impact of the “CEO-D” Identity on Learning
Identity affects the way people interpret their circumstances and changes their
cognitive maps and behaviours (Burke & Stets, 2009; Jarvis, 2010; Mezirow, 2012). I
found the designation of executives as CEO-D triggered the creation of a new identity and
pushed them to understand cues in their environment from a different perspective.
However, since the designation itself was of importance in this research, first, I discuss
below the process of designation as I uncovered it during the fieldwork. Second, I explain
the impact of this designation on the executives’ learning during the transition period.
The prevailing definition of an heir apparent in the CEO succession literature is
based on Vancil (1987)‘s description of an heir apparent. Vancil described the heir
apparent as an officer in the organization designated as the sole successor to the CEO
position a few years before the transition event. I found that in most of the organizations I
studied, the designation of the executive as the CEO-D occurred a few months before the
actual transition event. I also discovered that this designation happened, in most cases,
after a non-publicized competition for the role of CEO. Some of the candidates were
known to the organization internally and some were kept confidential. Some of the
candidates were already COOs when they participated in the competition and others ran
against the COOs – who ultimately lost the competition. In one of the cases I
encountered, the CEO told me that he was covertly told by the CEO-I several years ahead
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of time that he was her choice for the job and that she would groom him to be ready when
the time comes. Two years before the transition, this CEO-D found out the board of
directors would like to have options in choosing the next CEO. He also had to compete
against another candidate for two years before he was selected the CEO-D eight weeks
prior to the actual transition.
While the literature’s definition of the heir apparent might have been relevant in
the past, I found that this definition needs to be revisited to reflect current practices. I
believe the increased board of directors’ activism in the CEO succession process in the
recent years might have led to spanning the boundaries between the two types of inside
succession: horse race versus relay succession. The chair of a board told me the board
members prefer to take some measures to avoid being limited to choose the candidate
nominated by the CEO-I. While the board values the CEO’s input, they prefer to have
more than one candidate and they insist on being involved in the selection process. They
consider the opinion of the CEO-I regarding the candidates, but they also hire an external
organization to carry out the assessment of the potential candidates. Boards prefer not to
involve the CEO-I in the final decision regarding the announcement of the successor.
While the recent board activism regarding CEO succession might have blurred
boundaries between relay succession and horse race, there is also the possibility previous
research was biased by defining the heir apparent as the COO and/or president of the
organization. As good/practical a proxy as that might be, this research provided
reasonable doubt to question the established practice. It is important to note that this
research sample size was small compared to previous quantitative studies. Four of the
interviewed CEOs were COOs of their companies before they participated in the
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competition for the job, and three competed against the COOs of their companies. While
some COOs won the competition and some lost, their previous appointment as COOs did
not automatically make them heirs apparent. Seven of the other CEOs were given the title
of COO or president, or equivalent title given the nature of their organization, after the
designation and hence were COOs for a few months only. Quantitative databases that
were not updated continuously might have picked up some of these designations and
overlooked others. The remaining CEOs never held the title of COO and/or president.
Though this finding was not the driver of this research, it definitely shortened the
executives’ learning timeline from designation to ascension to the job.
The designation of the executive as the CEO-D triggered many immediate
changes in the cognition and behaviour of the executive. I found the executives had
mixed feelings upon discovering they were chosen to be CEO-D. A common reaction
was: “it is over – a relief the competition had ended” and “oh my god, I am the CEO-D –
the realization their life would change from that moment on”. The designation changed
the way they looked at the organization. They were no longer focused on their own
department; they found themselves focusing on the organization as a whole. Most of them
found themselves suddenly having to learn significantly about the organization. CEO-D
Frank expressed this overwhelming period in terms of the amount of knowledge to learn
with vivid description:
In fact, you spend your six months of transition getting to know the rest of the
organization that you don’t know. You spend so much time thinking, watching,
observing, and then there is this groundswell of information that comes bubbling up
from the organization to tell you what’s wrong with it, what’s right about it, much of
it self-serving, some of it genuine. So you are just absorbing terabits of data every
week through the transition period about what’s right, what’s wrong, what’s
happening, what you should think about. You don’t take out Porter’s strategic
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formula and the SWOT analysis, and sit down and somehow orchestrate all this in
your own little head.
In addition to the immediate change in cognition and behaviour, the designation
triggered the need to think about their future identity. It forced them to think about who
they would be as leaders and how they would behave. Would or could they have the same
leadership style as the CEO-I? Would or could they treat their “now subordinates” the
way the CEO-I did? They had to find ways to resolve these questions. Most of the CEOs
went through a self/soul searching journey to know who they were and what would be
their future identity. They also used a sounding board to help them discover their future
CEO identity. The sounding board, in few cases was the CEO-I, in others was a family
member who was or had been a CEO, a board member, or an outside consultant.
6.3. The Impact of the Change in Social Context on Learning
The designation of the executives as the CEO-D changed their social context. For
most of the participants, the actors in their social contexts remained the same, however,
the other actors’ expectations and perceptions of the designated executives changed. The
nature of the relationship with the actors of their social context changed. Their peers
became their subordinates, the board of directors – once their boss’s boss – became their
boss, and the outside stakeholders – once distant acquaintances – became direct partners.
The CEO-Ds believed their words and behaviours gained power upon designation
and were interpreted to reflect the organization’s position rather than the executives’ own
cognitive understanding, emotions, and personality. After their designations, the
executives were mindful as to which emotions they showed, words they used, how they
dressed, and how they treated their people. The transition period gave them the
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opportunity to experience the change in the people’s perceptions and expectations. CEODs also tried to convince the board of directors that they chose the right candidate. CEODs met with the board members to understand their expectations. They acted confidently
in order to gain the trust of their executive team. Some CEO-Ds kept their professional
distance from their subordinates in order to be able to make tough decisions later. More
than one executive mentioned that they were not at the organization to be loved or even
liked; they were there to be respected. Most CEO-Ds remained mindful of their
interaction with the outside partners because their promises were commitments for the
organization.
I found the designated executives appreciated the involvement of the CEO-Is in
introducing the CEO-Ds to their new social context. CEO-Ds who were introduced to
their environment by the CEO-Is appreciated the insight provided to them and saved them
from many mistakes. These CEOs knew if they faced any problems they had the CEO-I to
ask for help as noted by CEO-D Robert:
When you think about your responsibilities and relationship with the investors, the
board, managing rumors with your employees, improving client and broker
experience, it was a pretty big challenge, in a part of, in a traumatic period, really,
for financial institutions globally. But, I had the opportunity-- I jumped in the role
with a lot of confidence because James (CEO-I) was the CEO and would become
chairman of the board once I become CEO, so I knew if I needed help or advice I
could rely on him.
The lack of involvement of the CEO-Is had a negative impact on the designated
CEOs. Though the executives I interviewed did not explicitly mention the impact of the
lack of involvement on their learning during this period, they did express how it hurt
them, it delayed their ability to assume their new identity and act accordingly. “Not in one
of those meetings (meetings with the investors) did he introduce me as the CEO coming
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in” Bill, CEO-D, said. Allen, CEO-D, said: “I don’t think I ever saw him say, “Here is
Allen; my successor.” He never said that other than in front of the cameras and it was
carefully scripted and quick”. Both these executives agreed that while the investors or the
public knew they were the CEO-Ds and treated them accordingly, they would have
appreciated the outgoing CEO introducing them as such. The introduction by the CEO-I
of the CEO-D as the next leader of the organization would have helped the CEO-Ds start
building the necessary status for their new identity.
6.4. Types of Enactment and Learning Outcomes
Bigley and Wiersema (2002) referenced managerial cognitive orientation
literature to argue the longer executives had been designated as heirs apparent, the more
likely they acquired the same cognitive orientation as the CEO-Is. In this way they used
heir apparent tenure (independent variable) as the proxy for the similarity between the
incoming and outgoing CEOs cognitive schemas. Bigley and Wiersema (2002) failed to
account for the quality of interaction between the heir apparent and the CEO; they simply
assumed the longer the interaction between the two executives the more similar their
cognitive maps. Bigley and Wiersema (2002) also argued although heirs apparent had the
opportunity to “learn the ropes” of the job from outgoing CEOs, the nature and the length
of their work with incumbent CEOs may limit their abilities to develop their own
mindsets.
In the previous section, I discussed in detail how the length of heir apparent tenure
changed and in most succession events was shorter than one year. The mean heir apparent
tenure was 2.5 years in Bigley and Wiersema (2002)’s study and 4.5 years in Cannella
and Shen (2001)’s study. Using their logic, and given shorter heir apparent tenures, one
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can argue that the incoming and outgoing CEOs cognitive schemas are increasingly
becoming less similar. Moreover, there is doubt around what more or less similar
cognitive maps infer. If more similar cognitive maps mean the heir apparent and the CEO
were on the same wave length and agreed on many decisions, this would also be in
contradiction with my findings. This fieldwork showed the stronger the relationship
between the CEO-D and the CEO-I, that is they worked together closely and well, the
shorter and the smoother the transition period. Therefore, my findings dismissed the
impact of the length of the heir apparent tenure on the “similarities” in the cognitive maps
of the two CEOs and emphasised the importance of the quality of the interaction during
the transition period.
I developed three categories to classify the quality of interaction between the
CEO-D and the CEO-I in fieldwork. At one extreme, I found the minimal amount of
interaction which was represented in the findings as the “act” enactment mode. At the
other extreme, I found the maximal amount of interaction which was described under
“double interact” enactment mode. In between the minimal and maximal, there was the
medium amount of interaction and this one was described under “interact” enactment
mode.
Act defined situations where the interaction between the CEO-D and the CEO-I
was minimal or even adversarial. While hard to imagine this kind of relationship at such a
senior level of the organization, five of the 22 transition cases fell under this category. In
all of these cases, the CEO-Is were unwilling to leave, they did not want to give up the
power, and purposely did not involve the CEO-Ds in any of the strategic meetings inside
or outside the organization. This finding is partially in line with Cannella and Shen
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(2001)’s finding that powerful CEOs of successful organization dislike supporting the
ascension of the successor. Cannella and Shen (2001) argue CEOs entrenchment and
refusal to relinquish power may force the heirs apparent out or at least frustrate them but
they only include power in their operationalization of this construct. My findings showed
that some powerful CEOs managed their emotions well with respect to giving up the
power and were able to pass the baton as planned. However, powerful CEO-Is who
refused to relinquish power created problems for their successors. The CEO-Ds in these
cases had to act by themselves and took time to learn about the organization, assemble
their teams, and attempted to diminish the power of the CEO-Is as much as possible
during the transition period. Two of these executives unravelled some of the strategic
commitments the ex-CEO undertook before transition. All three had to fire some
executives who felt comfortable under previous leadership governance and could not
operate within the new leadership regime.
Double interact defines situations where the interaction between the CEO-D and
the CEO-I was positive. Nine of the 22 cases fell under this category. In these cases, the
CEO-Is were able to accept the passage of title to the CEO-Ds. In a few of these cases,
the CEO-Is planned their retirement and informed the board a year or more before to give
the board time to start the process. Under double interact, the CEO-Is played a major role
in facilitating the transition to the CEO-Ds. They took time to meet with the CEO-Ds and
discuss the handing over process. CEO-Is involved CEO-Ds in all the strategy
formulation meetings, introduced them to their social context and let them take control.
For example, the CEO-Is would briefly speak in town hall meetings, introduce the CEODs and then let the CEO-Ds handle the rest of the meeting. However, the CEO-Is would

184
not let this happen without preparation, so both CEOs would plan how to handle meetings
whether town halls, with suppliers, government officials, the media, and so on so forth.
CEO-Ds who benefited from this type of interaction during the transition period felt
prepared to assume the job when the time came to take the reins of the organization.
Interact defined situations where the interaction between the CEO-Is and the
CEO-Ds was not adversarial but also lacked lengthy discussion sessions regarding the
strategy or other responsibilities. Eight of the 22 cases fell under this category. Normally
the CEO-Ds felt comfortable having a debate with the CEO-Is and challenging the CEOIs practices and strategies. In these cases, the CEO-Ds asked for advice from the CEO-Is
on issues regarding the constitution of their executive teams, changing the communication
channels with the employees, refocusing the strategy of the organization on different
elements than the current ones. The CEO-Ds considered the CEO-Is advice in their
decision making process but judged its value using their own mental models rather than
seeking clarification. Once the CEO-Ds became CEOs, they implemented the changes
they had planned rather than planting the seed for change during the transition much like
the double interact.
6.5. CEO-Ds and the Implementation of Strategic Change
Previous research predominately concluded that heirs apparent are less likely than
successors appointed from outside or following a public horse race to induce strategic
change post succession. Many arguments supported this conclusion but they primarily
relied upon the influence of the CEO-Is on the cognitive maps of the heirs apparent.
Bigley and Wiersema (2002) argued heirs apparent built similar cognitive maps to the
CEO-Is and hence were unable to induce change. Devries (1988) and Zajac and Westphal
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(1996) argued CEO-Is chose successors who were similar to themselves and hence would
carry out their vision. Charan (2005) and Fondas and Wiersema (1997) believed the
intense socialization by the CEO-Is compromised the ability of heirs apparent to induce
change.
This research provided ground to challenge all three arguments. First, the heir
apparent tenure might not be a good measure of the similarities in the cognitive maps
between CEOs and CEO-Ds. The quality of interaction between these two might be a
more reliable indicator of whether the CEO-Ds were able to create shared, rather than
similar, mental models or not with the CEO-Is. Second, with the recent increase in board
of directors’ activism in the CEO succession process, the CEO-Is ability to choose their
own successors has diminished. CEO-Is are still able to nominate and provide their
opinions about the potential candidates for the CEO position, but in most cases the
decision was made by the board in “in-camera sessions” without the presence of the
CEO-I. Third, similar to the argument related to the creation of shared mental models, the
argument for intense socialization needs revision in light of the quality of interaction
between the incumbent and CEO-Ds. Where act is the dominant form of behaviour in the
relationship between the CEOs, the CEO-Is avoid willingly socializing the CEO-Ds.
In addition to the doubts raised above, this research also showed some of the
CEO-Ds, namely those who had the opportunity to double interact with the CEO-Is, were
actively involved in setting the future strategic direction of the organization during the
transition period. Therefore, it is worth revisiting how researchers operationalized the
strategic change post succession based on large data sets. Were they actually measuring
the change in strategy between the predecessor and the successor? Were they measuring
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the continuity of the strategy as put on course by the successor during the transition
period, especially in cases of double interact? Some CEO-Ds had less interaction with
CEO-Is and implemented major change upon appointment as CEO. These CEO-Ds were
very careful in framing these changes as a continuation of the existing “successful”
strategic vision of the organization in order not to upset the market and negatively affect
the company’s stock price. This leads to the question: would quantitative measures be
able to account for this smoothly communicated strategic change?
This research was conducted to address the research question around: “How the
designation of executives as heirs apparent affects their learning and prepares them to
become CEOs”. The findings of the research provided indications of the impact of
identity and social context changes, triggered by the designation, on their learning. These
changes combined with different enactment forms – act, interact, or double interact,
explained the process and the outcome of learning for the designated executives during
the transition period. I used a qualitative methodology to explore the research responding
to a call from Giambatista et al. (2005) to use qualitative research in order to validate the
conjectures of the CEO succession research heavily relying on quantitative studies. This
research showed this call was absolutely necessary as the results of this qualitative
research provided reasonable ground to rethink some of the main assumptions made in
previous CEO succession research.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
7.1. Summary of Contributions
This work is situated within the CEO succession literature. It explored the
learning CEO-Ds acquired during their transition period by combining the concepts of
sensemaking and learning. This work described the process through which CEO-Ds made
sense of their world upon designation and learned during the transition period to
change/adjust their mental models, behaviours, and identities before assuming the role of
CEO. I believe this research contributes to the existing CEO succession, sensemaking,
and learning literatures in significant ways.
7.1.1. Contributions to the CEO Succession Literature
This research contributes to the CEO succession literature in two ways. First, the
main contribution of this work is describing how the designation of executives actually
affected their learning during the transition period. Most research on “heirs apparent”
included some assumptions regarding the learning the CEO-D received from the CEO-Is
during the transition period. The main assumption revolved around CEO-Ds capturing the
cognitive schemas of CEO-Is. In developing the processes of the impact of designation on
executives’ identity, social context and enactment types on their learning during the
transition period, this research provided reasons to recheck many of the assumptions used
in previous research. Previous research concluded the influence of CEO-Is on heirs
apparent affected their learning outcome from the transition period without actually
exploring this process. This research showed that instead of one general category of CEODs, the processes varied and consisted of three different categories. The categories are
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those who: (1) act, (2) interact, and (3) double interact. These interaction types affected
the learning outcomes of executives during the transition period. This research thus
provided an alternative explanation to the prevailing argument “heirs apparent” are less
likely to induce change than other types of CEO successors.
Second, this work introduced a relatively new methodology to the CEO
succession research – namely, the phenomenological approach – to gain insight into the
CEO succession transition period. The use of this method addressed a call by Giambatista
et al. (2005) urging succession researchers to use qualitative research to clarify many of
the conjectures in the prevailing literature. This method provided indications inviting the
revisiting of the prevailing definitions and conceptualizations of heirs apparent, relay
succession, and horse race succession in the literature. While existing definitions might
reflect past practices, this research showed they are inaccurate descriptions of current
ones. The research also provided reasonable ground to revisit the common practice of
using the titles of COOs and presidents as proxies for the designation of executives as
“heirs apparent”.
7.1.2. Sensemaking Literature
Sensemaking explains the humans’ thinking patterns as a social process
influenced by one’s identities. It does not explain how people change their identities.
This research combined sensemaking and learning to provide an explanation as to how
CEO-Ds adopt the CEO identity in a social context. Moreover, sensemaking had so far
been extensively studied in contexts of crises – fire, plane crashes, and explosions – or
extreme change – hiring a new leader for an organization. This study contributed to our
understanding of the sensemaking process in relatively more stable environments.
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The sensemaking generic recipe: “how can I know what I think until I see what I
say” (Weick, 2012, p. 135) suggests action precedes cognition (Smerek, 2011). This
research showed this assumption is sometimes inaccurate at the level of CEO-Ds. CEODs took time during the transition period and went through a deep thinking and learning
process to reflect on changes to their identity standards as the future CEO. They also tried
to remain mindful of the impact of their status on the members of their social context and
hence made an effort to think before they acted.
7.1.3. Learning Literature
This research contributed to the human learning perspective. Instead of
concentrating only on the two most debated learning outcomes in the literature: change in
behaviour and cognition, this work showed at the CEO-Ds level change also involves a
change in being or identity. Findings of this research revealed the importance of learning
from action as well as learning to perform an action. It provided insights on the learning
process itself -- how different enactment types, in a social context, impact the expected
learning outcome. So rather than merely discuss the learning outcomes for CEO-Ds
during the transition period, this study explored the learning outcomes based on their
enactment styles with the CEO-Is during the transition. Hence this work contributed to
our understanding of the learning process, rather than the input-output relationships
between variables.
7.2. Practical Implications
This work presents significant practical implications given the importance of CEO
succession phenomenon in the life of organizations as an unavoidable event every
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organization experiences (Grusky, 1960). There is a recent increase in stakeholders’
interest in understanding the CEO succession event. Shareholders more frequently ask
organizations to publicly disclose their succession plans because they believe this affects
corporate financial results. Banks are demanding organizations be more transparent about
their succession plans. Boards of directors are becoming more involved in the succession
process in order to ensure a smooth transition of CEO position.
The major findings of this work are in describing the impact of designation on the
executives’ identity and social change and resulting learning outcomes. It also shows the
impact of different interaction types on the executives’ learning during the transition
period. The act type of interaction between the CEO-Ds and the CEO-Is led to the lowest
learning outcomes during the transition period. The double interact between CEO-Ds and
CEO-Is on the other hand led to the best learning outcomes from the transition period and
prepared the CEO-Ds to be ready to assume their job on the event day. This does not
mean that CEO-Ds who act or interact with CEO-Is will fail, especially given the
characteristics of this sample including only CEO-Ds who were successful in assuming
the CEO role. Rather, it means CEO-Ds who double interact with CEO-Is may be able to
assume the CEO responsibilities immediately and have less firefighting to do than CEODs who act/interact post CEO succession event. CEO-D Douglas described this
relationship as follows:
One of the things if you are going to be CEO, you got to have a degree of selfconfidence. So you ask a question like that (how long do you need to be ready to take
over?), I would tell you look, I would be fine on my own. I could have walked in here,
he could have left six months beforehand and I would have figured it out. And, you
have to have, if you are going to take these jobs, you have got to have that sense of
self confidence. Like I could walk into any company anywhere at any time, within a
very brief period of time, figure it out. Understand the economic dynamics,
understand the environment it’s in, get the respect of the people and be able to drive
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forward. So I don’t think there is any minimum required amount of time that you
couldn’t go in, get rid of the existing CEO, plug in the new CEO and drive forward.
However, if you are going to make it a true success, without firefighting like that, I
think probably in the 9 months period of time. So the incoming CEO has the chance
to come in, work with the outgoing CEO, see almost the full cycle of the year. After 9
months you have been through enough of it, you can see through until the year end
and that is probably enough time for anybody to get the lay of the land. Enough to
understand what needs to change and what does not and pursue the changes for the
next couple years that you think you should.
It takes commitment from the two parties in a relationship, CEO-D and CEO-I, to
engage in double interact. This research presents practical implications to assist the board
of directors as the guardians of the process and the incoming and outgoing CEOs in
improving the conditions leading to optimize the CEO-Ds’ learning outcomes during the
transition period.
7.2.1. Board of Directors
Boards of directors are becoming increasingly involved in the CEO succession
process. In 21 of the 22 CEO succession events I studied, the board of directors was the
main guardian of the process. They were involved in nominating and evaluating the
candidates. They sought help from CEO-Is and executive search firms. However, the
CEOs noticed the board’s involvement decreased, and in certain cases even disappeared,
after the announcement of the successor. One of the board members agreed: “I believe
our role ends at the announcement of the successor. I do not think we should be involved
in how the incumbent and incoming CEOs manage the transition. They are professionally
mature and should be able to do that. However, I guess if there are problems, they can
always come to the board.”
According to the findings there are three factors impacting the learning outcomes
of CEO-Ds during the transition period: (1) identity, (2) social context, and (3) type of
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enactment. While the appointment of the CEO-Ds sets their learning journey in motion by
evolving a new identity for them it does not guarantee the quality of the learning. The
board’s involvement to establish the expectations from and monitor behaviours of both
CEO-Ds and CEO-Is may improve the interaction between them, an important factor in
achieving a smooth transition.
The designation itself is important in activating the identity of the executive and
kick starting the transition process; however, if the timeline for the passing of the baton is
unclear, the learning may be affected. The two CEO-Ds who were privately told they
were the heirs apparent a long time before the transition event lost confidence in the
promise with the passage of time. CEO-Ds appreciated having a clear timeline for the
transition. The board may need to be cognizant of the impact of lacking a clear timeline
on the motivation of CEO-Ds. Both CEOs reported considering leaving should the board
not act and specify a date for the transition.
The quality of interaction between the CEO-Is and CEO-Ds was key in
determining the learning outcomes during the transition period. Many CEO-Ds found
informal discussions with CEO-Is as helpful if not more helpful than the formal ones. The
board of directors might consider taking actions to increase and facilitate the informal
interactions between the CEOs. Some CEO-Ds found being physically close to the CEOIs during the transition period, for example, helpful in asking for ad-hoc advice.
The quality of interaction between the CEO-Is and CEO-Ds impacted the timing
of undertaking strategic change affecting the performance of the organization. Double
interact led to faster changes than act or interact. While the board of directors may be
unable to enforce one enactment type over the other, they may be able to start
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implementing cultural values supporting double interact relationships as opposed to act or
interact.
The board of directors may need to be involved in monitoring the behaviours of
the CEO-Ds and CEO-Is during the transition period, especially in cases where the CEOIs are unwilling to let go of the position. Previous research showed that in cases of well
performing firms, CEO-Is might jeopardize the ascension of the successor to the top job
(Cannella & Shen, 2001). This situation was obvious in the cases of CEO-D Bill and
CEO-D Allen. Both of these executives had a difficult time during the transition period.
However, CEO-D Bill had a board that supported and helped him minimize the influence
of the CEO-I during and immediately after the transition. On the other hand CEO-D Allen
was disappointed by how the board reacted to the behaviour of the CEO-I instead of
supporting the CEO-D. The board felt indebted to the CEO-I and signed off on his
strategy to commit organizational resources well into CEO-D Allen’s tenure without
taking Allen’s opinion into consideration. As a result, Allen lost trust in the board’s
ability to add value to the organization and replaced, after assuming the CEO position,
many of the board members with others who were more likely to challenge the CEO-I.
Given the importance of the impact of the changes in the social context on the
CEO-D’s learning during the transition, the board may also consider increasing its
involvement in monitoring the CEO-Is’ actions to introduce the CEO-Ds to their new
social context. Many CEO-Ds mentioned the impact of the involvement of the CEO-Is in
their introduction to their social environment on their learning process. Some CEO-Ds
found it helpful to meet with other stakeholders jointly with the CEO-Is and learned from
the way the CEO-Is handled the conversations. Other CEO-Ds preferred to face their
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social context alone and establish their own footprint as leaders. In all cases, the
involvement of the board in creating the expectations with respect to these issues may
help the CEO-Ds prepare for their new position.
Many of the participants mentioned the support provided by the board of directors
to the candidates during the competition such as assigning coaches and mentors. Most of
the CEO-Ds found mentors who had experience as CEOs or worked intensively with
CEOs were very helpful whereas those who did not have such experience were less
helpful. Some candidates had board members as mentors and found them to be helpful
throughout the process. It might be worthwhile to discuss the identity of the mentor with
the candidates before assigning someone. This suggestion stems from interviews with
candidates who were designated. It might also be helpful to ask the candidates who were
not designated about their experience with the mentors. Moreover, this psychological
assistance ceased in most cases upon designation. Some CEO-Ds felt that these mentors
or sounding boards might have remained helpful during the transition, especially in cases
where the relationship with the CEO-I was not at its best.
Some of the CEO-Is handled the passing of the “power” to the successor better
than others. While this research was not directed at understanding this phenomenon,
many outgoing CEOs as well as CEO-Ds mentioned it. Five of the interviewees
appreciated the attitude of the CEO-Is at handing over their “power” and explicitly
suggested to me to study this phenomenon. While other CEO-Ds suffered as a result of
the CEO-Is’ attitude. CEO-Is reluctant to relinquish power delayed the learning of CEODs during the transition period. These CEO-Is even impeded the CEO-Ds’ abilities to
make changes or take actions to prepare for the job, such as selecting their executive
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teams and setting budgets. It is natural for humans to fear losing their power (Allee, 1997;
Devries, 1988; Goh, 2002). Some CEOs were cognizant of this fact, for example, CEO-I
Howard said to help him manage these feelings of losing power he sought help from a
professional consultant. The board of directors might want to consider providing
assistance and recruiting professional consultants to CEO-Is to help them through the
handing over of power, just as they recruit consultants for candidates to help them
through the competition period. The board of directors may thereby help improve the
transition process and enhance the learning of CEO-Ds during this period.
7.2.2. CEOs: Designate and Incumbent
This research provided insights into the outcomes of learning during the transition
period given the type of interaction between designate and CEO-Is. CEO-Ds who double
interacted with CEO-Is were the ones who learned the most during the transition period.
They found the CEO-Is to be critical resources in helping them establish their identity as
the future leaders. These CEO-Ds found that being open and willing to test your theories
with the CEO-Is was particularly helpful given these CEO-Is had been through this
experience and had valuable insights to share. Some of the CEO-Ds were very
understanding of the feelings the CEO-Is might experience as they were losing power. It
is important for the CEO-Ds to be mindful of these feelings and to address and
understand the behaviours of CEO-Is from this perspective.
Many CEO-Ds felt lonely in this transitional position. They could not discuss
delicate matters inside the organization fearing that it might be interpreted negatively.
However, most of the CEO-Ds found it helpful to have a mentor or a consultant or even a
family member who had experience as a CEO who could serve as a sounding board and
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critical analyst of their thinking process rather than as an enforcer of a decision or a
course of action.
Though this research was not directed toward outgoing CEOs it provided insights
into their thought processes. Some outgoing CEOs were better at dealing with exiting the
organization than others. Though all CEO-Is might have experienced a sense of loss upon
passing the baton, those who had plans for post CEO life were better at dealing with their
sense of loss. CEO-Ds believed that CEO-Is who became board members or had future
plans accepted the transfer of their “power” to them more willingly than the CEO-Is who
lacked plans. One of the CEOs had recruited help from a consultant to help him manage
the process.
7.3. Limitations and Future Research
This study is limited due to the selection of the sample and choice of methods.
First, my sample included CEO-Ds who were successful in reaching the CEO position.
This design allowed me to understand how the designation of executives as the CEO-D
affected their learning journey from designation to assuming the position. The fieldwork
helped me observe CEO-Ds belonging to three categories of enactment type and it
allowed me to understand the impact of different enactment types on the learning
outcomes the CEO-Ds acquire during the transition period. However, this design did not
allow me to explore the learning process of CEO-Ds who exited before getting the CEO
position. Cannella and Shen (2001)’s sample based on archival databases showed that
30% of heirs apparent exit before assuming the role of CEO. Though this number is
calculated based on the outdated definition of an heir apparent, this phenomenon may still
be substantial and deserves consideration. Future research should investigate the learning
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process of CEO-Ds who did not get the job in an attempt to compare learning processes
of these the two groups (i.e. successful versus unsuccessful CEO-Ds). This remains an
interesting area to study in future research and may provide insights into the CEO
succession process.
Second, my sample presents two limitations. The first limitation is, the
participants, with the exception of one, were CEO-Ds who succeeded successful CEO-Is.
This factor presented an additional layer of complexity to the transition period for the
CEO-Ds. They felt the pressure to perform and knew many stakeholders were watching
them. My sample was appropriate for the purpose of this study seeking to understand the
learning between CEO-Ds and CEO-Is. This is because in other cases CEO-Is may have
left the organization or double interact would have been avoided purposefully. Future
research should investigate the learning process and especially the ability of CEO-Ds to
induce change for those who succeeded CEOs who were less successful than the ones in
my sample. This will provide a basis to compare different learning processes and have a
clearer idea about their ability to induce strategic change. Also this sample does not allow
me to comment on the impact of enactment type on learning and on the performance of
the organization. The second limitation is, the initial sample was constructed with the
objective to understand the learning process of CEO-Ds rather than the impact of
enactment types on firm performance. I kept on interviewing until I was able to reach
participants who experienced different enactment types with the CEO-Is. Nevertheless,
the relationship between enactment and firm performance remains an interesting topic
and future research may want to explore it.
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Third, the use of the phenomenological approach allowed me to start with
suggested premises, grounded in learning and sensemaking perspectives as presented by
prior research unexplored. This particular framing might involve researcher bias in data
analysis and results reporting. To mitigate this limitation, I followed two suggestions.
Firstly, I adopted the bracketing process suggested by Moustakas (1994) and identified
my own beliefs and presuppositions that might impact the research and informed the
readers about their essence. Secondly, I followed Creswell’s (2013) recommendation and
adopted a structured approach to phenomenology and the most widely used method in
data analysis for this approach. The different iterations that the data analysis went through
led me to challenge many of my assumptions and the assumptions that exist in current
literature.
Fourth, the phenomenological approach relies on interviews as the main source of
data. This might lead to biases related to self-report as bases for evidence during data
analysis (Polkinghorne, 2005). Participants might not have had access to accurate
recounts of their experiences due to their sensemaking at the time of the interview, but the
main interest in our study was the phenomenon as it was retained in the consciousness of
the participants or the meaning they attributed to their behaviour (Giorgi, 2009; Giorgi,
2006; Husserl, 1970; Moustakas, 1994; Polkinghorne, 1989). This research asked
participants to recall specific events that happened during the transition rather than
common, everyday ones. Previous research showed individuals could retrospectively
recall accounts of specific events more accurately than recalling everyday events. One
tends to muddle everyday events in one’s memories, resulting in more problematic recall.
The availability heuristic explains the relative ease with which people recall unusual

199
events (Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka, & Simons, 1991; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974).
Fifth, interview data may also suffer from social desirability bias. Participants
may have been tempted to convey competent and attractive image given their status
inside the organization and in their province. To avoid such a bias, I carefully constructed
the interview questions and pilot tested them with individuals who had to take-over a new
position from other people but not at the CEO level. I also attempted to triangulate with
other data sources such as published articles in the newspapers given the public nature of
the interviewees and their organizations. Most of these articles were crafted with the
intention to preserve the image of the organization. However, my promise to the
interviewees regarding the confidentiality of their identity as well as that of their
organization, motivated the participants to be open and recall their experience as it
happened as much as possible. Moreover, I analyzed recurring themes in the experiences
of more than one participant (Polkinghorne, 2005). I also cross-checked the stories with
members of the board of directors, other executives in the organization, and consultants
who were involved in the succession process whenever possible.
Fourth, the choice of Canada and namely Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta as my
geographical locations might limit the generalizability of the findings to North American
culture. Though the aim of phenomenology is to generalize back to theory, in this case
learning and sensemaking, future research might replicate this study in other cultures to
provide a base for comparison.
Despite these limitations, I believe this study contributed significantly to the
existing body of knowledge and to practice. First, it provided a window into the transition
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period, considered a black box in the CEO succession literature. Second, it contributed
valuable information for boards of directors and CEO-Is to enhance their practices and
planning for CEO succession, an important event in the life of organizations.
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APPENDIX A: LEARNING NEEDS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HEIRS
APPARENT

Learning Needs
Origin of Heir
Apparent
From within
organization
Different
organization,
industry

the

same

CEO role

Organization:
Products and
People

Industry
Characteristics

Yes

Familiar

Familiar

Yes

Yes

Familiar

Different
Yes
Yes
organization,
different industry
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APPENDIX C: SUGGESTED INTERVIEW GUIDE
Topic

Suggested Questions

• Can you tell me how you functioned in the company until the
date you were designated as heir apparent?
• Which events were the most important to you throughout
your work at the organization?
• How did these events affect the way you do business?
Questions about the
So you were the (title: COO, president, or other) before
period before the
becoming the CEO.
explicit heir
• What were your responsibilities?
apparency designation • Who were the most central parties you interacted with (both
internally and externally: reporting to you, you reporting to,
and others)? On which subject matters?
• Can you tell us something about the nature of your
interaction with these parties? How did you handle
differences in opinion with these parties?
Questions about the
• How did you see yourself in the organization when you first
heir apparency
started? What did you see your role as?
designation to detect
• When did your view of yourself and your role change? How
changes in identity
did it change?
• When did you know you were the future CEO of the
company?
• What did this realization mean to you?
• Did your implicit designation as an heir apparent change
your view of yourself and your role?
• When was this information announced to different
stakeholders of the organization?
• What did this announcement mean to you?
• Did your public designation as an heir apparent change your
view of yourself and your role?
• Did your view of yourself and your role change between the
time you were designated as heir apparent and the time you
actually became the CEO? How?
• Did your priorities change? How?
Questions about the
• Did this designation lead to any changes in who the parties
heir apparency
were that you interacted with (who were the parties you kept
designation to detect
interacting with, those you stopped interacting with, and
changes in social
those you started interacting with? Both internally and
context
externally)?
• Which of these interactions meant the most to you? How?
• Which new interactions meant the most to you? How?
Opening questions:
History inside the
company
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Topic

Suggested Questions

• Can you describe the interactions with the CEO? BODs?
Other important parties (such as meetings, private
conversations, planning actions, etc.)?
• Did these interactions influence the way you do business?
The way you think? How did it influence the way you started
doing business and the way you do business now?
• Can you recall a special event that had a lasting impact on
the way you think and the way you do business? Follow-up
prompting questions: What was the subject? When did this
happen? Where did it happen? Who was involved? What
were the consequences on you (the way you think or act)?
• Can you recall another event?
Closing questions
• Now that you are the CEO, how would you plan your
succession? What would you repeat from your personal
experience? What would you do differently? How would you
go about this?
• What would you want your successor to know before taking
the reins of the organization?
Appendix C: Suggested Interview Guide
Questions about the
heir apparency
designation to detect
changes in enactment
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APPENDIX D: LETTER REQUESTING PARTICIPATION∗
Dear <insert title and name>,
Are outside or inside CEOs better for organizations? This question has been the centre of
interest for many succession researchers and practitioners. There is no definite answer
yet. However, the fact remains that more than 80% of publicly held organizations appoint
inside CEOs. The success of a future CEO is usually linked to the organization’s success
in managing the transition period. The question of interest that remains unanswered is
how heirs apparent manage the transition to the CEO position.
I am a PhD student at the Ivey Business School at Western University conducting my
doctoral dissertation, under the supervision of Professor Rod White, Associate Dean of
Faculty Development & Research. My doctoral thesis addresses the topic of how heirs
apparent manage the transition to the CEO position. Its results will help organizations
improve transitions to the CEO position. This research will assist future heirs apparent
and incumbent CEOs in enhancing their transition practices and will give you a chance to
have an impact on shaping the success of these transitions in major public organizations.
In order to understand the transition period and its impact on the success of future CEOs,
I am conducting in-depth interviews with current CEOs of large organizations, like you,
who were appointed from inside. I will cover companies from a range of different
industries and locations in Canada. The interview will be based on questions revolving
around how you made sense of your experience when you were designated as heir
apparent. What did you expect? What was unexpected? What events affected the way you
lead your organization? Who influenced you the most during the transition period? The
interview will take around one hour and will be tape recorded. Your identity will be kept
confidential, known only to me and my supervisor. No identifying information about your
organization will be disclosed to other parties or in any publications. Only pseudonyms
will be used for participants and their organizations. The only document matching actual
names and pseudonyms will be password secured and kept on my personal laptop. You
will also be given a summary of our interview for your approval before I use its content
for data analysis.
This research is aimed at understanding a critical period in the life of organizations. Your
contribution will help business students, heirs apparent, CEOs and board members benefit
from having a closer look at the challenges encountered during the transition period and
will improve transition practices. I would be very grateful if you would provide me with
an interview and, as a sign of appreciation for your time, I commit to present you with a
customized executive summary highlighting the findings of my research. I will also offer
a comparison between your experience and the collective experience of other participant
CEOs without revealing the identity of any of the other CEOs.
I do hope you will accept my invitation to participate in this important research and I will
follow up with you shortly. In the meantime, thank you very much for considering my

∗

This letter is a standard one. I will customize the letter depending on the participant addresses and the
availability of personal anecdotes related to the research topic that may enhance my chances of getting the
interview.
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request and if you need additional information about the research, please feel free to
e-mail me at
or call me at
.
Yours truly,
Rida Elias
Appendix D: Letter Requesting Participation
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APPENDIX E: CHECK LIST FOR BIASES

Participant Pseudonym: ________________ Date of the interview: ____________

Remarks: how will my bias affect how I interpret the
respondents’ statements

My Biases
1.

When I read the stories about this
participant I felt:

2.

Heir apparency is
succession process

3.

Heirs apparent
transition

learn

during

4.

Learning
leads
development

to

human

5.

Heirs apparent are aware of the
negative consequences of learning

6.

Upon designation as heir apparent,
the executive’s identity changes

7.

Upon designation as heir apparent,
the executive’s social context
changes

8.

Upon designation as heir apparent,
the executive changes the way
they enact their environment

9.

Upon designation as heir apparent,
the executive’s interpretation of
events changes (plausibility)

a

good

10. Upon designation as heir apparent,
the executive notices different
cues
11. Heirs apparent feel more powerful
upon designation
Comments:

Appendix E: Check list for biases
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APPENDIX G: EXECUTIVES’ THOUGHT PROCESSES
CEO-D

Description of the executive’s thought processes

Frank

I was like can I make a difference? It’s a world class organization. Can I lead that
organization

Philip

Well it’s like, so now all these emotions are going through your head. It’s, holy crap! I
could be the CEO of The Company and you are saying temper that down. He (CEO-I
Ralph) was very clear about: ‘look Philip, you are really young; you have only been with
us a short period of time. But we like what we see so we are going to put you through this
assessment and there are two other horses in the race.’

Margaret

I said should I or should I not? And I said because, is this what I want? Do I want to lead
the company and so I did not hesitate but I was stunned. I really was stunned. I said what?
What do you mean, leaving in three years? You (CEO-I) just arrived and…
I didn’t have, to say am I going to have a balanced life. It never was this. It was am I
frankly, I knew that if I was to go there, I had to commit myself for a few years and it was
not a matter of saying can I be happy at The Company for a few years. I knew I would and
it’s been seven years now and it’s just I knew I would like this company but it is not, like I
said to Russell, I came in for three years and I know you don’t take a CEO role for three
years. You have to say okay, I am going to be doing this for a while and I needed to feel
comfortable personally with that and personally with John too, because John could have
been in Toronto, could have been anywhere else so you know is this a good thing. He said
look, go for it, you like it; you are happy; I am happy; we like Montreal. Let’s do it. So to
me, it was more, if it’s my path, I will make sure I’ll learn as much as possible to be ready
and we will see. But to me it was more to say if I get there, I will have to stick around for a
few years. That was the only thing.

Stanley

Part of the selection process was my own inner thinking of do I want this role. I put my
hand up. That was an obvious thing to do and really what it came down to in my thinking
what do I believe, who do I believe will be the right person to lead the culture of the
company and the principles of the company going forward and so in my own thought
process was around not just applying to the board and meeting their expectations but
making sure that I wanted to do that Clearly I can tell you that I reached the commitment
personally in my head that I believed that I was the right candidate because of my history
in growing the company, because of the values that we had imbued in the company and
that needed to carry on as we grew the company. So that would come across in my
presentation if you will. But I can tell you that there was uncertainty between the middle of
December and the second of January as to whether I was going to get the role or not and
that uncertainty was an interesting dynamic in your mind which is what do you if you have
convinced yourself you are getting the role. If you want to role, maybe don’t get it.

Wayne

Well again, you know I had been a CEO so it wasn’t something on my list to say, you
know, my life is incomplete. Again, it was more to the point of when he asked me was to
be able to contribute more to the company and also over that period of time, I accumulated
more and more shares in the company so clearly it’s in my own interest to ensure that we
had good leadership at the top. So that kind of built up, but there was never a commitment
made to me anywhere along the line that I would be the CEO and we don’t do that here.
We are not a company that says there are five leaders and say you are in the race to
become the CEO because you run the risk of losing the other four when you are appointed
plus you could have a situation where the person or persons you identify don’t perform.
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APPENDIX H: DESCRIPTION OF THE PREDECESSOR BY THE CEO
CEO-D

Description of predecessor

Allen

Curtis (CEO) was put in here as a young man and the company needed a turnaround. He did
a good job. He has been in the job for a long time and significantly increased the size of the
company.

Bill

He (CEO-I) made a very clear statement when he became CEO. We are going to be a billion
dollar company. We are going to be 10000 people. We are going to be a top 10 firm globally.
And it was a vision, a dream that at the time seemed totally impossible. Come on, a 1500
person firm in Canada, and a little bit of people in the US, that was just not possible but it
was his drive, his vision, his leadership that just took us, year after year in those 10 years and
after the 10 years, in 2008, we had achieved it. We are a billion dollar company. It was an
amazing journey.

Cheryl

She (CEO-I) grew our organization from 58 million to like a 110 million. It was massive
growth for any Company. We went from being like the 20th largest in North America to
being the biggest in North America

Christopher

The most challenging thing that I had to go through was trying to think of exactly what I was
going to do January 1st because you have to remember, this company had done very well
under him (CEO-I) and when you take on a new role, you want to make some impact in that
first 90 days, 120 days, even six months

Douglas

He (CEO-I) was a highly respected individual who had grown the organization very well,
turned it into a highly profitable organization. Terrence (CEO-I) was very much a great guy
and just a wonderful man. And people just willingly would follow him anywhere, I would,
you know great going personality

Margaret

Russell left a company that is well and ordered with the union relationship that was pure. I
mean he left a company. You just turn the key into this company and the engine runs. That
was the state of it and his point was: “don’t make it crash because you have everything to
make it beautiful”. And he was right.

Phillip

The other thing is, he (CEO-I) has got a very strategic mind so he helped me with
understanding how he thinks of the company and how he built the company. So the company
is a different company and you have to understand the man (CEO-I) before you can
understand the company and so it was really good for me.

Randall

If you think about the history of the company with Jack as CEO, it went from a very small
company to a medium sized company. He grew it from 400 million in assets to when he
retired at just around 17 billion in assets. So significant growth both in assets and in
profitability as well. The company essentially doubled every five years.

Rodney

Barry (CEO-I) was a genius in how he took the company to the next level.

Stanley

We had grown dramatically in revenue and in number of stores and in number of employees

Wayne

He (CEO-I) took the company from one person in the 70s - which was Danny - to 68000,
worldwide in 40 countries so it works

Appendix H: Description of the predecessor by the CEO-D
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